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1. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Teppei Baba Is Berkeley's Theory of Ideas a Variant of Locke's?
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I try to show that Berkeley's theory of ideas is not a variant of Locke's. We can find such an interpretation of Berkeley in Thomas Reid. So, we could call this interpretation a 'traditional interpretation'. This traditional interpretation has an influence still now, for example, Tomida interprets Berkeley in this line (Tomida2002). We will see that this traditional interpretation gives a serious problem to Berkeley (section 1). And I am going to present an argument against this traditional interpretation (section 2).
2. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Miran Bozovic Metaphysical Egoism and its Vicissitudes
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The paper discusses the metaphysical theory developed in the early eighteenth century in France by the so-called égoïstes, and explores some of its ramifications. In the eighteenth century French, the term égoïsme was used not only in the ethical sense, but also in the metaphysical sense, that is, to denote the extremist view that only oneself exists. The paper focuses primarily on Jean Brunet's work Projet d'une nouvelle métaphysique, published in 1703, which has since been lost, analyzing its fundamental principle that the egoist's thought is the cause of the existence of all creatures, as found in a contemporary review of the book. Examining Brunet's "new metaphysics" within the framework of its own epistemology, the paper shows that the egoist philosopher himself was not trulyconvinced of the central tenet of his own metaphysical theory, that is, he did not sincerely believe that other minds were nothing other than modes of his thought or ideas that refer to nothing outside his mind, and argues that the very existence of Projet d'une nouvelle métaphysique in the form of a book in the mind of its author was contrary to the metaphysical theory expounded in it.
3. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Marina F. Bykova Hegel’s Phenomenology as a Project of Social Ontology
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief sketch of Fichte’s account of the self and discuss it as significant contribution to the modern theory of the selfhood. This discussion focuses on thinkers’ Jena projects of Wissenshaftslehre, including the 1794/95 Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre and Wissensftslehre novo methodo (1796/1797). For Fichte, the Jena period is a time of profound search for the ground and structure of his philosophical system. He finds such ground in a uniquely formulated conception of the self. Furthermore, beginning with the self as a direct intuition and ending with the self as a necessary idea, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre become an immense description of the development of the selfhood. Providing a conceptual outline of the main points of Fichte’s account of the self, the paper shows it as a unique philosophical result that is key to the emergence of post-Kantian German idealism.
4. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
L.M. Demchenko About the Unity of Power, Knowledge, Communication in M. Fuco’s “Archeological Search”
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Mishel Fuco not only influenced the consciousness of modern West, but changed the modus of thinking, the way of perception of many traditional notions, transformed the opinions about the reality, history, person. Philosopher’s principle research programme which attaches the entirety to his works is “archeology of knowledge” programme, the search of human knowledge’s original layers. Let us mark that all Fuco’s works in 1960s are devoted to main aim: to clear up the conditions of historical origin of different mental aims and social institutions in the culture of the Modern Time. Though in the whole this common aim remained for Fuco invariable, but the level on which he realizes his research search is changing constantly and rather logically. Relations of power, and to be more exact,accumulations of power and knowledge, social and cognitive which define all the aggregate of specific possibilities of culture in each given historical period. More than that the philosopher offers the particular prospects of sight of modern society and precisely totality of power relations, its ubiquitous nature and specific productivity which produces itself in each moment in any point or rather in any attitude from one point to another. From Fuco’s point of view the power is everywhere and not because it involves everything but because it comes from everywhere. The power is productive in that degree in which it is not associated with one definite imperious instance but pierces all kinds of activity in society, putting on its indelible stamp, developing under definite angle and due to this factit causes products, produced by them. The power induces and at the same time determines the fact which appears as a result of its inducement. The thirst of supremacy, which surrounds the individual and is focused on it as on the center of its use of force, comes out as a defining sign. It should be noticed that Fuco’s conception of power is not reduced to the understanding it as anonymous impersonal net of relations, piercing all society. It is supplemented by power treatment,coming out in “designed” look of definite imperious structure or imperious institute.
5. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Marco Duichin “Forerunner of Socialism” or “Genius of Bourgeois Stupidity”?: Marx and Engels on Bentham’s Utilitarianism
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From the early 1840s on, Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian doctrine aroused the joint interest of Marx and Engels, who saw the English philosopher as one of the forerunners of socialism. Later, however, in the various editions (German, French, English) of Book 1 of Capital (1867/90), Bentham would be sarcastically branded by Marx as a “genius of bourgeois stupidity”. In their youth, both Engels and Marx had independently become interested in Bentham’s ideas, admiring some social-ethical themes, seen as heralding interesting developments for the cause of the proletariat. On Engels’s suggestion, Marx included Bentham’s name, alongside those of the major 18th–19th century English and French exponents of protosocialism, in a planned Library of the most outstanding foreign socialist writers (1845), which however remained only a draft. From his first stay in England (1842/44), the young Engels had embraced in particular the famous utilitarian principle of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” advocated by Bentham. Marx, on the other hand, after initially praising Bentham’s work, which he had read in a French translation during his exile in Paris (1844), harshly criticized the ambiguous implications of this principle. In fact, he believed thatbehind a misleading progressive façade, it constituted the philosophical equivalent of the later economic theory of labour productivity propounded by D. Ricardo in opposition to the theory of its mere quantitative extension put forward by A. Smith. In the London Manuscripts (1861/63) Marx will reveal the affinity betweenBentham’s principle of the happpiness of the greatest number of people, and Ricardo’s assumption of the ineliminable misery of the minority condemned to productive labour. Based on the collection of Marx’s and Engels’s texts (letters, drafts, notebooks, manuscripts, printed works), made available today thanks to the critical edition by MEGA1, this paper sets out to re-examine, im großen und ganzen, the main moments in their critique of Bentham’s Utilitarianism.
6. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
David Evans The Highest Good in the Dialectic of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason
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Kant’s moral philosophy is celebrated for its doctrines of the primacy of the good will, the categorical imperative, and the significance of autonomy. These themes are pursued in the section of the Critique of Practical Reason which Kant called the Analytic, as well as in less formal works such as The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. In his main work Kant added a Dialectic, which is less well studied but is still essential to understanding his whole project. The concept of the Highest Good, summum bonum, the ultimate goal in life, incorporates both an objective and a subjective element. It pronounces on what we ought to want and how we ought to want it: it bears on our happiness and on our virtue. The aim in the Dialectic is to highlight the tension that can result from these twoelements, so that the need for a rapprochement between them becomes better appreciated. This tension remains in contemporary moral philosophy, with its diverse approaches of virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism. Kant’s stance regarding this dialectical tension needs to be understood, by Kant scholars and by moral philosophers.
7. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Edgard José Jorge Filho Concerning the Problem of Error in Kant
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In the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic, of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents a conception of error. In the (Jäsche) Logic, he also deals with the problem of error, albeit in a different way. This paper aims at exposing this difference and arguing that, in the (Jäsche) Logic, error is explained moreconsistently and suitably than it is in the Transcendental Dialectic. It begins by considering judgment as the place of truth, falsehood and error, and inquiring into the cognitive faculties that take part in its framing. These faculties, whose roles cannot be interchanged, are the sensibility, passive and receptive, and the understanding, active and spontaneous. Erroneous judgment springs from the unnoticed influence of sensibility on understanding, which makes theunderstanding hold merely subjective grounds of judgment to be objective ones. This unnoticed influence is conceived, in the Transcendental Dialectic, in such a way that sensibility is, in a certain sense, held to be the determining ground of error, as if it were an active faculty, whereas that influence is conceived in the (Jäsche) Logic in such a way that the understanding itself is regarded as the source and author of error. This authorship agrees with the conception of the understanding as submitted to prescriptive laws, which is contained in the very definition of Pure General Logic, as a science of the a priori laws of how the understanding ought to think.
8. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Nicolay Fomin Modern Philosophy of Human Essence
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The essence of the Man self-reflection has discovered Materialistic monism with understanding of substance as the reality of all existed, including universal: qualities – continuity, interruptness, corpuscleness, reflection; characteristics – transition from quantity to quality and vice versa, unity and struggle of opposites, denial of denial, unity of substance; states – rest, development, form, motion; processes – physical, chemical, biological, mental. The Materialistic monism consists of the unity of methodological, theoretical, sociological, statistical and practical levels of cognition, mastered by the Man through five known historical ways of the vital activity. Each successive historical period of life is characterized by more perfect forms of the Man bodiness, his common character and relationships, subject interaction, reflection and consciousness, and hence by it considerable broadening of the boarders of cognition and its set of instruments.Philosophical significance of the levels of cognition consists in their possibility to consider a phenomenon as universal, general, particular, separate and single; stratificated methods of cognition and technologies of penetration into different aspects of the phenomenon essence. The methodological cognition with itsown distinctive methods contains all other methods, thus this unity pretends to be the Modern Philosophy , including monistic, systemic, dialectial, metaphisical and empirical methods of cognition.
9. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Abel B. Franco Descartes’ Theory of (Human and Animal) Passions
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10. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 16
Patrick Gamez Leibniz, Absolute Space and the Identity of Indiscernibles
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The goal of this paper is to set out the structure and order of Leibniz’s discussion of the so-called “static shift,” in his correspondence in Clarke. The immediate point of this exercise is to determine precisely how Leibniz puts to use his two famous principles – the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and the Principleof Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) – in constructing, and defending his relational view of space, while providing a refutation of Absolute Space. In specific, it is to set out an interpretation of this argument contrary to the generally accepted one – here represented by Chernoff – about the use of the PII.