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articles in english
1. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Steve Bein Self Power, Other Power, and Non-dualism in Japanese Buddhism
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A traditional distinction is made in scholarship on Japanese Buddhism between two means for attaining enlightenment: jiriki 自力, or "self power," and tariki 他力, or "other power." Dōgen's Sōtō Zen is the paradigmatic example of a jiriki school: according to Dōgen, one attains enlightenment through strenuous zazen and rigorous ascetic practices. Shinran's Jōdo Shin Buddhism is the paradigmatic example of a tariki school: according to Shinran, human beings are incapable of self-salvation, but by chanting the nembutsu they can invoke the compassionate power of Amida to save them. But the jiriki-tariki distinction is arguably a false one, with no place within Buddhism's nondualistic framework. If the basic Buddhist intuition toward nondualism is correct, then jiriki and tariki cannot be opposed at all, but must rather be two sides of the same coin. In fact, both Dōgen and Shinran are fully in agreement on abandoning the ego (ātman), and on abandoning the artificial self-other distinction that accompanies the ātman. Dōgen had deep faith in the path of the Buddhist patriarchs, and in the power of the sangha; hetaught that both were necessary means for attaining enlightenment. And Shinran firmly believed in incorporating the nembutsu in every facet of one's life, a feat for which supreme self-cultivation is required. Thus Dōgen and Shinran both preach tariki and jiriki; moreover, this is to be expected, for unless jiriki and tariki are one, their approaches to Buddhism would be dualistic. Dōgen and Shinran should be taken as model cases for understanding the unity of jiriki and tariki in all of Japanese Buddhism.
2. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Hyun Choo The Ban-ya pa-ra-mil-da sim gyeong chan: Wonch'uk's Commentary on the Heart Sūtra
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This paper has attempted to present Wonch'uk's Ban-ya pa-ra-mil-da sim gyeong chan (般若波羅蜜多心經贊) or Commentary on the Heart Sūtra which was written in classical Chinese in the 7th century. As an example of the intellectual analysis of a sūtra, Wonch'uk's Commentary is an important text that has exerted asignificant influence on East Asian Buddhist thought. A prominent Korean Yogācāra scholar, Wonch'uk authored twenty-three works during his lifetime; unfortunately, all but three have been lost. The Commentary on the Heart Sūtra is the shortest among his extant writings, yet it clearly reflects his incomparable erudition. To date, there has been very limited research on Wonch'uk and his thought in both the East and West. Utilizing Wonch'uk's original Chinese text,this paper will examine the distinctive features of Wonch'uk's Commentary which may offer the contemporary readers an opportunity to remind the importance of sūtra study and the engagement in sūtra exegesis.
3. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Asaf Federman What Kind of Free Will did the Buddha Teach?
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Recently, some contradictory statements have been made concerning whether or not the Buddha taught free will. Here, a comparative method is used to examine what exactly is meant by free will, and to determine to what extent this meaning is applicable to early Buddhist thought as recorded in the Pāli Nikāyas. The comparative method reveals parallels between contemporary criticisms of Cartesian philosophy and Buddhist criticisms of Brahmanical and Jain doctrines. Although in Cartesian terms Buddhism promotes no recognizable theory of free will, it does promote a primitive theory of compatibilism which shares some keyfeatures with Daniel Dennett's position on this issue. It is argued that the implicit Buddhist stance on freedom of the will allows the existence of choice and responsibility without calling upon an ultimate controlling agency that transcends the causal nexus of mind and body.
4. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Takamichi Fujii Cooperation or Nonintervention?: Two types of Apologetic Arguments in Indian Thought
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The apologetic method of the Nyāya is inductive. The subject is distilled from the scripture and the Nyāya investigates it through logical argument. Through this procedure of partial verification, the reliability of the composer is established, and consequently the authority of the entire scripture is justified. The domains of thescripture and rational investigation overlap in significant issues such as the reality of the Self, and therefore, they can cooperate to establish the common truth. In Mīmāṃsā apologetics, the domain of the scripture and that of rational argument are mutually exclusive. Their apologetic program is basically accomplished as a process of purely rational investigation without referring to the content of the scripture. But at the same time, the authority of the Veda is regarded as innate and has no external basis. Working autonomously, the rational investigation imposes its own limitation from within and thereby secures the scriptural domain that is free from the intervention of any other kind of knowledge. The overlap between the domains of the scripture and the ordinary experience including rational investigation constitutes a necessary condition for the Nyāya apologetics, whereas in Mīmāṃsā apologetics, it is the absence of the overlapping domain that assures the unique authority of the Veda. This difference is supposed to be rooted in their disagreement on whether a man is able, or qualified, to examine the content of the scripture or not.
5. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
V.S Funtusov Global Ethical Potential of Buddhist Concept of Universal Inter‐Relationship
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This paper is an attempt to actualize central ontological fundamental principles of Buddhism, in particular, the concept of universal inter-relationship. It is this idea of the all-round universal inter-dependence of everything living that may be re-comprehended in the context of aggravating global contradictions of the modern world. The archaic and at the same time fundamental Buddhist idea of universal inter-relationship can be re-comprehended with regard to establishing a global axiological program of co-existence of various socio-cultural and natural worlds and be a basis for working out a global ethics, new behavior rules for man amid the aggravating ecological situation. The axiology of universal inter-relationship generates global synergetic consciousness and a program for man’scooperation with the world.
6. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Manjulika Ghosh Evolution of Buddhist Art
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There is a problematique about Buddhist Art. It cannot be deduced directly from the basic tenets of ethical Buddhism. Early Buddhist views forbid art as sensuous luxury. Even when Buddhists employed art for edifying ends it was essentially representative and realistic. With the changes in Buddhist system of beliefs and the rise of Buddhist philosophical schools Buddhist art came to symbolize the ideals of tranquility and Karunā - the Mahāyāna ideals par excellence. The masterpiece of the Gupta art depicting the Master in dharmacakrapravartana mudra at Sarnath or the Bodhisattva Padmapani of the Ajanta murals shows that the beauty of the Buddha image resides not in following models of worldly beauty but rather in the creation of an ideal. The medieval Buddhist art is a continuation of the achievements at Sarnath and Ajanta.
7. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Aruna Handa In Pursuit of a Good Fit: Dignaga and the Triple Condition of the Inferential Sign
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Several modern commentators of Dignaga have puzzled over the 5th century Buddhist philosopher1s theory of the triple condition of the inferential sign. Th. Stcherbatsky (1932), Richard Hayes (1988) and Bimal K. Matilal (1986) have wondered at the reasons for Dignaga’s insistence on the inclusion of the secondcondition, which seems to be the logical equivalent of the third condition. Do the three criteria together furnish patterns of valid inference which differ from those patterns furnished by criteria one and three alone? In this paper, I detail three types of cases which underline the importance of the inclusion of the second criterion.
8. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Hashi Hisaki The Logic of Non-Verbality: The Field of the Language between Zen-Kōan and Formallogic
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The subject of this report is a border region between two languages: that of the Zen kōan and that of formal logic. Firstly, I present part of a classic work of Zen Buddhism, the Hekiganroku (Biyen-lu, 碧巌録) with some additional commentary. Secondly, I put forward a possible means of translating Zen kōans into the language of formal logic. This exposition is tied to a three-fold problematic: Is it possible to say that the different logics (of the language of Zen and the language of formal logic) agree in their logical essence? If so, in which aspects can we find these points of agreement? Or do they represent only different parallel logics without any points of crossing? What is the definitive difference between their respective ways of thinking? The answers to these questions may providecontemporary buddhist philosophy with a further perspective: how Zen thought can stimulate and contribute to formal logic. The transcription of Zen kōan into formal logical symbols is able to clarify what is the most important subject in the language of Zen. At the same time it will show the limitations of the language of formal logic and the language of Zen kōan. In my report I try to delineate the limits of verbal expression in formal logic and explore what is the truth expressed in nonverbal applications of Zen logic. A new way of thinking can emerge from the field between the logic of verbal and of non-verbal expression.
9. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Thi Tho Hoang Buddhism in Vietnam: A Typical Example of Multi-Cultural Integration in Tradition and in Global Age
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Buddhism is a typical example of “successful integration” in Vietnam in tradition and now it is considered as a candidate in the tendency of globalization. Buddhism is a part of the “three traditional religions” of Vietnam. This paper tries to explain the philosophical foundation for Vietnamese Buddhism together with the nation to enter globalization through three points: 1) Vietnamese Buddhism in multicultural tradition; 2) Religious-philosophy of Buddhism as sustainablepotential for integration in globalization; and 3) Buddhist potential with Vietnam in the context of globalization.
10. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Kazuyoshi Hotta On Jainism and its Philosophy
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Jainism is characterized by an observance of non-violence (ahimsa) and asceticism (tapas). In the field of philosophy, it is marked by the doctrine of manifold aspects (anekantavada). The purpose of this study is to explore the inseparable connection between Jainism as a religion and as a philosophy. The first chapterdescribes the position of philosophical thinking in Jainism, while the second examines the doctrine of manifold aspects, which has become synonymous with Jainism. These exploration makes it clear that most of Jaina philosophers have not moved beyond their religious framework into the realm of pure philosophy, even though they have developed philosophical doctrine called the doctrine of manifold aspects. Finally, I introduce Haribhadra’s statement that could becalled an ideal form of the doctrine of manifold aspects. He deals with Kapila (thought to be the founder of the Samkhya school) impartially, and he deals with Mahavira, who founded Jainism, critically. It is interesting that such an idea was stated by a philosopher who was placed in a religious framework. Though thismay be a rare case, it shows the possibility that the philosophical thinking of Jainism has the potential to go beyond its own religious framework.
11. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Xie Huiyuan Confucianism’s Influence on Buddhism: From the Perspective of Contention of Piety and Loyalty
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This essay tries to analyze the contention, conversation and conjunction between Confucian and Buddhism through debates on loyalty and filial piety from the Three Kingdoms to the Tang Dynasty, and to explain the influence on Buddhist loyalty and filial piety by the Confucian thoughts.
12. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Hisataka Ishida Much Ado about One Sentence: The Status of Scriptural Authority in the Buddhist Logico‐epistemological Tradition
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In the history of Indian Buddhism there existed scholars, who engaged in studying logic and epistemology, and this tradition still survives e.g. in Tibet. This field of study was traditionally called “the study of the logical reason” (hetuvidyā), and this school was named “die logische und erkenntnistheoretische Schule des Buddhismus” (the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition) by Prof. Erich Frauwallner. These scholars actually developed full-blown theories of logic and epistemology and were actively involved in discussions with Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist philosophers. Nowadays the research of this school forms one of the major fields in the Indian Philosophy and Buddhist studies. However, it is still controversial among the modern scholars, as was the case with the historicalteachers in India and Tibet, whether this study of logic or epistemology is of any relevance for the Buddhist striving for liberation (nirvāna). In this presentation I would like to focus on discussing the status of scriptural authority in this tradition, and especially the interpretations of one statement by Dignāga (ca. 400-480), who is regarded as founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition, will be re-examined.
13. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Yoichi Iwasaki Religious and Epistemological Aspects of the Indian Theory of Verbal Understanding
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The various schools of the Indian classical philosophy have discussed the issue how we understand the meaning from an utterance. In the present paper, I analyse the ancient controversy on this issue between two schools, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, and attempt to show that it has two aspects of religious and epistemological natures. Vaiśeṣikas, on the ground that the process of the verbal understanding is identical with that of the inference, claim that the verbal understanding is merely a type of the inference. Naiyāyikas oppose this and assert that the former is distinct from the latter. I summarise Vaiśeṣikas’ argument into two points: (1) the similarity of the objects of the cognition and (2) that of the relations between the object and what denotes it. Naiyāyikas rejects both thesimilarities. The above discussion, which may stimulate our epistemological interest, has a close connection with the issue of scriptures. The utterance as a source of knowledge seems to have stood, in the early period, only for the scriptures, as pointed out by Hiryanna. Taking this into consideration, Vaiśeṣikas’ thesis can be understood to imply that they deny the intrinsic authority of scriptures and reduce it to the rational faculty of human beings. Naiyāyikas also deny itsintrinsic authority, but their view on the cognitive process of the verbal understanding is different from that of Vaiśeṣikas. The reason of this divergence may lie in how they treat the reliability of the speaker in respect to the cognitive process.
14. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Toji Kamata A Study of Relationship between Shinto and Japanese Buddhism
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In complete distinction to the world or universal religions like Christianity and Buddhism, Shinto is an ethnic religion that has grown out of the history and culture of the Japanese people. Shinto is a way of prayer and festivals that arose from a feeling of awe and reverence towards those entities the Japanese feared and respected as "KAMA (gods, divinities)", whereas Buddhism is a system of belief and practice leading to realization and the attainment of Buddhahood. We can highlight the fundamental differences between Shinto and Buddhism by looking at the following three contrasting features. First, the KAMI simply are, but a Buddha is something that one has tobecome . In other words the KAMI represent the power of existence itself, whereas the Buddha was a human being who became a Buddha only after his enlightenment. Second, the KAMI come towards us but the Buddha goes away from us. Responding to human prayers and festivals, the KAMI make their appearance in that very place, whereas the Buddha departs from this secular world with its delusion and suffering, and makes for the other shore - the world of enlightenment. The third difference is that the KAMI stand whereas the Buddha sits. While the gods are thought to appear standing erect like columns, the Buddhas are envisaged in the meditation posture, doing Zazen to become enlightened. Despite the fact that the KAMA and the Buddhas, Shinto and Buddhism, have these fundamental differences, Shinto and Buddhism in Japan have had a complex relationship characterized by religious fusion. We have to conside how could this have been possible.
15. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Sung Yong Kang Does tarka Implicate Negative Speculation?
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‘Tarka’ is a technical term that occupies a significant position in the logico-epistemological traditions in India. In this paper, it is attempted to expound the exact meaning of the term, in particular in the early Nyaya tradition, on the basis of the explanations found in the Nyayabhasya. The view that the essential feature of tarka consists in the differentiating approach (vibhaga) to the matter on discourse is substantiated, and with it a possible explanation is given for the well-known ambivalent valuations that tarka was often loaded with a negative connotation on the one hand and, was considered as the positive characteristic feature of the Naiyayika approach to epistemological problems on the other. In the case of tarka, the general applicability and the impression of logically exhaustive access to any given problem was combined with the danger of misuse of the reason without any quasi-formal deficiency. It is hoped that my suggestion to characterize tarka as the differentiating approach to the given matter without any factual information may give a plausible explanation for the double-pole character of tarka in the history of Indian philosophy.
16. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Young-Seop Ko On Wonhyo's Concept of "Mystical Understanding of One Mind"
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Bunhwang Wonhyo (芬皇 元曉, 617-686) was a philosopher in the Korean Shilla Dynasty. He was a successor to the Buddha's wise thought and merciful life on the basis of One Mind (一心) - Reconcilement (和會) -Interfusion(無碍). His One Mind philosophy opened a new way for researching the human abyss and worldessence. The breadth of his enlightenment also enabled many people to live in the vast sea of Buddha dharma, as his manner of thinking and living opened up completely new, unique, and encompassing vistas well beyond the conventional limits of his age, people, religion and philosophy. Wohyo's One Mind philosophy was based on the One Mind-Two Approaches (一心二門) formulation described in Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith. He was not restricted by the commonly accepted view of Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, wherein One Mind is understood in light of dualistic opposition of the Combined Consciousness of True and False (眞妄和合識)1). On the contrary, he applied a different view of One Mind to Combined Consciousness, unlike the Ālaya-vijñāna view of the Consciousness-Only school that tried to understand One Mind as True Consciousness of Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom (大圓鏡智). Therefore, his understanding of One Mind is very dynamic and elastic. The dynamics and elasticity are also caused by the dualistic structure of Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith (大乘起信論) , that divides One Mind into two characteristics such as white-clean and dirty-contaminated. Wonhyo, who investigated deeply into the suffering mind in order todetermine whether to classify the unenlightened person and Buddha as two or whether to unify them, also made One Mind open to the Ninth Consciousness (九識) without restricting the range of it to Eight Consciousnesses (八識). This ground of understanding is due to Wonhyo's dynamics and Miraculous Understanding. Wonhyo connects One Mind to Tathāgata-garbha (如來藏), while saying that 'it is called Tathāgata-garbha because the body of One Mind is defined as Original Enlightenment (本覺) and it causes phenomenon depending on ignorance.' In order to explain this, he 'coins' the expression of Miraculous Understanding and provides expands the existing understanding of One Mind by adding the meaning of Miraculous Understanding to the understanding of One Mind. And heexplains Miraculous Understanding on the basis of the property of Nirmāṇa-kāya that does not adopt inanimate objectivity, which shows that Wonhyo's One Mind exposes the changeable meaning of an absolute aspect and the unchangeable meaning of a phenomenal aspect at the same time. Wonhyo quoted the concept of Miraculous Understanding in order to explain changeability of an absolute aspect rather than its unchangeability, and unchangeability of a phenomenal aspect rather than its changeability. And finally, Wonhyo's Miraculous Understanding of One Mind shows that the real nature of Original Enlightenment is miraculous by itself. And the meaning of Miraculous Understanding belongs in the Ninth Consciousness, Amala-vijñāna, rather than being restricted to the eighth consciousness, Ālaya-vijñāna. In this way, Wonhyo harmonizes the Eight Consciousnesses theory of Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith and the Nine Consciousnesses theory of Vājrasamādhi–Sūtra (金剛三昧經論) through dynamics and Miraculous Understanding of One Mind. As a result, Wonhyo enlarged the extension of One Mind understanding by granting the meaning of dynamics and Miraculous Understanding to One Mind, which challenged the existing interpretation of his time.
17. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Christian Thomas Kohl Buddhism and Quantum Physics: A Strange Parallelism of Two Concepts of Reality
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Rudyard Kipling, the famous english author of « The Jungle Book », born in India, wrote one day these words: « Oh, East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet ». In my paper I show that Kipling was not completely right. I try to show the common ground between buddhist philosophy and quantum physics. There is a surprising parallelism between the philosophical concept of reality articulated by Nagarjuna and the physical concept of reality implied by quantum physics. For neither is there a fundamental core to reality, rather reality consists of systems of interacting objects. Such concepts of reality cannot be reconciled with the substantial, subjective, holistic or instrumentalistic concepts of reality which underlie modern modes of thought.
18. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Pramod Kumar Semantic Aspect of Buddhist Logic with Special Reference to Dinnaga and Dharmakirti
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Buddhist logicians have rejected the reality of universals on the one hand, and, on the other hand, given a substitute in the form of the doctrine of Apoha. The doctrine of apoha first appears in Dinnaga’s Pramanasamuccaya, according to which words and concepts are negative by their very nature. They proceed on thebasis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating their opposite meaning. The Buddhist logicians talk of two types of knowledge, viz., pratyaksa, which is non- relational and anumana, which is relational. They accept nirvikalpaka pratyaksa as a pure pratyaksa, and savikalpaka pratyaksa has been merged with anumana by them. According to them, cognition is either a direct awareness of an object, which is independent of any mentalconstructionor it is an awareness of an object which is a mentalconstruction. Further, according to the Buddhist logicians inferences are of two kinds, viz., svarthanumana and pararthanumana. But they do not accept pararthanumana as a source of knowledge. Now, since perception is devoid of kalpana, perceptual knowledge is essentially non-linguistic and does not involve any general concept or universal. Thus,Apoha has no role to play in perceptual knowledge. On the other hand, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana are based on kalpana, thus according to the Buddhist logicians knowledge of universal is essential for both, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana.
19. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Lepekhova E.S. The Concept of Virtue in Compositions of Prince Shotoku: “Commentary on the Sri-Mala Sutra” and “Seventeen-Article Constitution”
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The theme of article is a short investigation of the problem of virtue in compositions of Prince Shotoku (Shotoku Taishi) such as “Seventeen-Article Constitution” and “Shomangyo gisho” (“Commentary on the Sri-mala Sutra”). Prince Shotoku (574 - 622) is a well-known religious leader in a history of Ancient Japan whoplayed a paramount role in Japanese Buddhism. He supervised over the construction of the first Buddhist temples and, more over, was a first Buddhist in Japan who interpreted Buddhist philosophical texts. Shotoku Taishi wrote three commentaries known as “Commentaries on the Three Sutras” (Sangyo gisho). This work contains interpretation of three Buddhist sutras: “Lotus Sutra” (“Saddharmapundarica sutra”, “Hokke gisho”), “Vimalakirti sutra” (“Vimalakirtinirdesa sutra”, “Yuimagyo gisho”) and “Sri-Mala” sutra (“Sri-Malashimhanda sutra”, “Shomangyo gisho”). One of the most interesting aspects of this work, on my opinion, is a category of “virtue” (“zen”). While “virtue” in the concept of Shotoku Taishi is a basis of the One Vehile. At the same time, it differs from the Buddhist sense of this word. Also, the influence of “virtue” is reflected in articles of “Seventeen-Article Constitution”. Category of “virtue”, on my opinion, shows the new sights in the personality of Prince Shotoku. It leads as to moral aspects of religious and cultural policy which still not explored well in Western (Russian) scholarship.
20. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Hiroshi Marui Philosophy or Religion?: Reasoning and Argumentation as a Bridge Over Inter-Religious Conflicts
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Since the first half of the nineteenth century in which English was introduced as the language of higher education in India, the word and concept of “philosophy” has played an important role in Indian intellectual life. First the study of philosophy must have meant the study of Western philosophy in Indian universities, butlater various attempts were made to discover the Indian versions of philosophical traditions in Sanskrit literature. Today no one doubts that there has been a rich and very long tradition of such intellectual activities as are fully compatible with what European philosophers have actually been doing. Nevertheless, it is sometimes very difficult to draw a strict line between philosophy and religion in Indian thought. The present study will focus on that passage of the Nyāyamañjarī by a Kashmirian Nyāya scholar Jayanta which deals with the justification of the authority of the Vedas and other religious scriptures. From the analysis of the passage we may detect that there are two different dimensions in his application of logic for this issue. On the one hand he appeals to logical thinking for the defence of the Vedic authority and tries to establish the proper proof. But on the other hand he seems to be conscious of the limitation of reasoning, for he refers to those thinkers without refuting them in the latter half of the passage, according to whom every religious scripture must be accepted as valid insofar as the path of reasoning and argumentation is taken.