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1. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Konstantinos Boudouris Preface
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2. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
William L. McBride Introductory Note
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articles in english
3. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Zhabaikhan Abdildin Development of Concept of Science in the Context of Activity
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Three major phases can be distinguished in the history of the development of science. During the first phase, science had almost no link with production, craft, existed within philosophy and was considered to be elite activity. The radical change in the development of science occurs in the new time, when science having separated from philosophy becomes an independent area of knowledge. Science of new time not only discovers the laws of nature, it exists in close relation with production, and to some extent represents a basis for production. In this respect, the machine based production had a major impact. The next radical change in the development of science and its relations with production starts with technical revolution, which is of principal significance for both development of a man and for the understanding of the nature and concept of science. The most important value of technical revolution consists in its substantive impact on the nature of science and the change of its essential definitions and characteristics. In the context of technical revolution, a radical change occurs in the relation between science and production. In the modern automated production, science as a concentrated expression of laws directly merges with production, i.e. science itself becomes a direct productive force. A radical change occurs also in the nature of science. In the context of technical revolution, science transforms from a form of knowledge into the unity of science and activity, and an organic merger of science and production occurs.
4. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Inês Lacerda Araújo Rorty’s Historicist and Pragmatic Conception of “Epistemology”
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With “epistemology” between quotation marks I intend in this paper to show that Rorty’s conception is a critical one. His claims in favor of a culture where epistemology is not central are justified in a historicist and pragmatic point of view. There is no sense in looking for permanent criteria of knowledge (from the ideas for Plato to a priori transcendental categories for Kant). In a culture of freedom and solidarity epistemology would give place to hermeneutics, to practices of understanding. There are specific roles for proofs and experimentation in certain contexts like the one of science; one may require objectivity in argumentation; proofs are necessary in a trial. In epistemology, however, rules, constraints of a transcendental rationality, permanent categories all these are metaphors of mind representing reality. Without necessary and universal guidelines of knowledge, cultures would be more free, conversation and understanding would be practices preferable to permanent rules for truth. History shows what men did mainly in the name of truth was violence and dogmatism. Pragmatism is not utilitarianism, it is the vision of action in context, practices that can modify undesirable conditions of humanity, instead of one and only true theory (or knowledge conception, or religion faith).
5. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Valentin Balanovskiy What is Kant’s Transcendental Reflection?
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The concept of ‘transcendental reflection’ has been under-studied despite its crucial significance for Kant’s philosophical system. Kant’s transcendental reflection is an instrument inherent in our consciousness. Without this instrument, one would be unable to distinguish between representations/ fantasies and the reality; to have self-consciousness; to identify the functions of the human soul; to distinguish between the effects of the senses, the understanding, and reason within these functions, including identifying the a priori forms of the senses, the understanding, and reason; and to classify representations by the faculty of cognition to which they belong. This study aims to reconstruct the main features of Kant’s ideas of transcendental reflection and to define this notion through analysing the Critique of Pure Reason and the other fundamental works of Kant.
6. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
José Barrientos Rastrojo Experiential Reason: Beyond Critical-analytic-discursive Reason
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Experiential reason is a kind of reason born on experiences. It includes reasons that subjects discover in its crucial experiences like giving birth to a child, to attend a relative’s death or to recover from a serious illness. Those experiences create a specific knowledge, for instance people understand the essence of the miracle of life or the mystery of our finitude. So, that specific knowledge is not just a theoretical and/or cognitive one. It embraces theoretical information but we can see how a lively awareness is open inside his agent. He will become a new person after living those experiences. This experience, and this knowledge created by it, will transform in an ontological way. A new understanding-light will be got. That one is not opposed to critical or analytical knowledge because ‘experiential understanding’ needs theoretical (critical and analytical) information to be performed. However, ‘experiential knowledge’ is beyond it. Furthermore, it is near to, so called by tradition, wisdom. This paper aims to define experiential reason. It will differentiate it from religious wisdom and from false wisdoms and it will explain how a person can get it. To carry out it, we will be guided by some hermeneutical and metaphysical approaches (Beuchot, Dilthey, Gadamer, Zambrano, Spranger, Ortega, Marías). Our paper will finish with an application of our discoveries to an emergent philosophical discipline: Philosophical Practice.
7. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Mustafa I. Bilalov Socio-cultural Conditionality of Knowledge as Specifics of Cognitive Culture
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In modern spiritual, educational and scientific life the subjective character of cognitive activity and its cultural conditionality become more and more obvious. Remarkable is, that cognitive culture cannot be reduced to purely cognitive aspects of knowledge, but includes representations of social factors of collective life. Philosophical components of this culture are the general methods, principles and other basic grounds of science and knowledge. Religious and ethnic in cognitive culture also concerns ways and receptions, levels and steps, purposes and ideals of cognitive activity, developing historically in religious and ethnic traditions. No matter what form do the conducting determinants of cognitive culture take nowadays - scientific norms, philosophical methods, ethnic mentality features, religious traditions or methodological innovations - they demonstrate the amplifying subjective character of cognitive activity and its growing cultural conditionality.
8. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Siraprapa Chavanayarn A Problem of Some Reductionist Arguments Concerning Testimony
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Most epistemologists agree that testimony is an important source of knowledge. However, they fundamentally disagree whether it is a basic source as perception or not. The reductionist standpoint concerning testimony holds that, testimony is not a basic source of knowledge, so hearers cannot justify about what they are told simply on the basis of the testimony of speakers. The justification of testimony comes from other basic sources such as perception, reason and consciousness. However, in this article, I will propose a problem of some reductionist arguments. That is, although the arguments can reject testimony as a basic source of knowledge, other sources which are generally accepted as basic sources of knowledge are rejected as well.
9. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Simone Cheli Beyond Selfhood and Otherness: On Comergences
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The aim of this study is to propose an integration of the epistemological traditions of constructivism and systemics, and of the contemporary theorizations of physics and complex system models. All these theoretical viewpoints subsume a revolutionary construction of truth and reality, that supports and expands the concept of emergence. I hypothesise they issue three main challenges we must face with: (I) a radical construct of the observed reality as the autopoietic space of an observer; (II) a systemic integration of any observer and relationship through the proposed formulation of comergence; (III) an assumption of irreversibility in the construction of any process and state.
10. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Ruery-Lin Chen The Justification of Testimony and Intellectual Virtues
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There are two levels in the problem about the justification of testimony. The first level is about justification of testimony in general: Is testimony as a source or type of knowledge reliable and independent? Two opposite positions have been proposed in philosophical literature: reductionism and non-reductionism. For to this level, I propose a communitarian non-reductionism in contrast to traditional or individualist non-reductionism. It is also a restricted non-reductionism. The second level is about the justification of testimony in particular: How do we justify our acceptance of testimonial beliefs? Do we justify them in a direct way as we do in the cases of perception, introspection and memory, or, in an inferential way? The former position is known as fundamentalism and the latter inferentialism. For the particular level, I develop a position of virtue fundamentalism. I understand the meaning of intellectual virtues based on the view of virtue responsibilism. In summary, I call the communitarian non-reductionism and virtue fundamentalism in the sense of virtue responsibilism together a virtue account of the justification of testimony.