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series introduction
1. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 5
Ioanna Kuçuradi Series Introduction
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volume introduction
2. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 5
Stephen Voss, Berna Kilinç, Gürol Irzik Volume Introduction
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section: logic and philosophical logic
3. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 5
Erdinç Sayan Settling Rational Disputes -- A Dead End?
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Many wonder at the abundance of disputes, opposing views and schools in philosophy. This abundance is surprising in view of the fact that philosophers are known for their striving and high regard for rationality. (There are, of course, philosophers who attempt to oppose, mostly by rational argumentation, the view that philosophy should be a rational discipline.) Why are all these admirably smart and rational people in so much disagreement with each other? Suvar Köseraif argues that the explanation of this phenomenon may lie in the fact that when two perfectly rational agents A 1 and A 2 disagree about matters of truth, there seems no way they can settle their dispute in purely rational ways. For suppose A1 believes in the truth of claim Q on the basis of premises P and a valid argument P.'.Q, and A 2 believes that ~Q on the basis of premises R and a valid argument R.'. ~Q. Then it would seem on logical, hence rational, grounds that A 1 must reject A2 ' s reasons R, since P.'. ~R is also valid. Thus the reasons P, which led Ai to rationally accept Q, also constitute rational reasons for A 1 to reject R, and consequently reject the argument A2 adduces for ~Q. Symmetrically, A 2 cannot but reject the reasoning A1 adduces for Q. So the dispute between A1 and A 2 concerning the truth of Q cannot be resolved—unless either side compromises its rationality and yields to such nonrational methods as threats, brainwashing, offers of money, etc. If all this is right, we have (rational) reason to be pessimistic about the value of rationality not only in philosophy, but in any sphere of thought, including science. I attempt to offer a rational counterargument against Köseraif's.
4. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 5
Leah Savion, Raymundo Morado The Role of Logical Inference in Heuristic Rationality
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One of the key concepts in the Philosophy of Logic is the notion of inference. In this paper we expand the notion of logical inference and describe its role in a comprehensive theory of rationality. Some recent rationality theories either presuppose an unattainable logical capacity or they minimize the role of logic, in light of the vast amount of data on fallacious inferential performance. In this paper we defend the view that logical acuity, redefined to include heuristics, is a necessary factor in rationality. We evaluate some presuppositions of algorithmic models and some normative and metatheoretical properties of heuristic models, and defend our model against possible objections. Our revised notion of logical inference functions as the nucleus of the notion of logical acuity which in turn is a necessary building block for a realistic model of rationality. This model emphasizes the logical role of inferential heuristics, cognitive constraints and contextuality, introduces concepts such as "obvious inference", "cautious deductive closure", and "familiarity", and develops the notions of cognitive economy and contextual limitations as tools for evaluating and predicting rational behavior.
5. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 5
Mark Weinstein Informal Logic and the Foundations of Argument
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Informal logic offers a radical new perspective on the evaluation of arguments. But little work has been done on how deep concepts in the logical foundations of argument need to be modified in light of such efforts. This paper offers an indication of what might be done by sketching a new approach to the theory of entailment, truth and relevance.
6. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 5
Claude Gratton The Viciousness of Infinite Regresses
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Henry W. Johnstone (1996) attempts to use a notion of postponement to give a general account of viciousness of infinite regresses. Though some of his examples suggest that his notion applies to only beginningless regresses (...eRdRcRbRa), I will show that it also applies to endless ones (aRbRcRdRe...). Unfortunately, despite this expanded application, it does not apply to all vicious regresses, even to some of his own examples; it is cumbersome and unnecessary, and it fails to explain how some infinite regresses entail a contradiction.
7. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 5
Risto Vilkko The Problematic Reconstruction of the Development of Modern Logic
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Many historians and philosophers of logic have claimed that during the modern classical era there was a long period of stagnation or even of decline in the field of logic. The aim of this paper is to convince the audience that this standard evaluation of the development of modern logic during the period from Leibniz to Frege is misdirected and needs to be corrected. Even though it is true that the now usual way of understanding logic merely as the doctrine of syntax and semantics of explicit languages would not have appealed even to most 19th century logicians, it is still not the case that there is nothing worth discussing with regard to the development of logic during the modern classical period. The algebraic period culminated with Schroder's contribution and neither Herbartian formal logic nor Trendelenburg's critical epistemology aroused much interest among the 20th century mathematical logicians and analytic philosophers. Nevertheless, the development of symbolic logic can only be understood properly by relating its emergence to the immediately preceding philosophically-oriented discussion about the reform of logic.
8. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 5
Andrés Bobenrieth Hilbert, Trivialization and Paraconsistent Logic
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The origin of Paraconsistent Logic is closely related with the argument that from the assertion of two mutually contradictory statements any other statement can be deduced, which can be referred to as ex contradict!one sequitur quodlibet (ECSQ). Despite its medieval origin, only in the 1930s did it become the main reason for the unfeasibility of having contradictions in a deductive system. The purpose of this paper is to study what happened before: from Principia Mathematica to that time, when it became well established. The main historical claims that I am going to advance are the following: the first explicit use of ECSQ as the main argument for supporting the necessity of excluding any contradiction from deductive systems is to be found in the first edition (1928) of the book Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik by Hilbert and Ackermann. At the end, I will suggest that the aim of the 20th century usage of ECSQ was to change from the centuries long philosophical discussion about contradictions to a more "technical" one. But with Paraconsistent Logic viewed as a technical solution to this restriction, the philosophical problem revives, but now with an improved understanding of it at one's disposal.
9. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 5
Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia What Does '&' Mean?
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Using conjunction as an example, I show a technical and philosophical problem when trying to conciliate the currently prevailing views on the meaning of logical connectives: the inferientialist (also called 'syntactic') one based on introduction and elimination rules, and the representationalist (also called 'semantic') one given through truth tables. Mostly I show that the widespread strategy of using the truth theoretical definition of logical consequence to collapse both definitions must be rejected by inferentialists. An important consequence of my argument is that there are different notions of conjunction at play in standard first order logic, and that the technical and philosophical connections between them are far from well established.
10. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 5
Wen-Fang Wang Modal Fictionalism and Hale's Dilemma Against It
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Gideon Rosen proposes a view called "modal fictionalism" which Rosen thinks has all the benefits of modal realism without its ontological costs. Whereas modal realists have a paraphrase r(0) of a modal claim "0", modal fictionalists claim that the correct translation of "0" is rather the result of prefixing "according to the hypothesis of a plurality of worlds" to r(0). Rosen takes the prefix to be primitive and defines other modal notions in terms of it. Bob Hale, however, thinks the fictionalist's project suffers from a "simple" dilemma. The purpose of this paper is to show that Rosen is right in taking the prefix as primitive and Hale is wrong in thinking fictionalism as being threatened by the dilemma.