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1. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Takeshi Akiba Objection to Simons’ Nuclear Theory
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A number of philosophers today endorse the view thatmaterial substances (ex. cats, stones, atoms) can be analyzed asbundles of “particular properties” or “tropes”. Among severaldevelopments, the theory that P. Simons proposed is seen as themost successful one. Simons’ theory seems to owe its high reputationto mainly two advantages which he claims for his theory: thecapacity for avoiding infinite regress, and the explanatory adequacyfor phenomenon of change. In this paper, however, I try to object tothis high appraisal, by showing that the two alleged advantagesindeed cannot be simultaneously secured by Simons’ position. Tothis aim, I proceed as follows: First, I present Simons’ theory andexplain its alleged two advantages. Next, I take up A. Denkel’scriticism and show that the explanatory adequacy will be lost unlessSimons admits a certain revision of his theory. Finally, I show that asa result of the revision needed, Simons’ position comes to lose thecapacity for avoiding regress in turn.
2. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Hilan Bensusan, Manuel de Pinedo Holism and Singularity Towards an Ontology of the Unfitting
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Holism about thought content – especially coupled with a measure of semantic externalism – can provide us with an attractive account of how thinking relates to the world. It can help us to tell a neat story that starts out with the inseparable entanglement of truth and intelligibility: in order to understand thought, to confront it to the world and to give verdicts about that confrontation, we need to grasp a considerable amount of truths. A variety of positions that emerge under the influence of Davidson’s arguments (see, for instance, his 1974) deny the possibility of severing the connection between thought and facts of the world. However, this holisticunderstanding of thought seems less attractive when it is forced to account for our capacities to engage with singularities. A (roughly) Davidsonian conception of thought faces serious problems when it tries to answer questions regarding singular thoughts, de re attitudes and beliefs, and the nature of items of the world that cannot be described or referred to without the aid of demonstratives. This tension between thought and singularity is a well-known one and shows up in different traditions of philosophy. We aim at easing the tension without giving up the intuitions behind holism.
3. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski Varieties of Intentional Objects
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I propose a certain classification of entities which are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label ‘intentional objects’. Franz Brentano’s immanent objects, Alexius Meinong’s entities ‘beyond being and non-being’, or Roman Ingarden’s purely intentional objects can serve as examples of suchentities. What they all have in common is that they have been introduced in order to extensionalise the so called ‘intentional contexts’ (‘intentional’ with ‘t’). But not all entities which function this way deserve the name of intentional objects. In particular, neither Frege’s senses nor mental contents of the early Husserl are tobe classified as intentional objects in my sense. Roughly speaking, to be properly called ‘an intentional object’ a postulated entity must be supposed to function as a quasi-target of the subject’s intention. In other words: intentional objects are supposed to stand ‘before the subject’s mind’, so that they, in a sense, ‘replace’ the common sense objects of reference. It turns out that the intentional objects that were introduced in the history of philosophy make up groups which,from the ontological point of view, are very heterogeneous. Nevertheless it is possible to formulate certain systematic criteria of classifying them.
4. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Sun Demirli Bundles, Indiscernibility and Triplication Problem
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The bundle theory, supposed as a theory concerning the internal constitution of individuals, is often conjoined with a constitutional approach to individuation entailing the thesis ‘no two individuals can share all their constituents’ (CIT). But then it runs afoul of Black’s duplication case. Here a new bundle theory, takingdistance relations between bundles to be a sufficient ground for their diversity, will be proposed. This version accommodates Black’s world. Nonetheless, there is a possible objection. Consider the ‘triplication case’—a world containing three indistinguishable spheres, each 5-meters from each other. Since distance relations are dyadic, this version must fail to distinguish the threespheres world from Black’s world. In response to this objection, I maintain that we must construe distance relations as irreducibly multigrade and n-ary. Then these two worlds will be distinguished by appealing to a triadic relation—R3—that three things enter mutually. Aren’t all polyadic relations in principle reducible to dyadic relations? I won’t deny that. But I will aim lower and argue that R3 cannot be reduced to dyadic relations that obliterate the distinction between the three-spheres world and Black’s world.
5. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
David Gawthorne Existence as a Primitive Resistance to Ontological Contradiction
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There are two crucial problems for those who would take existence to be a ‘real’ property. (1) The predication of such a property of a thing appears insufficient to distinguish cases where the thing exists, on the one hand, from those where it does not exist on the other. That is, the property of existence does not add anythingto the concept of a thing. (2) If non-existent things are capable of having properties and identity – which is necessary to avoid an objection made by A. J. Ayer – then the identity of all things with all other things appears to follow. However, if the concept of existence is explained as a primitive property manifest as resistance toontological contradiction then these problems can be solved. The pay-off for considering existence to be a first-order predicate is, therefore, an argument against existing ontological contradictions.
6. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Mezentsev Gennady The Character of Crisis Events in the Bases of Modern Philosophy and the Ways of Solving These Problems
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This article is devoted to the crisis of the modern philosophy caused by the generally accepted approach towards the ontology issues of existence and the ways to solve these problems. Before Kant’s theory the fundamental principle of the universe organization in the ontology was the determination of the existence as the number of objects that were independent from the subject and explored as they were. Kant showed then that the subject deals only with the images of its own conscience. The existence became not the thing-in-itself, but the thing, that opens to the human mind. But this experience gave no answer to the question about the differences between the immanent perceptions of conscience and the universe itself. This article reveals that the transition from the understanding of things as independent existing objects toward the understanding of their subjective origin as objects themselves demands more radical conclusions. These conclusions consist of that fact that the ontology should concentrate more exploring existence as the unformed organic whole and not to forget about its general problemsand presentations about the conscience. Currently we can get non-verbal knowledge about the existence itself and take steps of getting verbal one. Separation of the existence as the unformed organic whole from the presentations of conscience prevents from mistake of determining the things created by the subject in the process of universe perception as its attributes (the plurality of interpretations turns into the ontology pluralism).
7. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Serghey Gherdjikov Virtual and Real Relativity
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Here the topics of the virtual and that of relativity are joined together. New concepts of relation, virtuality and reality are devised. Relation is definition. It is not something detached and real but is the very ‘thing’. Relating is virtual defining – projection of the real connection between moments of a life process. ‘This’ without ‘that’ is not this. ‘I’ without ‘you’ is not I. ‘West’ without ‘East’ is not west. ‘Man’ without other living beings is not man. We pass each other. In the same degree we do not know ourselves as an ego, as community, as civilization. This is an unconsciousness relativity effect, which comes into being in the process of communication between cultures and between individuals. Relativity in awareness can be a virtual freedom for a synthesis of definitions, relations and descriptions, and a real freedom for a synthesis of a life process, identity and life in a human form. Which is real and which is not, if thongs are definiteonly in relation? Which is real and which is not in a global interrelating and virtual communication? The virtual pertains to all artefacts. The reality of artefacts, and especially of signs, lies in their being related to a meaning, their reality is relational. Meaning is understood as a moment of a human life process. The scheme iselaborated in two spheres: virtual and real relativity analogous to special and general relativity (Einstein).
8. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Patricia Hanna Realism without Empiricism
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In his later writings, Wittgenstein is generally taken as committed to anti-realism. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. Although he is committed to ontic anti-realism, this does not preclude his acceptance of epistemic realism. I argue that the possibility of using practices to fix meanings and to provide aframework for conceptual differentiation of our experiences rests upon a version of realism, which I call “praxial realism”, which does not presuppose anything like a Kantian noumenal world.
9. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Endre Kiss Construing Identity Under the Role of Difference: Some Philosophical Elements of the Actual Problems of Identity
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By 1989, the neo-liberal logics of identity and difference took over the Socialist, as well as the Christian basic notions of identity and difference. This means, neither Socialist solidarity nor Christian love for brethren eases the power of difference. In such cases, difference is not a simple difference, value, or ideology any more, but ontology, moreover, it acquires logical character. While in the divided world difference was based on hidden identity, now neo-liberal - human-rights identity is being filled with concrete contents by an unreconcileable difference. The power of difference is the final state of being different. In the relations of the present, the logic of identity doesn't simply dominate, but it seems to be a higher, maybe straight unexceedably final variant of identity - we are not simplyidentical with one another, but as a result of the grounding on human rights we are identical in our most dignified nature. But in actual fact, political and social spaces show a row of mutations differing from this. This doesn't mean the ideology of identity would have got unveiled, but that identity - logic has become selective in a new way. While the identity - logic is working in the foreground, in the background, a difference - logic stronger than ever before, is operating ruthlessly.
10. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Chenchulakshmi Kolla Some Perspectives on Business Ethics
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