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series introduction
1. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2
Ioanna Kuçuradi Series Introduction
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volume introduction
2. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2
William L. McBride Volume Introduction
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section: the nature and tasks of social philosophy
3. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2
Jurate Morkuniene Contemporary Social Philosophy: The Problem of the Method and the Goals
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In the modern world, with the processes of social development gaining accelerated rates, a new philosophical image of the world emerges, accompanied by the formation of a new social philosophy. Contemporary social philosophy is not a monosemantically defined field of the usage of notions, because it generalizes the most complicated and rapidly changing objects such as society and man. In this sense social philosophy is always incomplete, relatively open and, therefore, a temporary, theoretically "imperfect", "nonsystematic". Over the last few decades social philosophy has suffered a deep crisis. This crisis was evoked by changes in the paradigm of science. Philosophy was too slow with its reaction to these changes; its former means of cognition failed to explain the new, rapid processes of social life. Philosophy began to get out of the crisis for two reasons. First, social theory felt the need of new, more general means of explanation, of a metatheory, which can be nothing else but philosophy. Second, philosophy itself changed its orientation, entered the paradigm of integrity, accepted the idea of society as an open system. The task of contemporary philosophy is not only to attain truth, but also to show how this truth can become active. Contemporary philosophy is the means of both thinking and action. Philosophy has no absolutely accomplished truth any more: it is searching for the truth of its time.
4. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2
Jozef Sivák Le Philosophe dans la cité
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Quelle est la place du philosophe dans son environnemen social (societe civile) en general et aux moments des grands bouleversements sociopolitiques en particulier? S'il doit en parier, doit-il agir en acteur aussi ? Ne risque-t-il pas de perdre son identite professionnelle? 1 Ä son habitus intellectuel et scientifique s'ajoute ainsi une dimension ethique allant d'une attitude de sagesse et de distance ä une interpretation axiologique et essentialiste des phenomenes politiques. Toutefois, le philosophe n'est pas politicien et s'il lui arrive ä s'engager sur le plan politique, il risque de perdre son identite professionnelle, son autorite morale, et sa liberte.
5. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2
Iryna Predborska The Concept of "Multi-Dimensionality" in Social Philosophy
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This paper deals with the problem of the methodological foundations of social philosophy. The notion of "multidimensionality" as one of the key concepts in the new social philosophy paradigm is analyzed. This notion reflects some expanded pictures of the social and cultural world. The paper makes reference to H. Marcuse's, A. Toynbee's, R. Dahrendorfs, and P. Bourdieu's interpretations of multidimensionality. Their different approaches are considered. The author underlines the common positions of scholars' interpretations and shows the differences in terminology. Primary attention is paid to the analysis of how researchers develop and use this new notion. The significance of this notion for the analysis of social phenomenon is underlined. This explication demonstrates the heuristic possibilities of the concept "multi-dimensionality" for the exploration of society.
6. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2
Thalia Fung Philosophy: A New Knowledge and an Alternative Political Science
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Philosophy can enhance communication among new forms of knowledge, existing ones, and those that will arise in light of the heuristic possibilities of the revolutions in science, technology, and thought; it can turn to a reevaluation of all of the culture that humanity has produced for its own welfare and can prevent the loss of the differentiating essences of diverse social groups. In the conjugation of the forms of knowledge, I am interested in the relationship that has emerged between specialized scientific knowledge and ordinary knowledge, between the tradition, religion, art, and the evaluation of all that has previously been treated by philosophy. But if there is one discipline that I regard as privileged because of its effect on human actions, it is political science: public policy can provide a basis for planetary consciousness, a concern for mankind and for its potential destruction. The role of political philosophy is to serve as an ideological guide for a political science that would comprehend political behavior in relation to its consequences for individual human beings and would thus support actions favorable to humanity.
7. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2
Antoine Côté On the Very Idea of a Democratic Empire
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The short anonymous work known as the Constitution of the Athenians has long since fascinated scholars. Written sometime in the 5th century, during or just before the Peloponnesian War, it offers a scathing attack on Athenian democratic institutions. Its author is unknown but has traditionally been called the "Old Oligarch" in reference to his obvious political convictions. But the pamphlet's interest lies not so much in its critique of Athenian democracy as in the connection the author sees between these institutions and Athens' imperialist policies in the Aegean.
8. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2
Edward C. Halper Spinoza on the Political Value of Freedom of Religion
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The last chapter of Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise (TTP) is a brief for freedom of religion. In our enthusiasm for Spinoza's conclusion it is easy to overlook the blatant contradiction between this thesis and the central claim of the immediately preceding chapter that "right over matters of religion is vested entirely in the sovereign." There Spinoza emphasizes the necessity that there be but one sovereign in the state and the threat that autonomous religious authorities would pose to the authority of this sovereign. This last claim is, in turn, bolstered by his analysis of the deficiencies of the Hebrew state in the chapter before, chapter 18, according to which it was the usurpation of political authority by priests that ultimately undermined the state. In other words, in chapters 18 and 19, Spinoza makes the case for the strict political control of religion only to conclude his treatise by arguing, in chapter 20, that the purpose of the state is, in reality, freedom and that that freedom manifests itself, in part, in freedom of religion. How could this latter not pose exactly the sort of threat to the sovereign and the state that leads Spinoza to insist on the sovereign's absolute control of religion? How can Spinoza insist that religion be both free and controlled by the state? This paper aims to answer this question and, in the process, explains a number of troubling features of the Theological-Political Treatise.
9. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2
Roberto Dante Flores Las Relaciones Interestatales en Hobbes y Morgenthau
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Este trabajo tiene por finalidad analizar la vision de dos autores sobre aspectos del poder y de la justicia entre los estados. Para ello tomamos dos de sus obras representativas que buscan comprender la politica de su tiempo: Leviatän escrito por el ingles Thomas Hobbes, publicado en 1651, y Politica entre las naciones escrito por el alemän Hans Morgenthau, publicado en 1948. El poder es la razön del soberano, su büsqueda estarä por encima de la justicia. Pero la instituciön de principios normativos que regulan el comportamiento de la sociedad es imperativa para mantener el orden y la paz. Esta paz es fruto del poder y no de la justicia, es fruto de la imposiciön del mäs fuerte y su capacidad para mantener el orden dependerä de la normativa juridica y de la fuerza coactiva para defenderla. Las pasiones humanas terminan en la razön que sostiene al Estado hobbesiano, las pasiones de los estadistas terminan en el orden juridico internacional morgenthauniano. El realismo de la büsqueda del poder constituye la base filosöfica para el desarrollo de una teoria emprrico-normativa que sirve de base a los analistas de politica exterior para comprender los actos de los estadistas e incluso adelantarse a sus acciones. La teoria en Morgenthau es la verificaciön de los hechos histöricos para darles sentido, mediante un metodo, a traves de la razön. La historia humana atravesada por el concepto de lucha por el poder es el enlace metodolögico que une a los dos autores.
10. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2
Ferit Güven Hegel and the Dialectic of Racism
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The modern conception of an atomistic subject constituting itself by excluding and dominating its other(s) remains insufficient for rethinking a "postcolonial subject" despite its merits in explaining the historical relationship between the Western subject and the Oriental other. Hegel seems to offer a promising alternative to this model. For Hegel, the construction of the subject does not take place in terms of the exclusion and oppression of, but in terms of a dialectical relationship to, its other, hence Hegel's model of subjectivity appears to be useful in rethinking the relation between the colonizer and the colonized in terms of mutual recognition and interdependent constitution. However, this appearance is misleading. In fact, the Hegelian model of the subject is the source of problems concerning the relation between self and other in general, and between the colonizer and the colonized in particular. Not only does Hegel attribute the possibility of the dialectical movement to a particular kind of subject (European), but his model of subjectivity reduces difference to opposition, and thereby obviates the possibility of rethinking a difference between the colonizer and the colonized. This paper tries to justify this observation through a discussion of Hegel's understanding of race as articulated in the third section of the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. I argue that Hegel's understanding of race in the context of the natural soul allows one to draw inferences concerning his general conception of subjectivity and dialectics. Accordingly, this paper claims that rather than providing an alternative model for postcolonial subjectivity, Hegel's notion of the subject grounds the colonial model itself.