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articles
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 3
Ivar Hannikainen Questioning the Causal Inheritance Principle
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Mental causation, though a forceful intuition embedded in our commonsense psychology, is difficult to square with the rest of commitments of physicalism about the mind. Advocates of mental causation have found solace in the causal inheritance principle, according to which the mental properties of mental statesshare the causal powers of their physical counterparts. In this paper, I present a variety of counterarguments to causal inheritance and conclude that the conditions for causal inheritance are stricter than what standing versions of said principle imply. In line with this, physicalism may be destined to epiphenomenalism unless multiple realizability turns out false.
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 3
José Ferreirós La lógica matemática (Mathematical Logic): una disciplina en busca de encuadre (A discipline in search of a frame)
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RESUMEN: Se ofrece un análisis de las transformaciones disciplinares que ha experimentado la lógica matemática o simbólica desde su surgimiento a fines del siglo XIX. Examinaremos sus orígenes como un híbrido de filosofía y matemáticas, su madurez e institucionalización bajo la rúbrica de “lógica y fundamentos”, una segunda ola de institucionalización durante la Posguerra, y los desarrollos institucionales desde 1975 en conexión con las ciencias de la computación y con el estudio de lenguaje e informática. Aunque se comenta algo de la “historia interna”, nos centraremos en la emergencia, consolidación y convoluciones de la lógica como disciplina, a través de varias asociaciones profesionales y revistas, en centros como Turín, Gotinga, Varsovia, Berkeley, Princeton, Carnegie Mellon, Stanford y Amsterdam.ABSTRACT: We offer an analysis of the disciplinary transformations underwent by mathematical or symbolic logic since its emergence in the late 19th century. Examined are its origins as a hybrid of philosophy and mathematics, the maturity and institutionalisation attained under the label “logic and foundations”, a second wave of institutionalisation in the Postwar period, and the institutional developments since 1975 in connection with computer science and with the study of language and informatics. Although some “internal history” is discussed, the main focus is on the emergence, consolidation and convolutions of logic as a discipline, through various professional associations and journals, in centers such as Torino, Göttingen, Warsaw, Berkeley, Princeton, Carnegie Mellon, Stanford, and Amsterdam.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 3
María Jiménez-Buedo, Luis M. Miller Why a Trade-Off? The Relationship between the External and Internal Validity of Experiments
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Much of the methodological discussion around experiments in economics and other social sciences is framed in terms of the notions of internal and external validity. The standard view is that internal validity and external validity stand in a relationship best described as a trade-off. However, it is also commonly heldthat internal validity is a prerequisite to external validity. This article addresses the problem of the compatibility of these two ideas and analyzes critically the standard arguments about the conditions under which a trade-off between internal and external validity arises. Our argument stands against common associations of internal validity and external validity with the distinction between field and laboratory experiments and assesses critically the arguments that link the artificiality of experimental settings done in the laboratory with the purported trade-off between internal and external validity. We conclude that the idea of a trade-off or tension between internal and external validity seems, upon analysis, far less cogent than its intuitive attractiveness may lead us to think at first sight.
state of the art
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 3
Roberto Torretti La proliferación de los conceptos de especie en la biología evolucionista (The proliferation of species concepts in evolutionary biology)
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RESUMEN: La biología evolucionista no ha logrado definir un concepto de especie que satisfaga a todos sus colaboradores. El presente panorama crítico de las principales propuestas y sus respectivas dificultades apunta, por un lado, a ilustrar los procesos de formación de conceptos en las ciencias empíricas y, por otro, a socavar la visión parateológica del conocimiento y la verdad que inspiró inicialmente a la ciencia moderna y prevalece aún entre muchas personas educadas. El artículo se divide en dos partes. La primera atiende al concepto biológico (o genético) de especie adoptado por Theodosius Dobzhansky y Ernst Mayr alrededor de 1940, así como a las alternativas introducidas para superar sus limitaciones. La segunda parte estudia la tradición “cladista” fundada por Willi Hennig (1950) y sus ramificaciones. Varios conceptos de especie que no era fácil integrar en estos dos grupos se omitieron en aras de la coherencia y la brevedad de la exposición.ABSTRACT: Evolutionary biology has not suceeded in defining a concept of species that will satisfy all researchers. This critical survey of the main proposals and their respective difficulties tends, on the one hand, to throw light on the processes of concept formation in the empirical sciences, and, on the other, to undermine the paratheological vision of knowledge and truth that initially inspired modern science and still prevails among many educated persons. The article is divided into two parts. The first part concerns the biological (or genetical) concept of species which was adopted by Theodosius Dobzhansky and Ernst Mayr ca. 1940 and some alternatives which were subsequently introduced to overcome its limitations. The second part deals with several branches of the cladist tradition founded by Willi Hennig (1950). Various concepts of species that could not be easily integrated in either group were omitted for the sake of coherence and brevity.
book reviews
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 3
Jordi Mundó ¿Quién teme a la naturaleza humana?
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6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 3
Horst Nowacki The Genesis of Fluid Mechanics: 1640-1780
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7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 3
Daniel Blanco Across the Boundaries: Extrapolation in Biology and Social Science
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8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 3
Summary
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9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 3
Contents of Volume 25
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monographic section
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Mireia López Editor's Introduction
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11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Sergi Oms Truth-Functional and Penumbral Intuitions
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Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden'sview with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I will present my own worries about Tappenden's account.
12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Gonçalo Santos A Not So Fine Version of Generality Relativism
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The generality relativist has been accused of holding a self-defeating thesis. Kit Fine proposed a modal version of generality relativism that tries to resist this claim. We discuss his proposal and argue that one of its formulations is self-defeating.
13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Alfredo Tomasetta Counting Possibilia
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Timothy Williamson supports the thesis that every possible entity necessarily exists and so he needs to explain how a possible son of Wittgenstein’s, for example, exists in our world: he exists as a merely possible object (MPO), a pure locus of potential. Williamson presents a short argument for the existence of MPOs: how many knives can be made by fitting together two blades and two handles? Four: two, at the most, are concrete objects, the others being merely possible knives and merely possible objects. This paper defends the idea that one can avoid reference and ontological commitment to MPOs. My proposal is that MPOs can be dispensed with by using the notion of ‘rule of an art’. I first present a solution according to which we count instructions describing physical combinations between components. This account, however, is not completely satisfactory and I claim that one can find a better one: in answering Williamson’s question, we count classes of possible worlds in which the same instance of a general rule is applied.
14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Fiora Salis Fictional Reports: A Study on the Semantics of Fictional Names
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Against standard descriptivist and referentialist semantics for fictional reports, I will defend a view according to which fictional names do not refer yet they can be distinguished from one another by virtue of their different name-using practices. The logical structures of sentences containing fictional names inherit these distinctions. Different interpretations follow.
15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Marta Jorba Is There A Specific Experience of Thinking?
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In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least somethinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the case of understanding as a paradigmatic case for the phenomenal contrast argument and I defend it against two objections.
16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Marc Artiga Learning and Selection Processes
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In this paper I defend a teleological explanation of normativity, i. e., I argue that what an organism (or device) is supposed to do is determined by its etiological function. In particular, I present a teleological account of the normativity that arises in learning processes, and I defend it from some objections.
17. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Miroslav Imbrisevic The Consent Solution to Punishment and the Explicit Denial Objection
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Recently, David Boonin has put forward several objections to Carlos S. Nino's 'Consensual Theory of Punishment'. In this paper I will defend Nino against the 'explicit denial objection'. I will discuss whether Boonin's interpretation of Nino as a tacit consent theorist is right. I will argue that the offender's consent is neither tacit nor express, but a special category of implicit consent. Further, for Nino the legal-normative consequences of an act (of crime) are 'irrevocable', i.e. one cannot (expressly and successfully) deny liability to them. I will suggest an explanation for Nino's irrevocability claim.
articles
18. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Larrie D. Ferreiro The Aristotelian Heritage in Early Naval Architecture, From the Venice Arsenal to the French Navy, 1500-1700
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This paper examines the Aristotelian roots of the mechanics of naval architecture, beginning with Mechanical Problems, through its various interpretations by Renaissance mathematicians including Vettor Fausto and Galileo at the Venice Arsenal, and culminating in the first synthetic works of naval architecture by theFrench navy professor Paul Hoste at the end of the seventeenth century.
book reviews
19. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
El giro pictórico. Epistemología de la imagen
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20. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Lino Camprubí Ciencia y fascismo. La ciencia de posguerra española
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