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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Randall Colton, A Thomistic Defense of the Distinction Between the Moral and Intellectual Virtues
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Contemporary virtue epistemologists often evince a great deal of sympathy for the virtue ethics of Aristotle and Aquinas. For the most part, they also deny the distinction between the moral and intellectual virtues that is common to Aristotle and Aquinas. More sustained reflection on Thomas’s account of the intellectual virtues can show that this distinction has been too hastily dismissed. To that end this paper will offer a defense of Thomas’s version of the distinction by responding to four theses that are often taken to provide compelling grounds for rejecting it.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Thomas M. Lennon, The Will’s Free Choice: Does Descartes Change His Mind in the Principles?
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Focusing on the only two texts from the Principles cited on behalf of the libertarian interpretation provides a handle on the otherwise intractable debate over Descartes’s conception of free choice of the will. The main point of this paper is to argue that these texts do not advance a libertarian conception and that therefore at least one attractive version of the libertarian interpretation, according to which Descartes changes his mind there to espouse the libertarian conception, fails. But even a weaker version of this main point shows how broad its implications are. For even if it has been shown only that these texts need not be read in libertarian terms, then at least the burden of proof has been shifted to those who view Descartes as everywhere a libertarian, with no change of mind.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Gretchen Gusich, Three Aristotelian Moments in Husserl’s Phenomenological Account of Truth
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Heidegger famously appeals to Aristotle because of substantive and methodological commonalities, particularly with regard to truth. But there are three respects in which Husserl’s account of truth is more in keeping with Aristotle than Heidegger’s own account is. (1) Husserl’s account acknowledges and preserves the value of pre-philosophical experience. (2) It is more natural and less violent. (3) It recognizes truth as a cognitive achievement. This paper presents the salient features of both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenological reworkings of the correspondence theory of truth, outlines the strengths of Husserl’s account vis-à-vis Aristotle, and shows how Husserl’s account safeguards against Heidegger’s concern with mere utterance, thus opening up a new line of inquiry for Husserlian phenomenologists.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Robert Geis, A Failed Point in Kant: Boundary, Indivisibility, Fluxion, and the A Priori Form of Space
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A critical flaw in Kant, hitherto unremarked in the literature, is our focus here. Kant’s doctrine of the a priori form of space as a condition for human experience and that of space as a fluxion makes impossible experiences of objects that he admits constitute human awareness. Imaginative synthesis in accord with the categories provides Kant no egress from this difficulty. The Kantian critical project does not account for how we experience and for this reason fails at what it attempts, viz., a metaphysic of knowledge.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Jeffrey Dirk Wilson, A Consideration of Roland Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text: From an Erotics to an Agapics of Reading
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Richard Howard calls Roland Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text the first “erotics of reading” in which we, as readers, “instance our ecstasy, our bliss in the text.” Yet Barthes writes as if his erotic reading of texts were an analogue to some other relationship, perhaps to an unnamed, even unwritten text. Thus his is a transcendent eroticism in which the encounter with the text points beyond the text. As alternative to an erotics of reading, this paper proposes an agapics of reading, also called Christian textualism. It seeks to establish, first, the relationship of agape and eros as substance and its shadow, and arguing, second, that every text can be read agapically, i.e., to discover the substance of which the text is a shadow. The paper concludes by exemplifying the method of Christian textualism through an agapic reading of The Pleasure of the Text’s final paragraph.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Christopher B. Kulp, Disagreement and the Defensibility of Moral Intuitionism
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This paper takes up the Disagreement Objection to Moral Intuitionism, which is roughly this: If moral intuitions conflict, there must be falsehood somewhere. But there is no respectable way to resolve such conflict because there is no respectable way to choose between intuitions. Therefore, moral intuitions cannot serve their intended role of grounding justified moral belief and knowledge. This paper rebuts the Disagreement Objection: it recommends a doxastic interpretation of moral intuitions and argues that we have many resources to adjudicate intuitional conflict. I develop analogies between intuitional and non-intuitional disagreement, and I develop the concept of an intuitional background to show how intuitional disagreement may be resolved. The paper diagnoses the genesis of the Disagreement Objection as largely based on the Fallacy of Perspectival Infallibility and on an instance of the Justification Isolation Fallacy. The Disagreement Objection does not refute Moral Intuitionism.
book reviews
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Paul Kucharski, Knowing the Natural Law: From Precepts and Inclinations to Deriving Oughts. By Steven J. Jensen
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
James Swindal, Neo-Scholastic Essays. By Edward Feser
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J., Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide. Edited by Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras
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