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articles
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Lorenzo Casini, Phyllis Mckay Illari, Federica Russo, Jon Williamson Models for Prediction, Explanation and Control: Recursive Bayesian Networks
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The Recursive Bayesian Net (RBN) formalism was originally developed for modelling nested causal relationships. In this paper we argue that the formalism can also be applied to modelling the hierarchical structure of mechanisms. The resulting network contains quantitative information about probabilities, as well as qualitative information about mechanistic structure and causal relations. Since information about probabilities, mechanisms and causal relations is vital for prediction, explanation and control respectively, an RBN can be applied to all these tasks. We show in particular how a simple two-level RBN can be used tomodel a mechanism in cancer science. The higher level of our model contains variables at the clinical level, while the lower level maps the structure of the cell’s mechanism for apoptosis.
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
María José García-Encinas Singular Causation without Dispositions
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Singular causation may be best understood within a dispositionalist framework. Although the details of just how a claim that this is in fact the case have not yet been fully worked out, different philosophers have made some positive contributions in this direction. In opposition to such suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions contains unresolvable flaws in its metaphysical foundations.First, I present two main constituents that I take to be necessary for any possible dispositional account of singular causation: (i) the possibility of causation without laws, which is a necessary condition for causal singularism, and (ii) a conception of dispositions as real, irreducible entities or properties. This results in aminimal dispositionalist view of singular causation. Second, I argue that, even if minimal, this view already has to face up to serious difficulties: (i) an ontological problem concerning the individuating conditions for dispositions in causal contexts, (ii) an instance of infinite regress, (iii) the loss of the relational character ofcausation and, as a corollary, (iv) the loss of the asymmetry of causation. Third, I argue that dispositionalists tend to misrepresent causal modality when proposing and solving a modal choice between Humeanism and dispositionalism that is becoming commonplace but which, I claim, is in fact a false choice. Finally, Isketch a possible picture of causality without laws and without dispositions.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Mario Bacelar Valente The Relation between Classical and Quantum Electrodynamics
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Quantum electrodynamics presents intrinsic limitations in the description of physical processes that make it impossible to recover from it the type of description we have in classical electrodynamics. Hence one cannot consider classical electrodynamics as reducing to quantum electrodynamics and being recovered from it by some sort of limiting procedure. Quantum electrodynamics has to be seen not as a more fundamental theory, but as an upgrade of classical electrodynamics, which permits an extension of classical theory to the description of phenomena that, while being related to the conceptual framework of the classical theory, cannot be addressed from the classical theory.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Vivette García Deister La centralidad de la Fundación Rockefeller en el desarrollo de la biología molecular revisada (The Centrality of the Rockefeller Foundation in the Development of Molecular Biology Revisited): una extensión de la crítica de Abir-Am a la luz del modelo del operón (an Extension of Abir Am’s Critique in the Light of the Operon Model)
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RESUMEN: Abir-Am ha criticado la visión estándar de que la Fundación Rockefeller (FR) jugó un papel central en el surgimiento de la biología molecular durante la década de 1960. En su opinión, la FR aceleró la molecularización de las ciencias de la vida, pero no intervino de manera directa en el surgimiento de la biología molecular como disciplina. Aquí sostengo que esta crítica tiene consecuencias mayores a las que sospechó su autora y muestro que la tesis de la centralidad de la FR en el desarrollo de la biología molecular no se puede desmantelar sin alterar también la visión de la biologia molecular como una disciplina orientada a la resolución de problemas predefinidos.ABSTRACT: Abir-Am has critiqued the standard view that the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) played a central role in the development of molecular biology during the 1960s. In her view, the RF accelerated the molecularization of the life sciences, but it did not directly contribute to building molecular biology’s disciplinary identity. Here I argue that Abir-Am’s critique has more consequences than she envisioned, and I show that the thesis of the centrality of the RF cannot be dismantled without also altering the view of molecular biology as a field oriented towards the solution of predefined problems.
book reviews
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Luis Fernández Moreno The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds
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6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Tom Roberts The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology
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7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Sergio F. Martinez Nancy Cartwright’s Philosophy of Science
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8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
José Antonio López Cerezo El triunfo de la antisepsia: Un ensayo en filosofía naturalista de la ciencia
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9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Armando Menéndez Viso Ciencia y acción: una filosofía práctica de la ciencia
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10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Mauricio Suárez Probability: A Philosophical Introduction
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11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Carlos Castrodeza Pensar desde la Ciencia
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12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Antonio Sánchez Secret Science: Spanish Cosmography and the New World
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13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Marc Meléndez Schofield Probabilidad, causalidad y explicación
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14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Gerardo Bolado Història social de la filosofia catalana: la lògica (1900-1980)
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15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Books Received
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16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Summary
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17. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Informantes De Theoria (2009-2010) Referees For Theoria (2009-2010)
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