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articles
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Luis Estrada González, Ivonne Victoria Pallares Vega La diferencia entre lógicas y el cambio de significado de las conectivas (Differences between Logics and Meaning-Variance): Un enfoque categorista (A Categorial Approach)
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RESUMEN: En este artículo tratamos de hacer plausible la hipótesis de que las conectivas de diferentes lógicas no necesariamente difieren en significado. Utilizando el tratamiento categorista de las conectivas, argumentaremos contra la tesis quineana de que la diferencia de lógicas implica diferencia de significado entre sus conectivas, y ubicamos el cambio de tema en la diferencia de objetos más que en una tal diferencia de significado. Finalmente, intentamos mostrar que ese tratamiento categorista es una forma de minimalismo semántico, de acuerdo con el cual no todos los elementos semánticos usuales son relevantes para determinar el significado de las conectivas.ABSTRACT: We argue here that the meanings of logical connectives need not differ in different logics. treatment of the logical connectives, we argue against the well-known Quinean thesis that a difference between logics implies a difference in the meanings of connectives. We thus locate this change in the difference between certain objects rather than in the difference between the meaning of connectives. Finally, we try to show that the category-theoretic treatment of logical connectives is a form of semantic minimalism, according to which not all the usual semantic components are relevant in fixing the meaning of a connective.
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Urs Hofmann, Michael Baumgartner Determinism and the Method of Difference
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The first part of this paper reveals a conflict between the core principles of deterministic causation and the standard method of difference, which is widely seen (and used) as a correct method of causally analyzing deterministic structures. We show that applying the method of difference to deterministic structures can giverise to causal inferences that contradict the principles of deterministic causation. The second part then locates the source of this conflict in an inference rule implemented in the method of difference according to which factors that can make a difference to investigated effects relative to one particular test setup are to be identified as causes, provided the causal background of the corresponding setup is homogeneous. The paper ends by modifying the method of difference in a way that renders it compatible with the principles of deterministic causation.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Julio Torres Esencialismo, valores epistémicos y conceptos de especie (Essentialism, Epistemic Values and Species Concepts)
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RESUMEN: En el actual contexto científico que forma la concepción darwiniana de las especies aún persisten las interpretaciones esencialistas de los conceptos de especie. ¿Se trata aquí sólo de la ignorancia de la teoría biológica? O, más bien, ¿es posible comprender la persistencia de los enfoques esencialistas sobre la base de la potencialidad de estos enfoques para explicar el logro de ciertos valores epistémicos de los actuales conceptos de especie? Me propongo responder afirmativamente a esta última pregunta. En la sección 1 argumento que Samir Okasha (2002) no logra mostrar que hay otras razones, distintas a la de la ignorancia de la biología, que motivan el error de Kripke y de Putnam acerca de las especies. En la sección 2 propongo mi respuesta a la pregunta inicial en términos de algunos valores epistémicos que comparten las ideas esencialistas acerca de las especies y algunos de los actuales conceptos de especie.ABSTRACT: In the current scientific context that forms Darwinian conception of species, essentialist interpretations of the species concept persist. Is this only because of an ignorance of the biological theory? Or rather, is it possible to understand the persistence of essentialist approaches on the basis of the potentiality of these approaches to account for the achievement of certain epistemic values of the current species concepts? I intend to give a positive answer to this second question. In Section 1, I argue that Samir Okasha (2002) does not succeed in demonstrating that there are other reasons, which are different from that one regarding the ignorance about biology, which cause Kripke and Putnam to be mistaken about the species. In Section 2, I put forward my answer to the initial question in terms of some epistemic values sharing the essentialist ideas about the species and some of the current species concepts.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Lilian Bermejo-Luque, Antonio Casado Da Rocha Bancos, bibliotecas y cementerios (Banks, Libraries and Graveyards): usos de las analogías en el razonamiento sobre biotecnología (the Uses of Analogies in Biotechnological Reasoning)
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RESUMEN: El uso de analogías en bioética es muy frecuente. Dado que son instrumentos especialmente eficaces desde un punto de vista retórico, resulta fundamental determinar bajo qué condiciones la formulación de analogías constituye un recurso discursivo legítimo. En este artículo, distinguimos entre usos no-discursivos y usos discursivos de las analogías, y dentro de estos últimos, entre usos explicativos y usos argumentativos. En base a esta clasificación, proponemos distintos conjuntos de criterios para determinar si una analogía particular constituye un recurso discursivo legítimo o no. Para ello, ilustramos brevemente nuestra clasificación mediante algunos ejemplos tomados del reciente debate sobre los biobancos.ABSTRACT: Analogies are frequently used in bioethics. As they are particularly effective as rhetorical tools, it is essential to determine under which conditions they can be said to be a legitimate discursive resource. In this paper we distinguish between nondiscursive uses and discursive uses of analogies and, within the latter, between explanatory uses and argumentative uses. Taking this classification as a basis, we provide different sets of criteria for determining whether or not a particular analogy constitutes a legitimate discursive resource. In distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate analogies, we briefly illustrate our classification by some examples from recent literature on biobanks.
state of the art
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Henrik Zinkernagel Some Trends in the Philosophy of Physics
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A short review of some recent developments in the philosophy of physics is presented. I focus on themes which illustrate relations and points of common interest between philosophy of physics and three of its ‘neighboring’ fields: Physics, metaphysics and general philosophy of science. The main examples discussed inthese three ‘border areas’ are (i) decoherence and the interpretation of quantum mechanics; (ii) time in physics and metaphysics; and (iii) methodological issues surrounding the multiverse idea in modern cosmology.
book reviews
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Carlos J. Moya Kinds of Reasons. An Essay in the Philosophy of Action
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7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Miguel García-Sancho Scientific Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives
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8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Carlos Castrodeza La Evolución del Conocimiento: de la mente animal a la mente humana
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9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
José Luis Ferreira The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics
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10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
María González Moreno La fabricación de nuevas patologías. De la salud a la enfermedad
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11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Juan José Acero Reference and Description: The Case Against Two-Dimensionalism
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12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Federica Russo Depth. An account of scientific explanations
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13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 26 > Issue: 2
Summary
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