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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Mark K. Spencer, The Flexibility of Divine Simplicity: Aquinas, Scotus, Palamas
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Contrary to many interpreters, I argue that Thomas Aquinas’s account of divine simplicity is compatible with the accounts of divine simplicity given by John Duns Scotus and Gregory Palamas. I synthesize their accounts of divine simplicity in a way that can answer the standard objections to the doctrine of divine simplicity more effectively than any of their individual accounts can. The three objections that I consider here are these: the doctrine of divine simplicity is inconsistent with distinguishing divine attributes, with the doctrine of the Trinity, and with the doctrine of divine freedom.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Ezequiel L. Posesorski, Maimon’s Late Ethical Skepticism and the Rejection of Kant’s Notion of the Moral Law
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This paper discusses a set of arguments launched in Salomon Maimon’s 1800 Der moralische Skeptiker against Kant’s notion of the moral law. Apart from being an almost overlooked chapter in the history of post-Kantian ethics, this work is one in which Maimon takes issue with four related aspects of the ethical thesis and methodology presented in Kant’s second Kritik. At the core of the discussion is Maimon’s emphasis on a major incongruity in the correlation of Kant’s notions of theoretical and practical reason: objectively valid statements in ethics should not qualitatively diverge from those in theoretical science. It is in this context that the paper discusses the late Maimonian thesis that Kant’s factual notion of the moral law cannot be reconciled with his notion of theoretical rigor. It also shows why, for Maimon, the highest principle of Kantian ethics should reveal itself to be theoretically untenable and dogmatic, and hence lead to skepticism.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Steven G. Smith, Meaningful Moral Freedom: An Improved Kantian View
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Kant’s central notion of a “causality of freedom” seems inconsistent with his theoretical analysis of causation. Because of its detachment from any reference to time, it is also seriously in tension with ordinary moral ideals of individuality, efficacy, responsiveness, and personal growth in the exercise of freedom. I suggest a way of conceiving moral freedom that avoids the absurdity of practical timelessness while preserving the main strengths of Kant’s theories of theoretical and practical meaning, including his refusal to specify the content of human fulfillment. Much as Kant’s ideal of the highest good combines the supreme good of moral virtue with its necessarily desired complement of worthy happiness, a Kantian ideal of the fullest freedom can combine the transcendental freedom of the moral disposition with individual exercises of freedom in the dramatic interaction of actual moral community.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Luca Forgione, Kant and the Simple Representation “I”
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The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: (1) in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; (2) in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational nature. It proves helpful to interpret the “transcendental subject” in formal terms as a concept that, mutatis mutandis, has the same function of the concept of the “transcendental object.”
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Jonathan J. Sanford, Aristotle on Evil as Privation
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The notion that evil is not simply a privation but a privation of a due good has roots in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and implications for other areas of his thought. In making this case, I begin with a description of the standard view of Aristotle’s place in the development of the privation theory of evil and contend that the standard view does not do justice to Aristotle’s theory of evil. I then provide an interpretation of a portion of Metaphysics Theta that utilizes recent scholarship on this book of the Metaphysics in an effort to demonstrate that Aristotle thinks of evil in such a manner as to be compatible with what the later tradition describes in terms of evil as the deprivation of a due good. I then consider several of the ways in which Aristotle’s metaphysical theory of evil has impact on other areas of his thought.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
David M. Holley, Confident Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue
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Religious communities that speak of faith typically affirm the ideal of a highly confident faith. If we understand confidence in terms of the quality of assent to faith-claims, however, it is difficult to reconcile a high degree of confidence with intellectual virtue. As an alternative, I propose to construe confident faith as a kind of trusting perception. The sort of confidence that I envision here makes sense as a religious ideal. In addition it leaves room for the recognition of epistemic risk needed for intellectual humility as well as for the kind of openness to revising the content of faith in the light of relevant evidential considerations that intellectual integrity demands. Furthermore, someone with this type of confidence can find a particular faith compelling, while also acknowledging some faiths that make conflicting claims to be reasonable options.
book reviews
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
John W. Peck, S.J., Evolution, Chance and God: Understanding the Relationship between Evolution and Religion. By Brendan Sweetman
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Clara Sarrocco, Arendt’s Judgment: Freedom, Responsibility, Citizenship. By Jonathan Peter Schwartz
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Sam Zeno Conedera, S.J., The Human Rights State: Justice Within and Beyond Sovereign Nations. By Benjamin Gregg
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