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Displaying: 1-14 of 14 documents


1. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Sergi Avaliani Philosophy of the Pseudoabsolute
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Since human knowledge is relative, human beings consciously (or often unconsciously) dismiss the relative by creating the absolute. The absolute thus created is the psuedoabsolute which, by virtue of its human origins, is relative. However, it functions in both the practical and theoretical life of homo sapien as a genuine absolute. Hence, the psuedoabsolute is relatively absolutized by the human person. The psuedoabsolute is a dialectical unity of the absolute and relative and, as a "third reality," plays a great role in the spiritual life of humankind.
2. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
John M. Berry The Reliability of Heidegger’s Reading of Plato’s Gigantomachia
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At issue is the reliability of Heidegger’s contention that Greek thinking, especially Plato’s, was constricted by an unthought "pre-ontology." "The meaning of being" supposedly guiding and controlling Greek ontology is "Being = presence." This made "the question of the meaning of ousia itself" inaccessible to the Greeks. Heidegger’s Plato’s Sophist is his most extensive treatment of a single dialogue. To test his own reliability, he proposes "to demonstrate, by the success of an actual interpretation of [the Gigantomachia], that this sense of Being [as presence] in fact guided [Plato’s] ontological questioning . . .". I will show Heidegger’s strategy in connecting what he takes to be Plato’s naive pre-ontology — Being = Presence — to the ontology of the Gigantomachia — Being = Power. I will show that Heidegger blatantly misreads the text to make the connection: he completely misses the distinction between bodies and bodiless things. The text makes sense, I will show, if and only if its explicit ontology — Being = Power — is its implicit pre-ontology. Plato wrote his text not to discuss, but to exemplify, Heidegger’s ontology-preontology distinction. He wrote the Gigantomachia for Heidegger, but Heidegger missed it.
3. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Andrzej Chmielecki A Vindication of Ontology
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I argue that ontology, when distinguished from metaphysics and taken to mean the most general theory of reality, is a genuinely cognitive enterprise. Thus it follows that ontology, and not epistemology, lays the foundation for all philosophical thought. The main task of ontology is to elaborate a conceptual framework that can deal with all domains of being (material and spiritual, real as well as ideal) and then solve problems appearing at the point of contact between different domains of being.
4. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Wolfgang Deppert Zur systemtheoretischen Verallgemeinerung des Kra begri es
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In order to generalize the concept of force due to its application within theoretical descriptions of biological systems, the Newtonian notion of force is used. So-called ‘wholenesslike’ (ganzheitliche) systems of notions allow us to define ‘wholenesslike’ states. There are two possible changes of such states: the changes of eigenstates and the change of the structure of systems. Therefore, two types of forces are discussed: systemeigenforces and systemcombinationforces.
5. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Louise D. Derksen Anne Conway’s Critique of Cartesian Dualism
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I describe and analyze Anne Conway’s critique of Cartesian dualism. After a brief biographical introduction to Conway, I sketch some of the influences on her philosophy. I then describe her non-Cartesian view of substance. According to Conway, there is only one substance in created reality. This substance contains both matter and spirit. A purely material or spiritual substance is, she argues, an impossibility. Next, I discuss several of Conway’s arguments against Cartesian dualism. Firstly, dualism is inconsistent because dualists, while denying that concepts such as divisibility and extension are applicable to spiritual substance, nevertheless use such terms when describing the soul or spirit. They assume that soul or spirit is something particular which can be located somewhere. Secondly, she argues that dualism results in mechanism because it makes too sharp a distinction between body and soul, thus regarding the body as a mechanical machine and the soul as something which is not integrally related to the body. Thirdly, dualism cannot account for the interaction between mind and body. The two substances of which a dualist speaks are defined on the basis of the exclusion of characteristics. But the two things which have nothing in common cannot influence each other causally.
6. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Ricardo O. Díez Hacia una Ontología del Nombre
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Conforme a la inquietud del Vigésimo Congreso Mundial de la Filosofía he querido delinear algunos aspectos de la función educativa a través de tres pasos. (1) El primero dice algo de la palabra mediadora en la enseñanza. La lectio, meditatio y oratio son los apotes que rescato del medioevo junto a los cuatro sentidos de la Escritura. (2) La referencialidad de la palabra constituye el segundo paso de la comunicación. Por ella los que dialogan deben aprender a mirar juntos en una misma dirección. (3) Finalmente se propone una figura y una ontología. La figura en X es el quiasmo dibujado entre las palabras y las cosas. Dos direcciones relacionan los extremos que se cruzan en un punto. Mediante estos movimientos el sentido va desde lo que es al texto, y la significación desde el lenguaje a lo real. En el punto crucial se edifica el nombre que invoca y convoca a los que dialogan. El diálogo en su ejercicio involucra al pensar y al corazón. El primero cumple su función en la interpretación de la palabra y en la visión de realidad. El segundo en la ordenación cordial del mundo y en la sumisión de todo lenguaje a la dimensión de quien escucha. Educador y educando, palabras y cosas configuran cuatro ámbitos de la tarea educativa. La extensión de la comunicación nos hizo limitar a la horizontalidad realizada por el quiasmo y el modo como el pensamiento juega junto a la expresión y la realidad. El pensar ve los movimientos que dibuja la figura quiástica. Mediante el uso correcto de una gramática centrada en el nombre que narra la vida, la acción pensante edifica una ontología que usa de la palabra para edificar los afectos que construye el mundo con lazos cordiales.
7. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Daisuke Kachi The Ontology of Many-Worlds: Modality and Time
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There are two types of theories regarding many worlds: one is modal, while the other is temporal. The former regards reality as consisting of many possible worlds, while the latter holds that reality consists of many momentary worlds, which are usually called moments. I compare these two theories, paying close attention to the concept of transworld identity and compare trans-possible world identity with trans-momentary world identity (or transmoment identity). I characterize time from the point of many-worlds view, believing this to be one of the best ways of grasping the reality of time. First, I show that there is reason to adopt the many-worlds view because transworld identity is meaningful for both of them, while it is not for space. Second, I argue that transmoment identity is different from transpossible world identity concerning reality. The former is a realistic relation, while the latter is not. Thus, I find that the reality of time is in the relation of transmoment identity. Such a view, I contend, has merit on the basis that it recognizes the reality of time in a sense that is not true of space.
8. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
C. Kanzian Zur Ontologie Natürlicher Arten
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In meinem Beitrag versuche ich, das Problem einer Ontologie natürlicher Arten auf eine Weise anzugehen, die nicht dem Verdacht ausgesetzt ist, von vornherein auf nominalistische oder realistische Extrempositionen festzulegen. Zunächst lege ich meine terminologischen und inhaltlichen Voraussetzungen dar: Eine davon besteht in der Annahme, daß die Identität von Dingen, d.i. ihre ontologische Konstitution, sortal dependent ist. Die ontologische Konstiution von Dingen hängt auch von ihrer Artzugehörigkeit ab. In der Folge analysiere ich, worin diese sortale Dependenz genauerhin besteht. Dies geschieht anhand einer Untersuchung von Existenz-bzw. Konstitutionsbedingungen, denen individuelle Dinge aufgrund ihrer Artzugehörigkeit unterliegen. In einem nächsten Schritt stelle ich die Frage, ob es Entitäten gibt, deren ontologische Konstitution in besonderer Weise sortal abhängig ist. Ich lege ausfürhrlich dar, worin diese Besonderheit bestehen soll und diskutiere meine Option, die gestellte Frage zu bejahen. Schließlich schlage ich vor, Vorkommnisse, deren ontologische Konstitution auf diese besondere Weise sortal dependent ist, als Vorkommnisse natürlicher Arten zu bezeichnen. Meine Vorgangsweise ist nicht thesenhaft behauptend, sondern argumentativ abwägend. Mit der Anführung meiner Option verbinde ich somit nicht den Anspruch, das Problem einer Ontologie natürlicher Arten zu lösen; eher den, zur weiteren Aktualisieriung seiner Diskussion beizutragen.
9. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Michael Rahnfeld The Structure of Wholeness
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Using a part-whole-calculus the vague concept of wholeness is rendered precisely as the structure of an atomic boolean lattice. The so-defined prototypical structure of wholeness has the status of a category, since every element of our experience may be considered as an intended application of it. This will be illustrated using examples from different ontological spheres. The hypothetical and therefore fallible character of the structure is shown in its inadequacy in grasping quantum logical facts. This demands a differentiation of wholeness. The defined structure may be seen as circular in two respects: On the one hand it is the precondition for the understanding of its own syntactic and semantic basics, on the other hand there exists a mutual defineability between its atoms, which leads us to the thesis that wholeness cannot be defined in a non-circular manner.
10. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
William L. Reese The Structure of Possibility
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I call attention to the following theses concerning possibility. 1) Anything that has become actual must have been possible in the period of time immediately preceding its actualization. 2) The logically possible is a conception, and conceptions exist within the mind. 3) The possible is not a mere name. 4) The possible is not a mental entity and that alone. 5) Every possibility, whether mental entity or not must be, or image, an ontological entity, real although not (yet) actual. 6) For all we know logical possibility is the sufficient condition of ontological possibility. 7) Philosophers who lack the category of ontological possibility nonetheless refer to it as an implicit, if hidden, feature of their systems. 8) In some part of the period of time preceding its actualization, an ontological possibility becomes a nascent actuality, and external consistency a necessary condition for nascency. 9) The rise or fall of energy level through directed energy vectors, on human and nonhuman levels, is the third condition for the actualizing of possibilities, or for their failure to actualize.
11. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Nathan M. Solodukho Starting Philosophic Problem
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The starting philosophic problem is related to the categories ‘being’ and ‘nonbeing.’ This is the problem of the relationship between being and nonbeing. The cardinal question of philosophy is: ‘What can be considered to be primary, being or nonbeing?’ In the history of philosophy, it is possible to speak about two basic philosophic paradigms: philosophy of being and philosophy of nonbeing. This paper is an elaboration of the ‘philosophy of nonbeing.’
12. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Malgorzata Szczesniak Das Präphysiche Stadium und der Anfang der Welt
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This paper concerns the main physical, philosophical and existential aspects of the ‘pre-physical’ stage in the evolution of the universe. I will discuss the ways that contemporary cosmology tries to: (1) solve the problem about the time period of the ‘pre-physical’ state; (2) answer the question whether the beginning of time was at the same time as the beginning of the existence of the Universe; (3) answer another whether the Big Bang was an absolute beginning of the existence of the Universe or only a beginning of some stage of its evolution; (4) respond to another question whether the absolute beginning of the Universe inevitably implies its creation by God or whether it allows for the possibility of the creation of the Universe in a natural way; and (5) discuss the issue of the ‘singular’ moment. All of these questions, in particular the last one, will be discussed with reference to the latest achievements in the fields of physics and cosmology.
13. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Sanjyot D. Pai Vernekar Aurobindonian Ontology: Salient Peculiarities
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Aurobindo envisages a cosmic salvation via an endlessly openended, eternally optimistic, and forward-looking ontology. The purpose of humankind is to go beyond its present form of ordinary (mental) consciousness until it attains the Supermind. Aurobindo says this can be done by a technique he calls Integral Yoga that enables humankind to purposefully cooperate with the cosmic evolutionary urge and thereby rise from the present mental stage to the supramental stage. Another peculiarity of Aurobindo’s ontology is his concept of Brahman. It negates illusionism and gives his metaphysical scheme a religious dimension. There is no room in his system for any adversary, anti-Divine or Satan as an independent entity. Thus, evil and suffering also stand accounted for. Peculiarities of this order make him the very first and, so far, the only ontologist claiming a preordained divination of the universe.
14. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 13
Yiwei Zhang Why the Tractarian Objects Cannot Be Properties and Relations
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One of the most frequently discussed notions in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is the notion of simple object. However, among the literature on Tractarian objects, recent or classic, none has treated configurations of objects as a major and non-trivial issue. In this paper, I show that a detailed study of configurations of objects will yield a series of interesting and important results: it leads to a new understanding of the picture theory, helps us calculate the maximum numbers of internal and external properties of objects, and enables us to reinterpret and reach a solution to the notorious debate on whether properties and relations should be included as Tractarian objects.