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1. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
Phil Mullins Preface
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2. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
News and Notes
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3. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
Submissions for Publication
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4. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
Paul Craig Roberts Letter to the Editor
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5. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
2012 Polanyi Society Annual Meeting Program
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michael polanyi and charles sanders peirce
6. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
Phil Mullins Michael Polanyi and Charles Sanders Peirce: An Introduction and an Historiographical Note
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This brief essay introduces David Agler, Vincent Colapietro, and Robert Innis, who provide the major essays in this special issue of Tradition and Discovery devoted to putting together Michael Polanyi and Charles Sanders Peirce. It also provides an historiographical comment, suggesting that the two references to Peirce in Polanyi’s writing are quite puzzling and likely imply that Polanyi’s collaborators, rather than Polanyi, took an interest in similarities between the thought of Peirce and Polanyi.
7. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
David W. Agler Polanyi and Peirce on the Critical Method
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This essay points to parallel criticisms made by Charles Peirce and Polanyi against the “critical method”or “method of doubt.” In an early set of essays (1868–1869) and in later work, Peirce claimed that the Cartesian method of doubt is both philosophically bankrupt and useless because practitioners do not apply the method upon the criteria of doubting itself. Likewise, in his 1952 essay “The Stability of Beliefs” and in Personal Knowledge, Polanyi charges practitioners of the critical method with a failure to apply the method rigorously enough. Polanyi contends that “critical” philosophers apply the method of doubt only to beliefs they find distasteful and rarely ever to the tacit beliefs that make doubt possible.
8. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
Notes on Contributors
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michael polanyi and charles sanders peirce
9. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
Robert E. Innis The Reach of the Aesthetic and Religious Naturalism: Peircean and Polanyian Reflections
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In this article I reflect upon the problem of the aesthetic intelligibility of the world in connection with an aesthetic approach to religious naturalism. Taking the work of R.W. Hepburn as conversation partner, I bring it into relation to the work of Charles Peirce and Michael Polanyi. Admitting the ambiguous nature of their own religious commitments, I try to sketch, with no claim to completeness, how they help to illuminate just what would be entailed in beginning the process of translating religious forms of attending into aesthetic forms and what would be gained and what would be lost in doing so.
10. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 38 > Issue: 3
Vincent Colapietro Intellectual Passions, Heuristic Virtues, and Shared Practices: Charles Peirce and Michael Polanyi on Experimental Inquiry
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The central preoccupation of Peirce and Polanyi was to undertake (in the words of the former) an inquiry into inquiry, one in which the defining features of our heuristic practices stood out in bold relief. But both thinkers were also concerned to bring into sharp focus the deep affinities between our theoretical pursuits and other shared practices. They were in effect sketching a portrait of the responsible inquirer and, by implication, that of the responsible agent more generally. This essay is, in structure, a series of études for how we might reconstruct that portrait, since there is no extended treatment in the writings of either author of these central figures (the agent and, in particular, the responsible inquirer). It is accordingly a preliminary study, though in some particulars a detailed one. Its ultimate aim is to join—and thereby to invite others to join—Peirce and Polanyi as inquirers into the very nature of inquiry itself.