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Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy

Volume 2, Issue 1, 2018
Ancient Greek Philosophy: Pre-Socratic Philosophy

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Displaying: 1-10 of 11 documents

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1. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Fabiola Menezes de Araujo The Sentence of Parmenides’ Poem “[...] are the same being and thinking” (“τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστί<ν> τε καὶ εἶναι”)
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This paper intends to lead with one of the most famous sentences of the Parmenides’ poem Peri physeos: “[...] are the same thinking and being”. The proposal is to bring some considerations of Jacques Lacan and of Martin Heidegger that concern also this sentence, and then to achieve one interpretation that includes both considerations. Those considerations seem to be in contraction in the beginning, but, when we look forward, we see that they both criticize the modern way of thinking to talk about one distinguished experience that fundamentally the Greek poem introduces: the thinking – noein – as existing in the mood of the being; that is einai. We develop the notion that this experience can show the destiny to who seeks it.
2. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Seweryn Blandzi A New Approach to the Parmenides’ Revelation: The Route of Truth - the Riddle Resolved
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The author wishes to show that in Parmenides’ approach, the Aristotelian division of being and the truth still do not exist: being as presence or an object in general, individual or universal, material or mental, and the truth as the value of the judgment, because for the Eleatic word ‘to eon’ only means the truth. This word is the name of the truth as a transcendent nature (resp. essence) in general. In his poem Parmenides, for whom the truth is the only Being, praises and describes the existence of the truth (identified with what truly is or with pure being par excellence) in opposition to the multitude of opinions (appearances of the truth and being). Parmenides’ poem is the testimony and account of experience (of existence) of the truth as Being itself, and the experience of its normative force as transcendent nature. This Parmenidean ‘aletheism’ allows us to understand how Plato’s theory of eternal truths ever appeared (ideas, or forms as norms and paradigms of nature, cognition and action), as well as the importance of Parmenides himself for Neo-platonism.
3. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Óscar Flantrmsky Infinity, Reality and Eleatic Thought in Anxagoras’ Philosophy
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Anaxagoras philosophy has been traditionally analyzed from the concept “homeomeries”. This concept is only a part of a bigger topic which can be found in his doctrine almost in a tacit way. That is infinity. But, why did Anaxagoras include this concept in his doctrine? The explanation given in this paper is that Anaxagoras propounded infinity as a way to preserve the Eleatic legacy without denying reality. In fact, infinity helps to keep the most radical ideas of Parmenides (no generation, no destruction and no changes) and, at the same time, to explain reality from itself, it means, accepting that these events are in reality and are not an appearance. For this reason, Anaxagoras theory has infinity as an important concept and from this concept, his doctrine will be explained in this paper.
4. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Evaldo Antonio Kuiava Identity and Difference in Parmenides
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The matter of difference appears at the moment in human thought, inaugurates debate and philosophical discussion in Western tradition, and becomes a significant and culminant point in the history of philosophy. From its origin the philosophical discourse lives on this perplexity, although it searches from its very origin to think identity as identity in the sinuosity of real differences, and in the power of its linguistic game, it assumes a position, which is essentially based on a logocentric illusion. It is about a position which expresses itself for being, against nothing, for synchrony against diachrony, and for sameness against alterity. Concerning this, it is not possible here not to inquire about this position towards multiplicity, in which reason tries to unite it in a whole. Would this not mean in the origin of philosophy itself a limitation and insecurity of what is rational? Would this attitude not reveal a symptom of weakness and an incipient decline, whose destiny is fulfilled along the Western tradition? Historically, and in spite of the most varied solutions and vicissitudes presented to this problem, it is possible to observe that the attempt to direct philosophical thought to totality continually prevails.
5. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Andrei Lebedev Idealism in Early Greek Philosophy: the Case of Pythagoreans and Eleatics
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1. There is a commonly held endoxon that idealism did not exist and could not exist before Plato, since the «Presocratics» did not yet distinguish between the material and the ideal etc. This preconception is based on the misleading conception of «Presocratics» as physicalists and the simplistic evolutionist scheme of Aristotle’s Metaph. A. In fact, religious and idealist metaphysics are attested in different archaic traditions before Plato, whereas «simple» physical theories of elements of the Milesian type did not exist before the 6th century B.C. scientific revolution. 2. Those who deny the existence of idealism in Greek philosophy commonly refer to Myles F. Burnyeat (see, “Idealism and Greek philosophy: What Descartes saw and Berkeley missed” in: The Philosophical Review, Vol.91, No1, 1982, 3-40). We will argue against this article on the following grounds: a) it is based on a selective and incomplete data from early Greek philosophy, b) Burnyeat understands by «idealism» subjective idealism and anti-realism. But Greek idealism as a rule is a form of objective idealism and has nothing to do with anti-realism. The two basic forms are: dualstic idealism (Pythagoreans, Plato) and monistic idealism (Parmenides, Neoplatonists). 3. We will argue against modern naturalist interpretations of the Pythagorean first principles by Huffmann and others. Both in the table of opposites (58 Α5 DK) and in Philolaus (44 B1) πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον (ἄπειρα καὶ περαίνοντα) denote self-subsistent mathematical essences, ‘out of which’ (cf. ἐξ ἀπείρων etc.) physical bodies (cf. φύσις – ibid.) are composed. It is impossible to interpret “the limit and the unlimited” (or “limiters and unlimiteds”) as physical bodies themselves or as properties of physical bodies. 4. We will argue for the Pythagorean (not «Orphic») origin of the 5th centu-ry graffiti on bones’ plates from Olbia. According to this early table of oppo-site, the body is ψεῦδος, i.e., an illusion. 5. The Zeller-Burnet interpretation of Parmenides B3 (taking τὸ αὐτό as subject) is grammatically impossible. The fragment states the identity of νοεῖν καὶ εἶναι, i.e., affirms mental nature of Being.6.The basic opposition of Parmenides’ Aletheia (being vs. non-being) exactly corresponds to the basic opposition of doxa (light vs. darkness). Light is the active and thinking element, night is the «heavy», dense, corporeal substance. Sine light corresponds to Being, night (i.e., body) corresponds to non-Being. The philosophy of Parmenides is a radical form of immaterialism and idealistic monism.
6. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Aikaterini Lefka Some Wise Advice for a Good Life at the Origins of European Philosophy
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When contemporary scholars study the first Greek (and European) thinkers, their most current attitude is to concentrate on their ontological and epistemological theories, paying little or no attention at all to their ethical or political positions. It is true that ethical and political ideas cover a minor part of the fragments we possess. Moreover, they often take up a peculiar form, which has been characterized as “non-philosophical”, because it isn’t deductive, empirical or clearly founded on rational arguments: they resemble rather some common sense advice offered by the elderly members of a community. But are these precepts indeed to be taken so lightly? In my paper, I intend to make an analysis that hasn’t been undertaken up to now, to my knowledge, of this particular form of ethical and political ideas destined to help people to achieve concretely a life as good as possible, in order to prove that: a) these concepts are founded on a philosophical method equivalent to the one result-ing in the cosmological theories of the archaic period; b) their form, inspired by the oracles, is chosen deliberately in order to astound, to help memorization in a largely oral cultural environment, and to encourage the personal activity of rational interpretation, which may lead to multiple results, underlining the liberty of thought. I shall finally cite some representative examples of the eth-ical and political maxims attributed to the “Seven sages” (of which Thales), to Pythagoras and to Democritus, to illustrate this particular link between theory, and practice at the origins of the European philosophy.
7. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Simon Varga Hesiod’s Political Anthropology
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There is probably no doubt that Hesiod is one of the important ancient Greek personalities still known today. From my point of view, Hesiod is not only the first European philosopher who reflected on the beginning of the world in the Theogony or about a few ethical questions in the Works and days, but also the first who thought about the human being and his unique features from a political standpoint. For this purpose I will consider six different politico-anthropological identities of human beings: eris (good and bad strife), dikê (justice and injustice), ergon (work), oikos (home), philia (friendship) and godliness. As far as I can see, no one has argued until today that a political anthropology exists in Hesiod’s Works and days. We can´t find a classical philosophical construction in the text, but what we can find is the consideration of some basic categories, words and themes of a political anthropology that are – as it seems – firstly discussed by Hesiod.
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8. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Francesc Casadesús Bordoy ¿Por qué a la naturaleza le gusta ocultarse? Heráclito DK B 123
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Uno de los fragmentos de Heráclito que más ha llamado la atención es el que proclama que la naturaleza tiende a ocultarse, φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ. Su aparente ambigüedad ha sido objeto de múltiples in-terpretaciones que en muchas ocasiones se han alejado del contexto cultural y lingüístico en que Heráclito formuló esta conocida frase. Por ello resulta de gran interés recurrir al pasaje de la Odisea X 302-306, en el que aparece la palabra φύσις por vez primera en lengua griega, cuando el dios Hermes muestra a Odiseo la naturaleza oculta de la planta moly. De estos versos se extrae la conclusión de que, en un principio, la noción de φύσις estaba vinculada al mundo vegetal y una de sus principales características: que las plantas presentan una parte visible y llamativa, la flor, y otra oscura e invisible, la raíz, a la que, sin embargo, las primeras deben su existencia. Asimismo, la observación del ciclo de la naturaleza demuestra que son muchos los vegetales que como la vid o el trigo ‘desaparecen’ en invierno para volver a aparecer con renovada fuerza en primavera. De esta sencilla observación se constata que, fiel a su estilo, Heráclito expresó una obviedad de un modo tan solemne que, paradójicamente, su interpretación ha acabado convirtiéndose en un reto para la tradición hermenéutica.
9. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Einar Iván Monroy Gutiérrez La filosofía en Heráclito como indagación y modo de vida
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Si partimos tanto de los testimonios biográficos y doxográficos como de los fragmentos que nos han llegado a modo de “citas”, debe reconoc-erse que no hay propiamente un concepto heracliteano sobre filosofía, mucho menos en el sentido imperante a partir de Platón. Lo que sí encontramos con toda seguridad son las señales de lo que caracteriza al φιλοσόφους: alguien despierto (22B 1, 17, 72a, 89, 101a), atento a la interpelación de su propia existencia (22B101 DK) y de las cosas (22B35 DK), desapropiado de sus propias creencias (22B 2 y 28a DK) y de las doctrinas u opiniones dominantes (22B74 DK) y, sin embargo, junto con todo ello, alguien resoluto a ver, escuchar, decir, y sobre todo callar. Con base en lo anterior, puede afirmarse que la filosofía en Heráclito, no es ni ciencia ni mucho menos una visión de mundo sino que ante todo, es una indagación sobre el modo de habitar en la dimensión del Ser.
10. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
David Torrijos Castrillejo La noción de “homeomería” en Anaxágoras
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Aristóteles introdujo en la historia de la recepción de Anaxágoras el término ‘homeómero’. Este vocablo hace referencia a las sustancias cuyas partes son similares entre sí y también se asemejan al todo. Aunque las explicaciones del Estagirita pueden dar lugar a confusión, cabría que ese término respondiera a un aspecto auténtico de la doctrina de Anaxágoras reflejada en los fragmentos de su obra. Ahora bien, haría falta, quizá, encontrar un significado específico para ‘homeómero’ en Anaxágoras, un poco distinto del que parece poseer la palabra en Aristóteles. Para ello hace falta revisar el sentido de los dos términos implicados: ‘homoios’ y ‘moira’. Es necesario averiguar qué realidades son designadas como partes y, por consiguiente, distinguir el todo respecto del cual es apreciada su parcialidad. Además, hay que atender al tipo de semejanza que guardan entre sí esas partes y a su parecido con el todo. El autor concluye que las partes son “todas las cosas”, las cuales se parecen unas a otras y a todo el universo por estar compuestas de todas las cosas, según Anaxágoras.