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series introduction
1. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Jaakko Hintikka, Robert Cummings Neville, Ernest Sosa, Alan M. Olson, Stephen Dawson Series Introduction
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volume introduction
2. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Akihiro Kanamori Volume Introduction
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articles
3. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Stephen Schiffer Pleonastic Fregeanism
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Fregeans hold that propositional attitudes are relations to structured propositions whose basic constituents are concepts, or modes of presentation, of the objects and properties our beliefs are about. It is widely thought that there are compelling objections to the Fregean theory of mental and linguistic content. However, as I try to show, these objections are met by the version of Frege’s theory which I call Pleonastic Fregeanism.
4. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
João Branquinho On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions
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My aim is to sketch a principle of individuation which is intended to serve the Fregean notion of a proposition, a notion I take for granted. A salient feature of Fregean propositions, i.e., complexes of modes of presentation of objects (individuals, properties), is that they are finegrained items, so fine-grained that even synonymous sentences might express different Fregean propositions. My starting point is the principle labelled by Gareth Evans the Intuitive Criterion of Difference, which states that it is impossible coherently to take conflicting mental attitudes to the same proposition. As a logical truth (a consequence of Leibniz’s Law), this is a synchronic principle, the application of which is restricted to attitudes held at a single time. I argue that such a restriction might be reasonably lifted and, on the basis of an adequate notion of attitude-retention, I propose an admissible diachronic extension of the principle.
5. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Philip L. Peterson Fact-, Proposition-, and Event-Individuation
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The distinctions among facts, propositions, and events are supported by linguistic analyses segregating factive, propositional, and eventive predicates. The concepts of fact, proposition, and event may be basic categories of human understanding, as well as being ontologically significant. FPE theory was developed in part to reject the identification of facts with true propositions. The degree of ‘fineness’ of individuations within each category results from how closely event-, fact-, or proposition-individuation mirrors linguistic semantic structure. Event structure is not reflected in many event phrases. Fact- and proposition-structure typically does reflect semantic structures of factive and propositional clauses. The relevant properties for event individuation are all expressible by eventive predicates. Fact and proposition individuation is not as straightforward, because so many factives and propositionals do not express properties relevant to the Leibnizian principle. The intractability of proposition individuation may be overcome through an explanation of fact cognition.
6. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Manuel García-Carpintero Token-Reflexivity and Indirect Discourse
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According to a Reichenbachian treatment, indexicals are token-reflexive. That is, a truth-conditional contribution is assigned to tokens relative to relational properties which they instantiate. By thinking of the relevant expressions occurring in “ordinary contexts” along these lines, I argue that we can give a more accurate account of their semantic behavior when they occur in indirect contexts. The argument involves the following: (1) A defense of theories of indirect discourse which allows that a reference to modes of presentation associated with expressions occurring in indirect contexts can be made depending on contextual aspects. (2) A defense of the “doubleindexing” theories proposed by Stalnaker and others in order to account for the difference between metaphysical and epistemological modalities. (3) The claim that a Reichenbachian view improves upon the theories defended in (1) and (2).
7. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
R. Mark Sainsbury Empty Names
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This paper explores the idea that a name should be associated with a reference condition, rather than with a referent, just as a sentence should be associated with a truth condition, rather than with a truth value. The suggestion, to be coherent, needs to be set in a freelogical framework (following Burge). A prominent advantage of the proposal is that it gives a straight-forward semantics for empty names. A problem discussed in this paper is that of reconciling the rigidity of names with seeming truths of the form “there might have been such a planet as Vulcan.”
8. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Roger Wertheimer The Synonymy Antinomy
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Logical form has semantic import. Logical sentences (GG: Greeks are Greeks) and their synonym interceptions (GH: Greeks are Hellenes) state the same fact but different truths with different explanations. Terms retain objectual reference but its role in explaining truth is preempted by syntax or synonymy. Church’s Test exposes puzzles. QMi sentences (GmG: ‘Greeks’ means Greeks), and QTi sentences (p≡it is true that p≡“p” is true) are metalogical necessities, true by syntax. Their interceptions alter syntax and modality, yielding contingent truths (GmH: ‘Greeks’ means Hellenes, HmG: ‘Hellenes’ means Greeks). Meta-logical translation preserves syntax (GmG: ‘Greichen’ bedeutet Greichen), not necessarily objectual reference. Metalogical syntax secures truth by self-referential quotational indexing that identifies quotational referent with an intrasentential replica.
9. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
George M. Wilson Satisfaction Through the Ages
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In a recent paper, Ebbs has given an elegant statement of a notable puzzle that has recurred in the literature since the original publication of Putnam’s “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” The puzzle can be formulated, for a certain characteristic case, along the following lines. There are very strong intuitions in support of a thesis that Putnam has explicitly endorsed, namely, the thesis: The extension of the word ‘gold’, as we use it now, is the same as the extension of ‘gold’, as it was used in 1650 (before the rise of molecular chemistry). However, strong convictions about language use and truth conditions also incline us to the view that the extension of a term, as it is used at a time t, is determined by facts about the use of the term in the language at or before t, together with the facts about the various items to which the term prospectively applied. This paper looks at the various issues involved regarding these matters.
10. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 6
Terry Horgan Facing Up to the Sorites Paradox
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The ancient sorites paradox has important implications for metaphysics, for logic, and for semantics. Metaphysically, the paradox can be harnessed to produce a powerful argument for the claim that there cannot be vague objects or vague properties. With respect to logic, the paradox forces a choice between the highly counterintuitive ‘epistemic’ account of vagueness and the rejection of classical two-valued logic. Regarding semantics, nonclassical approaches to the logic of vagueness lead naturally to the idea that truth, for vague discourse, is not direct language-world correspondence grounded in referential connections linking a statement’s basic subsentential constituents (names, predicates, the apparatus of quantification) to real objects and real properties; rather, truth is a matter of indirect correspondence between vague language and nonvague reality.