>> Go to Current Issue

Faith and Philosophy

Volume 17, Issue 4, October 2000
Kant's Philosophy of Religion

Table of Contents

Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:

Displaying: 1-10 of 10 documents

1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Robert Merrihew Adams God, Possibility, and Kant
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In one of his precritical works, Kant defends, as “the only possible” way of demonstrating the existence of God, an argument from the nature of possibility. Whereas Leibniz had argued that possibilities must be thought by God in order to obtain the ontological standing that they need, Kant argued that at least the most fundamental possibilities must be exemplified in God. Here Kant’s argument is critically examined in comparison with its Leibnizian predecessor, and it is suggested that an argument combining the strengths of both of them has much to be said for it
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
William F. Vallicella Does the Cosmological Argument Depend on the Ontological?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Does the cosmological argument (CA) depend on the ontological (OA)? That depends. If the OA is an argument “from mere concepts,” then no; if the OA is an argument from possibility, then yes. That is my main thesis. Along the way, I explore a number of subsidiary themes, among them, the nature of proof in metaphysics, and what Kant calls the “mystery of absolute necessity.”
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
John E. Hare Kant on Recognizing Our Duties As God’s Commands
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Kant both says that we should recognize our duties as God’s commands, and objects to the theological version of heteronomy, ‘which derives morality from a divine and supremely perfect will’. In this paper I discuss how these two views fit together, and in the process I develop a notion of autonomous submission to divine moral authority. I oppose the ‘constitutive’ view of autonomy proposed by J. B. Schneewind and Christine Korsgaard. I locate Kant’s objection to theological heteronomy against the background of Crusius’s divine command theory, and I compare Kant’s views about divine authority and human political authority.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Jacqueline Marina Transformation and Personal Identity In Kant
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper explores how Kant’s development of the idea of the disposition in the Religion copes with problems implied by Kant’s idea of transcendental freedom. Since transcendental freedom implies the power of absolutely beginning a state, and therefore of absolutely beginning a series of the consequences of that state, a transcendentally free act is divorced from the preceding state of an agent, and would thus seem to be divorced from the agent’s character as well. The paper is divided into two parts. First I analyze Kant’s understanding of the disposition and discuss the ways in which it allows us to understand a person’s transcendentally free actions in terms of that person’s character. I then discuss Kant’s resources for understanding the Socratic injunction to care for the soul in light of his concept of the disposition.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Allen Wood Religion, Ethical Community and the Struggle Against Evil
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper deals with the motivation behind Kant’s conception of “religion” as “the recognition of all our duties as divine commands”. It argues that in order to understand this motivation, we must grasp Kant’s conception of radical evil as social in origin, and the response to it as equally social - the creation of a voluntary, universal “ethical community”. Kant's historical model for this community is a religious community (especially the Christian church), though Kant regards traditional churches or religious communities as suitable to their moral vocation only if they undergo Enlightenment reform. The paper concludes with a plea for the Enlightenment view of religion, and an indictment of the common failure to understand it correctly.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Philip L. Quinn Kantian Philosophical Ecclesiology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper begins with an outline of some of the main themes in the ecclesiology Kant presents in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. It then discusses implications of Kant’s ecclesiology for issues concerning scriptural interpretation and religious toleration. With the help of these implications, an objection to Kant’s ecclesiology is developed, and a Kantian ecclesiology modified in response to the objection is sketched out. The Roman Catholic ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council is compared to both Kant’s ecclesiology and the modified Kantian ecclesiology. It is argued that on some points the ecclesiology of Vatican II represents movement in the direction of Kant’s ecclesio]ogy while on others tension between Kant and Vatican II can be reduced by the modified Kantian ecclesiology.
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Kelli S. O’Brien Kant and Swinburne on Revelation
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Immanuel Kant’s position on special revelation is a matter of debate. Here I discuss Kant’s position in detail and compare it to that of Richard Swinburne. I examine both philosophers’ views on the assertability of special revelation, its contingency, whether it is necessary, the possibility of error, and appropriate methods of interpretation. I argue that, like Swinburne, Kant finds belief in special revelation to be acceptable, even beneficial, under certain circumstances.
8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
James K. A. Smith Re-Kanting Postmodernism?: Derrida’s Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This essay considers the legacy of Kant’s philosophy of religion as appropriated by Jacques Derrida in his recent, “Foi et savoir: les deux sources de la ‘religion’ aux limites de la simple raison.” Derrida’s adoption of this Kantian framework raises the question of how one might describe this as a postmodern account of religion, which in turn raises the question of the relationship between modernity and postmodernity in general, and Derrida’s relationship to Kant in particular. Following an exposition of Derrida’s notion of a formal “ethical” religion as a repetition of Kant’s critique in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, I offer a critique of Derrida’s (and Kant’s) “formalization” of religion and the relationship between faith and reason, arguing that a more persistent postmodernism requires a de-formalization of the modern concern for justice, appreciating its determinate prophetic origin.
notes and news
9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Notes and News
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Index of Volume 17, 2000
view |  rights & permissions | cited by