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Displaying: 1-4 of 4 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 2
Owen Cotton-Barratt, William MacAskill, Toby Ord Statistical Normalization Methods in Interpersonal and Intertheoretic Comparisons
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A major problem for interpersonal aggregation is how to compare utility across individuals; a major problem for decision-making under normative uncertainty is the formally analogous problem of how to compare choice-worthiness across theories. We introduce and study a class of methods, which we call statistical normalization methods, for making interpersonal comparisons of utility and intertheoretic comparisons of choice-worthiness. We argue against the statistical normalization methods that have been proposed in the literature. We argue, instead, in favor of normalization of variance: we claim that this is the account that most plausibly gives all individuals or theories ‘equal say’. To this end, we provide two proofs that variance normalization has desirable properties that all other normalization methods lack, though we also show how different assumptions could lead one to axiomatize alternative statistical normalization methods.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 2
Christine Tiefensee "Ought" and Error
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The moral error theory generally does not receive good press in metaethics. This paper adds to the bad news. In contrast to other critics, though, I do not attack error theorists’ characteristic thesis that no moral assertion is ever true. Instead, I develop a new counter-argument which questions error theorists’ ability to defend their claim that moral utterances are (typically) meaningful assertions. More precisely: Moral error theorists lack a convincing account of the meaning of deontic moral assertions, or so I will argue.
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 2
Call for Submissions: The Isaac Levi Prize
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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 2
Memo to Authors
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