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Displaying: 1-10 of 11993 documents

1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Ethan Jerzak Two Ways to Want?
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I present unexplored and unaccounted for uses of ‘wants’. I call them advisory uses, on which information inaccessible to the desirer herself helps determine what she wants. I show that extant theories by Stalnaker, Heim, and Levinson fail to predict these uses. They also fail to predict true indicative conditionals with ‘wants’ in the consequent. These problems are related: intuitively valid reasoning with modus ponens on the basis of the conditionals in question results in unembedded advisory uses. I consider two fixes, and end up endorsing a relativist semantics, according to which desire attributions express information-neutral propositions. On this view, ‘wants’ functions as a precisification of ‘ought’, which exhibits similar unembedded and compositional behavior. I conclude by sketching a pragmatic account of the purpose of desire attributions that explains why it made sense for them to evolve in this way.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Richard Holton Lying About
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We do not report lies with that-clauses but with about-clauses: he lied about x. It is argued that this is because the content of a lie need not be the content of what is said, and about-clauses give us the requisite flexibility. Building on the work of Stephen Yablo, an attempt is made to give an account of lying about in terms of partial content and topic.
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3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Raphael van Riel Lying beyond a Conversational Purpose: A Critique of Stokke's Assertion-Based Account of Lying
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In this paper, I argue that a particular assertion-based account of lying, which rests on Stalnaker’s theory of assertions, proposed by Andreas Stokke, is both too broad and too narrow. I tentatively conclude that the account fails because lying does not necessarily involve a conversational purpose.
book reviews
4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Zoltán Gendler Szabó Barry Schein: 'And': Conjunction Reduction Redux
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5. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 1
Florian Steinberger Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative
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According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. Gilbert Harman challenged the view that there is any straightforward connection between logical consequence and norms of reasoning. Authors including John MacFarlane and Hartry Field have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view. I argue that the debate is marred by a failure to distinguish three types of normative assessment, and hence three ways to understand the question of the normativity of logic. Logical principles might be thought to provide the reasoning agent with first-personal directives; they might be thought to serve as third-personal evaluative standards; or they might underwrite our third-personal appraisals of others whereby we attribute praise and blame. I characterize the three normative functions in general terms and show how a failure to appreciate this threefold distinction has led disputants to talk past one another. I further show how the distinction encourages fruitful engagement with and, ultimately, resolution of the question.
6. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 1
Peter Tan Counterpossible Non-vacuity in Scientific Practice
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The longstanding philosophical orthodoxy on counterfactuals holds, in part, that counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents (“counterpossibles”) are indiscriminately vacuously true. Drawing on a number of examples from across scientific practice, I argue that science routinely treats counterpossibles as non-vacuously true and also routinely treats other counterpossibles as false. In fact, the success of many central scientific endeavors requires that counterpossibles can be non-vacuously true or false. So the philosophical orthodoxy that counterpossibles are indiscriminately vacuously true is inconsistent with scientific practice. I argue that this provides a conclusive reason to reject the orthodoxy.
7. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 1
In Memoriam: Isaac Levi
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8. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 12
David J. Chalmers Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism
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Cartesian arguments for global skepticism about the external world start from the premise that we cannot know that we are not in a Cartesian scenario such as an evil-demon scenario, and infer that because most of our empirical beliefs are false in such a scenario, these beliefs do not constitute knowledge. Veridicalist responses to global skepticism respond that arguments fail because in Cartesian scenarios, many or most of our empirical beliefs are true. Some veridicalist responses (suggested by Bouswma, Putnam, and Davidson) have been motivated using verificationism, externalism, and coherentism. I argue that a more powerful veridicalist response to global skepticism can be motivated by structuralism, on which physical entities are understood as those that play a certain structural role. I develop the structuralist response and address objections.
9. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 12
Remco Heesen Why the Reward Structure of Science Makes Reproducibility Problems Inevitable
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Recent philosophical work has praised the reward structure of science, while recent empirical work has shown that many scientific results may not be reproducible. I argue that the reward structure of science incentivizes scientists to focus on speed and impact at the expense of the reproducibility of their work, thus contributing to the so-called reproducibility crisis. I use a rational choice model to identify a set of sufficient conditions for this problem to arise, and I argue that these conditions plausibly apply to a wide range of research situations. Currently proposed solutions will not fully address this problem. Philosophical commentators should temper their optimism about the reward structure of science.
book reviews
10. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 12
Paul Teller Catherine Z. Elgin: True Enough
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