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series introduction
1. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Ioanna Kuçuradi Series Introduction
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volume introduction
2. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Dermot Moran, Stephen Voss Volume Introduction
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section: theory of knowledge
3. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Fred Adams, Murray Clarke Defending the Tracking Theories of Knowledge
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Since Kripke's attack on Nozick's Tracking Theory of knowledge, there has been strong suspicion that tracking theories are false. We think that neither Kripke's arguments and examples nor other recent attacks in the literature show that the tracking theories are false. We cannot address all of these concerns here, but we will show why some of the most discussed examples from Kripke do not demonstrate that the tracking theories are false.
4. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Matteo Negro Concepts, normes et jugements
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Conceptual activity is a normative activity, consisting in using or exercising rules which are functional in the formation of language, particularly judgments and propositions. Concepts, the essential elements of propositional content, are not to be considered as simple properties or predicates, but instead as constituting the rules of correct judgment. Two aspects of these claims are to be underlined. First, the dimension of normativity: the concept itself is a rule, a mode of functioning of understanding. Second, the notion of understanding as disposition to judgment. Anyone who expresses a judgment exercises a certain responsibility, an implicit or explicit endorsement of a rule.
5. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Jorge Portilla Dominios Epistémicos
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El propösito de esta monografia es presentar el bosquejo de un desarrollo teörico acerca de dominios epistemicos. Tal desarrollo, distinto a enfoques de nombre similar que provienen particularmente de las ciencias de la conducta, ha sido disenado para ser aplicado en evaluaciön y producciön de discurso. La teoria postula que cada discurso estä fuertemente determinado por el dominio epistemico discursante y por la creencia que este sustenta acerca del dominio epistemico oyente. Se percibe que la teoria puede ser ütil en el campo politico, educativo y empresarial, es decir, aquellos que requieren alta producciön y recepciön de discurso. La teoria presenta a los dominios como construcciones objetivas que conforman una unidad compleja de elementos y sus relaciones mutuas, que se modifica (a) segün sus propias estructuras frente a externalidades, o (b) por inferencias que produce segün una razön que le es propia. Esa alteraciön del dominio es el conocimiento. El dominio actüa como validaclor o censor de lo cognoscible. Cualquier configuraciön del dominio es posible. Los elementos del dominio no son representaciones, el sujeto es un elemento opcional y no un soporte de la acciön cognoscitiva, y la externalidad al dominio no se ve como objeto ni como realidad.
6. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Daniel Quesada Making Room for Philosophy: Naturalism and the A Priori
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This paper traces the development of transcendental philosophy in the 20th century back to the strongly perceived need to preserve an exclusive area of a priori research for philosophy. It will argue that a genuine sort of aprioristic philosophical inquiry does not in fact require the step from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology taken by Husserl and well attested in his works from at least his 1911 essay "Philosophy as Strict Science", nor does it require the "detranscendentalization" of Husserlian phenomenology carried out in the work of Heidegger. On the contrary, as I will show, recent work in philosophy connected to the development of the cognitive sciences suggests how it is possible to obtain significant a priori knowledge, by a sort of "wide reflexive equilibrium", consistently with the empirical impugnability of knowledge required by Quinean empiricism.
7. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Peter Simpson The Rejection of Skepticism
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There is a widespread belief among contemporary philosophers that skeptical hypotheses—such as that we are dreaming, or victims of an evil demon, or brains in a vat—cannot definitively be ruled out as false. This belief is ill-founded. In fact it is based on a failure to see that skeptical arguments beg the question. Such arguments assume that reality is not an immediate given of experience in order to prove that reality is not an immediate given of experience. This point is explained and justified in detail. Conversely, however, the realist would beg the question in the opposite way if he tried to prove realism. The conclusion we should reach is that skepticism and realism are problems of immediacy and not of proof. They face us with a choice between alternatives that are not only radically different but also pretty much impregnable and irrelevant to each other. This choice is not arbitrary, for there are grounds to determine it. But the grounds are the immediate evidence and not the arguments.
section: philosophy of communication and interpretation emotions on the net
8. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Aaron Ben-Ze'ev Emotions on the Net
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Emotions are fascinating phenomena which occupy a pivotal position in our lives. I have presented elsewhere (Ben-Ze'ev, 2000) a comprehensive framework for understanding emotions in our everyday life. The paper briefly describes the characterization of typical emotions, while indicating their relevance to online personal relationships. It discusses issues such as emotional complexity; the typical emotional cause, concern, and object; emotions and intelligence; and managing the emotions. The paper then goes on to examine whether the emotions elicited in online relationships are similar to those in face-to-face relationships or whether we are witnessing the emergence of new types of emotions.
9. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
David Boersema Geach on Proper Names
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Recently, several philosophers of language have claimed that, at least in some respects, Peter Geach proposed a view about proper names that anticipated important features of the causal theory (or historical chain theory) that was later set forth by Saul Kripke and others. Quentin Smith, for example, in his essay, "Direct, Rigid Designation and A Posteriori Necessity: A History and Critique," says explicitly that "Geach (1969) ... originated the causal or 'historical chain' theory of names" (1999). In his entry on "Proper Names" for the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Graeme Forbes speaks of the "Geach-Kripke historical chain account" of proper names. In this paper, I suggest that, while there are very clear affinities between Geach's view on proper names and that of Kripke, there are several important differences, differences that are significant enough for me to claim that Geach and Kripke do not share a single account of proper names.
10. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
D. Beybin Kejanlioğlu The 'Public Sphere' and the Problem of 'Information'
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This paper examines the debate over the relationship between the public sphere and communication, which has become a focus of attention after the publication of Jürgen Habermas's Structural Transformation of Public Sphere in English in 1989, following the two volumes of his The Theory of Communicative Action in 1984 and 1987. Although the historical account of the public sphere has also received a good deal of attention, I deal mainly with the normative dimension of Habermas's theory as it led to a rethinking and reassessment of public broadcasting, to the end of restructuring it as a site where 'citizens act as a public'. That is to say, a site where people assemble and unite freely, and express and publicize their opinions on matters of general interest without constraint in an age of deregulated communications. Several scholars have provided us with maps for re-organizing the media of communications in this respect, but they have failed to analyze the 'information' which feeds the 'informed citizen'. This paper addresses not only what information means today—whether it is a digit, a signal, or content—but also how it is produced within daily routine practices and how the nature of the means of its dissemination influences its character. Another serious aspect of those assessments, including that of Habermas, is the global character of communications today. Habermas is well aware of the mismatch between the global market and the absence of its corollary in politics. Yet his silence in the economics of information, even as he acknowledges the digitalization of communications and 'a world public sphere', also calls for a critical account of the relations between 'information', democratic politics and the question of scale.