Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-20 of 22 documents


symposium: kidney for sale by owner, revisited
1. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
James Stacey Taylor Introduction to Symposium: Kidney for Sale By Owner, Revisited
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
2. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Simon Rippon Organ Markets and Disrespectful Demands
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
There is a libertarian argument for live donor organ markets, according to which live donor organ markets would be permitted if we simply refrained from imposing any substantive and controversial moral assumptions on people who reasonably disagree about morality and justice. I argue that, to the contrary, this endorsement of live donor organ markets depends upon the libertarians’ adoption of a substantive and deeply controversial conception of strong, extensive property rights. This is shown by the fact that these rights would prevent states intervening in cases of preventable and intuitively impermissible wronging of others that can arise when free individuals engage in voluntary offers and exchanges. I outline two forms of such wronging: discrimination and disrespectful demands. I argue that although these types of acts are morally impermissible, the policy question of whether and how they should be regulated by states is non-trivial. I then argue that there is good reason to think that organ markets would rely on disrespectful demands. This may help explain the widespread moral repugnance people feel toward organ trading. It also provides a , though not decisive, case for states to prohibit such markets.
3. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Julian J. Koplin Consequences and Kidneys
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Kidney for Sale by Owner discusses a range of different arguments that can be offered in defence of live donor kidney markets. Although Cherry’s case for establishing such markets does not rest on consequentialist considerations, Cherry nonetheless suggests that allowing the sale of organs would have net positive consequences. He argues that both renal failure patients and people living in poverty could benefit from participating in the market, and further claims that a legal trade in organs would not shape society in harmful ways. This paper argues that the likely consequences of establishing an open market in kidneys are less benign than Cherry suggests. Specifically, I argue that a live donor kidney market could plausibly harm sellers, give rise to harmful pressures to participate in the market, and reinforce unjust political and social structures. I conclude by considering the implications of these arguments for the organ market debate.
4. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Cansu Canca On Coercive Offers: In Support of a Market in Kidneys
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
A prominent argument against a market in kidneys is the Argument from Coercion (AfC). AfC claims that a market would violate the autonomy of typical suppliers by presenting them with coercive offers. Engaging with Cherry’s response to AfC, this paper argues that while a consistent AfC could be constructed, it would still fail to justify a prohibition of a market. AfC, as fully formulated, only holds if we assume that the state is obligated to provide for the basic needs of its citizens. Once such a state functions ideally, a market ceases to involve coercion, thus making a prohibition redundant. In fact, such a state’s obligation to care for its citizens supports a market in kidneys. On the other hand, if the state is dysfunctional, then while a market could involve coercive offers, a prohibition would not restore, and would present a further constraint on, individual autonomy.
5. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Peter Jaworski How to do Applied Ethics Right
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Mark Cherry’s Kidney for Sale by Owner is a book that illustrates how to do applied ethics right. Mark Cherry recognizes the important role of empirical facts in bridging a gap between our moral prescriptions, and our public policy or institutional prescriptions. In Kidney for Sale by Owner this method is on full display. While there is nothing the matter with Ideal Theory, we stand in need of what might be called bridge principles between the ideals of justice and some specific set of institutions that, we intend and hope, will actually realize those ideals. The bridge between Ideal and Actual will consist of empirical facts that require the tools of the social scientists.
6. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Mark J. Cherry Kidney for Sale by Owner: Endorsing a Secular Heresy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper defends an in principle understanding of the authority of persons over themselves and, in consequence, argues for significant limits on morally permissible state authority. It also defends an account of the limits of permissible state action that distinguishes between (a) the ability of persons to convey authority to common projects and (b) what may be judged virtuous, good, safe, or proper to do. In terms of organ transplantation policy, it concludes that it is morally acceptable, and should be legally permissible, for individuals to sell one of their kidneys while living, pocketing the cash to use as that person sees fit to advance their own understanding of their own best interests. Morally objectionable policy proposals, I argue, are not those that encourage individuals to sell a redundant kidney while living or families to sell the organs of a recently deceased loved one, but those that seek coercively to confiscate the organs of the recently deceased. Recognizing the authority of persons over themselves, and their ability to convey moral authority to common projects, including the sale of human organs for transplantation, would shed light on the medical marketplace and clarify public policy, while increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of procuring human organs for transplantation.
articles
7. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Jennifer Mei Sze Ang Moral Dilemmas and Moral Injury
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Psychiatrists working with war veterans have, in recent years, constructed ‘moral injury’ as a separate manifestation of war trauma that is distinct from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). This paper argues that for moral degradation to occur, it necessarily involves one’s commissions or omissions that transgresses one’s personal morality, and hence, distinguishes sufferers of moral injury from PTSD sufferers who were witnesses to traumatic and morally abhorrent events. To this end, it clarifies how some of the situations surrounding moral injury are misunderstood, by discussing the process of moral reasoning in the context of moral dilemmas, dirty hands, and moral blind alleys. Finally, it concludes that when we conceptualise moral injury as being caused by one’s commissions and omissions in moral dilemmas, we find that shame and guilt are situation-appropriate responses with a role to play in what ethics mean.
8. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Susan T. Gardner Human Agency: Its Pedagogical Implications
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Let us suppose that we accept that humans can be correctly characterized as agents (and hence held responsible for their actions). Let us further presume that this capacity contrasts with most non-human animals. Thus, since agency is what uniquely constitutes what it is to be human, it must be of supreme importance. If these claims have any merit, it would seem to follow that, if agency can be nurtured through education, then it is an overarching moral imperative that educational initiatives be undertaken to do that. In this paper, it will be argued that agency can indeed be enhanced, and that the worldwide educational initiative called Philosophy for Children (P 4C), and others like it, are in a unique position to do just that, and, therefore, that P4C deserves our praise and support; while denigrations of such efforts for not being “real philosophy” ought to be thoroughly renounced.
9. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Rodney C. Roberts The Idea of an Age of Majority
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper gives a brief history of the idea of an age of majority and argues that no age of majority should exceed the fighting age, i.e., the age at which a person becomes eligible to serve in (or liable to conscription into) a military unit. Several objections to the proposed constraint on ages of majority are raised and answered.
10. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
Michael S. Pritchard, Elaine E. Englehardt Moral Development and Professional Integrity
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
We rely on doctors, accountants, engineers, and other professionals to be committed to the basic values of their professions and to exercise their ex­pertise in competent, reliable ways, even when no one is watching them do their work. That is, we expect them to have professional integrity. Children obviously do not yet have professional integrity, even if someday they will become professionals. Nevertheless, the moral development of children who will become professionals plays an important role in the eventual emergence of their professional integrity. We will discuss both what this integrity involves and how the basic moral development of children contributes to its emergence in professional life.
11. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 2
About the Contributors
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
symposium on trump and conflicts of interest
12. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Elliot D. Cohen Introduction
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
13. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Michael Davis Trumping Conflicts of Interest
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
As President, Donald Trumps faces two sorts of conflict of interest. The first are conflicts of interest other Presidents also faced, though Trump’s are “writ large.” These seem—as a practical matter—unavoidable now, hard to escape, not to be much changed by disclosure, and not even much subject to management. The other sort of conflict of interest seems to be without resolution even in principle while Trump remains both President and the person he is. These conflicts of interest are the product of the same life that made him President. He cannot be both chief executive of a republic (as his oath of office requires him to be) and the royal autocratic central to his business brand.
14. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Aaron Quinn Fake News, False Beliefs, and the Need for Truth in Journalism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Many of U.S. President Donald Trump’s business interests—and those of his family and close associates—either conflict or could conflict with his position as the country’s top elected official. Despite concerns about the vitality of the journalism industry, these actual or potential conflicts have been reported in great detail across a number of journalism platforms. More concerning, however, are the partisan news organizations on both the right and left that deliberately sow social discord by exciting deeply polarized political tensions among the U.S. populous. Often described as “fake” news, these organizations produce reports that seem designed to create outrage among audiences instead of enlightenment. This paper draws upon social epistemology and information ethics to offer a truth-based ethos for journalism to help overcome this pernicious form of exploitation.
15. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Stephen Kershnar Does the Emolument Rule Exist for the President?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this article, I argue that with regard to the President, the Emoluments Clause (EC) is not law. I argue for this on the basis of two premises. First, if something is a law, then it has a legal remedy. Second, EC does not have a legal remedy. This premise rests on one or more of the following assumptions: EC does not apply to the President; if EC were to apply to the President, it does not provide a remedy; or, if EC were to apply to the President and have a remedy, it is not law because it is vague. The conclusion that EC does not apply to the President has a practical upshot. As a practical matter, President Trump’s worldwide business tentacles and his refusal to put his business assets into a blind trust does not violate EC and, arguably, does not violate federal conflict-of-interest law.
16. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Fritz Allhoff, Jonathan Milgrim Conflicts of Interest, Emoluments, and the Presidency
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The past presidential election reinvigorated interest in the applicability of conflict of interest legislation to the executive branch. In § 2, we survey various approaches to conflicts of interest, paying particular attention to 18 U.S.C. § 208. Under 18 U.S.C. § 202, this conflict of interest statute is straightforwardly inapplicable to the President. We then explore the normative foundations of such an exemption in § 3. While these sections are ultimately lenient, we go on to consider the Emoluments Clause of the United States Constitution in § 4. In §§ 5–6, we apply the Emoluments Clause to the presidency, arguing that it complements conflict-of-interest regimes with regards to foreign affairs, but with more substantial restrictions.
symposium of refugees, libertarianism, and welfare rights
17. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
James P. Sterba Libertarianism and Refugees
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
18. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Jan Narveson Libertarianism and the Refugees Problem
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
19. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
James P. Sterba Response to Narveson on the Refugees Problem
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
20. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Clifton Perry Confrontation and Its Discontents
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The United States Supreme Court has held that the criminal’s constitutional right of confrontation is not abridged when the defendant is not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine each and every witness offering evidence for the government. This rather surprising contention is investigated through an analysis of the Court’s arguments in light of certain philosophical principles.