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Displaying: 1-9 of 9 documents


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1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Michael Devitt Whither Experimental Semantics?
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The main goal of the paper is to propose a methodology for the theory of reference in which experiments feature prominently. These experiments should primarily test linguistic usage rather than the folk’s referential intuitions. The proposed methodology urges the use of: (A) philosophers’ referential intuitions,both informally and, occasionally, scientifically gathered; (B) the corpus, both informally and scientifically gathered; (C) elicited production; and, occasionally, (D) folk’s referential intuitions. The most novel part of this is (C) and that is where most of the experimental work should be. The secondary goal of the paper is to defend my earlier paper “Experimental Semantics” from the criticisms of Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich in “If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What?” They charge that I have seriously misunderstood their goal in “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style” and that many of my arguments are “largely irrelevant”. I argue that these charges are baseless.
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Edouard Machery Expertise and Intuitions about Reference
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Many philosophers hold that experts’ semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people’s intuitions – a thesis commonly called “the Expertise Defense.” Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Manuel Pérez Otero Los propósitos de razonar, ilustrados con el argumento externista anti-escéptico de Putnam
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Desarrollo varias hipótesis sobre los propósitos de la argumentación racional, parcialmente inspiradas en el análisis de Jackson sobre el concepto de petitio principii. Destaco como especialmente relevante entre tales propósitos la referencia a los potenciales destinatarios de una argumentación. Ilustro la discusión con un caso concreto: el argumento elaborado por Putnam para demostrar que no somos cerebros en una cubeta. Presento una versión de ese argumento y lo defiendo frente a una posible crítica (inspirada por una objeción de Falvey y Owens contra un argumento muy similar) que lo acusa de prejuzgar la cuestión.I work out some hypothesis on the purposes of rational arguing, partly inspired by Jackson’s analysis of the concept of petitio principii. It is especially relevant among such purposes the reference to the potential intended addressee of an argument. The discussion is illustrated with a concrete example: Putnam’s proofthat we are not brains in a vat. I present a version of Putnam’s proof and defend it from a possible criticism (inspired by an objection of Falvey and Owens against a very similar argument) which accuses it of begging the question.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Jan De Winter How to Make the Research Agenda in the Health Sciences Less Distorted
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A well-known problem in the health sciences is the distorted research agenda: the agenda features too little research that is tailored to the health problems of the poor, and it features too little research that supports the development of other solutions to health problems than medicines (e.g., change of lifestyle). This article analyzes these two sub-problems in more detail, and assesses several strategies to deal with them, resulting in some specific recommendations that indicate what governments should do to make the research agenda in the health sciences less distorted.
state of the art
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Roberto Torretti Fenomenotecnia y conceptualización en la epistemología de Gaston Bachelard
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Se explican dos ideas capitales de la epistemología de Bachelard y su relación mutua: la ciencia es fenomenotécnica, la ciencia inventa sus conceptos La producción de fenómenos con arreglo a esos conceptos certifica su idoneidad.We explain two main ideas of Bachelard’s philosophy of science and their mutual relation. Science produces phenomena and creates its own concepts. Production of phenomena according to these concepts certifies their aptness.
book reviews
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Valeriano Iranzo La predicción científica. Concepciones filosófico-metodológicas desde H. Reichenbach a N. Rescher
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7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Ángeles Eraña Cuestiones de Teoría del Conocimiento
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8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Ricardo Crespo La lógica de las ciencias morales
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9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Summary
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