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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Randall Colton A Thomistic Defense of the Distinction Between the Moral and Intellectual Virtues
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Contemporary virtue epistemologists often evince a great deal of sympathy for the virtue ethics of Aristotle and Aquinas. For the most part, they also deny the distinction between the moral and intellectual virtues that is common to Aristotle and Aquinas. More sustained reflection on Thomas’s account of the intellectual virtues can show that this distinction has been too hastily dismissed. To that end this paper will offer a defense of Thomas’s version of the distinction by responding to four theses that are often taken to provide compelling grounds for rejecting it.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Thomas M. Lennon The Will’s Free Choice: Does Descartes Change His Mind in the Principles?
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Focusing on the only two texts from the Principles cited on behalf of the libertarian interpretation provides a handle on the otherwise intractable debate over Descartes’s conception of free choice of the will. The main point of this paper is to argue that these texts do not advance a libertarian conception and that therefore at least one attractive version of the libertarian interpretation, according to which Descartes changes his mind there to espouse the libertarian conception, fails. But even a weaker version of this main point shows how broad its implications are. For even if it has been shown only that these texts need not be read in libertarian terms, then at least the burden of proof has been shifted to those who view Descartes as everywhere a libertarian, with no change of mind.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Gretchen Gusich Three Aristotelian Moments in Husserl’s Phenomenological Account of Truth
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Heidegger famously appeals to Aristotle because of substantive and methodological commonalities, particularly with regard to truth. But there are three respects in which Husserl’s account of truth is more in keeping with Aristotle than Heidegger’s own account is. (1) Husserl’s account acknowledges and preserves the value of pre-philosophical experience. (2) It is more natural and less violent. (3) It recognizes truth as a cognitive achievement. This paper presents the salient features of both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenological reworkings of the correspondence theory of truth, outlines the strengths of Husserl’s account vis-à-vis Aristotle, and shows how Husserl’s account safeguards against Heidegger’s concern with mere utterance, thus opening up a new line of inquiry for Husserlian phenomenologists.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Robert Geis A Failed Point in Kant: Boundary, Indivisibility, Fluxion, and the A Priori Form of Space
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A critical flaw in Kant, hitherto unremarked in the literature, is our focus here. Kant’s doctrine of the a priori form of space as a condition for human experience and that of space as a fluxion makes impossible experiences of objects that he admits constitute human awareness. Imaginative synthesis in accord with the categories provides Kant no egress from this difficulty. The Kantian critical project does not account for how we experience and for this reason fails at what it attempts, viz., a metaphysic of knowledge.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Jeffrey Dirk Wilson A Consideration of Roland Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text: From an Erotics to an Agapics of Reading
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Richard Howard calls Roland Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text the first “erotics of reading” in which we, as readers, “instance our ecstasy, our bliss in the text.” Yet Barthes writes as if his erotic reading of texts were an analogue to some other relationship, perhaps to an unnamed, even unwritten text. Thus his is a transcendent eroticism in which the encounter with the text points beyond the text. As alternative to an erotics of reading, this paper proposes an agapics of reading, also called Christian textualism. It seeks to establish, first, the relationship of agape and eros as substance and its shadow, and arguing, second, that every text can be read agapically, i.e., to discover the substance of which the text is a shadow. The paper concludes by exemplifying the method of Christian textualism through an agapic reading of The Pleasure of the Text’s final paragraph.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Christopher B. Kulp Disagreement and the Defensibility of Moral Intuitionism
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This paper takes up the Disagreement Objection to Moral Intuitionism, which is roughly this: If moral intuitions conflict, there must be falsehood somewhere. But there is no respectable way to resolve such conflict because there is no respectable way to choose between intuitions. Therefore, moral intuitions cannot serve their intended role of grounding justified moral belief and knowledge. This paper rebuts the Disagreement Objection: it recommends a doxastic interpretation of moral intuitions and argues that we have many resources to adjudicate intuitional conflict. I develop analogies between intuitional and non-intuitional disagreement, and I develop the concept of an intuitional background to show how intuitional disagreement may be resolved. The paper diagnoses the genesis of the Disagreement Objection as largely based on the Fallacy of Perspectival Infallibility and on an instance of the Justification Isolation Fallacy. The Disagreement Objection does not refute Moral Intuitionism.
book reviews
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Paul Kucharski Knowing the Natural Law: From Precepts and Inclinations to Deriving Oughts. By Steven J. Jensen
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
James Swindal Neo-Scholastic Essays. By Edward Feser
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide. Edited by Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras
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11. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Alberto Luis López Berkeley Revisited: Moral, Social and Political Philosophy. Edited by Sébastien Charles
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12. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Kirk G. Kanzelberger Thinking About Thinking: What Kind of Conversation is Philosophy? By Adriaan Peperzak
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13. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Books Received
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14. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Index for Volume 56
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15. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
About Our Contributors
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16. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
James Wood The Goodness of Pleasure in Plato’s Philebus
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This paper takes a nuanced stance against an intellectualist position that is strong in the literature on the Philebus by arguing that pleasure’s goodness is inherent but not independent. Pleasure is worth pursuing together with intellectual activity in the mixed life because pleasure is the sensual manifestation, direct or indirect, of growth in goodness. Pleasure as the expression of this growth is the sensual component of the mixture that Socrates in this dialogue defends as the good for human beings. But if pleasure’s contribution to the overall goodness of a human life is not to be outweighed by some corresponding badness, it must reflect an accurate assessment of the goodness of our experiences and either proceed directly from the right kind of intellectual or psychic activity or else be subordinated to the rational ordering activity of intellect according to the standards of virtue, moderation, and health.
17. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Joseph Forte Explaining Hope in Plato’s Philebus
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My aim in this paper is to illustrate the significance of hope (elpis, elpizein) in Plato’s Philebus and to indicate topics under this heading that invite further investigation. Even though there is some scholarship treating the issue of hope in the Philebus, there is no study solely devoted to this topic. By providing such a study I intend to fill this lacuna and to show that examining this topic is valuable because it develops our understanding of the good life. In this essay I maintain that the Philebus defines hope as (1) a pleasure of the soul that (2) anticipates pleasure as certain, (3) may be true or false, (4) may be pure or impure, and (5) involves memory. I proceed chronologically through the Philebus’s discussions of hope and make every effort to treat each of the aforementioned components of the definition separately. In so doing I explain why certain topics, such as the relationship between pure intellectual hope and philosophical activity, invite further investigation.
18. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Jeremy Bell The Coherence of Socrates’s Mission
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The debate over Socrates’s claim in the Apology to have practiced philosophy as a divinely ordained mission is almost as old as this claim itself. Yet scholars remain divided over the issue because of the extraordinary difficulty of understanding how Socrates interpreted the negative proclamation of the oracle as providing a positive prescription for a way of life. Finding this difficultly insurmountable, many authors have denied the coherence of Socrates’s account. In this essay, I argue that the debate can be resolved by revisiting the interpretation of human wisdom offered in the Apology. Demonstrating that Socrates understands human wisdom to be structurally incompatible with the claim to possess it, I show that he is thereby prevented from ever simply affirming the truth of the oracle and that this, in turn, establishes his philosophical practice as a lifelong mission.
19. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Stephen R. Munzer Kierkegaard on Purity of Heart
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Kierkegaard holds that purity of heart is to will one thing. But his treatment of despair, double-mindedness, and self-deception runs into difficulties over whether one can choose beliefs about oneself, which theories of the will (if any) could establish its unity, and whether the individual who fails to become pure of heart is blameworthy. Pace Kierkegaard, willing the good does not make immutable the person who so wills, and purity of heart should not be entirely will-based. This essay articulates a broad understanding of purity of heart whose value and importance in moral and religious life are much clearer. This understanding recasts willing in terms of certain higher-order desires, identifies ambivalence as a different phenomenon from double-mindedness, brings in motives and beliefs, emphasizes trusting radically in God, and explicates purity of heart as a moral and religious ideal.
20. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 3
Tetsushi Hirano Reason as Acquaintance with Background and the Performative Turn in Phenomenology
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Husserl’s notion of “sense” has often been interpreted through a Fregean lens. I will show that Husserl saw it as an acquaintance with the background or horizon of perceptual objects. He understands reason (Vernunft) as prescribing rules for performance with regard to perceptual objects. Thus Husserl’s view has a wider scope of experience than Kant’s sense of it as a pre-reflective acquaintance with one’s environment. After Ideas I Husserl develops these notions as part of his theory of the intersubjective world. Heidegger takes over the insights of Husserl and brings out the performative turn inherent in phenomenology by critiquing Husserl’s orientation to theoretical perceptual experience. The reference of performative expressions is not determined by the contents but by performance. What is disclosed in the phenomenological notion of sense is the background against which human existence is to be understood.