Cover of Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:


  • Issue: 1

Displaying: 1-10 of 10 documents


articles
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Francesca Poggiolesi, Nissim Francez Towards a generalization of the logic of grounding
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The main goal of this paper is to provide a ground-analysis of two classical connectives that have so far been ignored in the literature, namely the exclusive disjunction, and the ternary disjunction. Such ground-analysis not only serves to extend the applicability of the logic of grounding but also leads to a generalization of Poggiolesi (2016)’s definition of the notion of complete and immediate grounding.
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Ezequiel Zerbudis Making sense of the ‘is’ of constitution
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I consider a problem that arises in connection with (alleged) cases of coincident objects (such as a statue and the lump of clay it is made of) and that affects the two main accounts that have been given of such cases, namely, Pluralism (according to which statue and lump are distinct) and Monism (according to which they are one). The problem is that both views seem committed to accepting strained interpretations of some of the statements used to describe the situation. I consider Pickel’s arguments against the Pluralist’s strategy of interpreting ‘is’ as expressing constitution in sentences such as ‘The statue is the lump of clay’, and provide reasons for rejecting them—so as to vindicate, eventually, the Pluralist position.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Nathaniel Gan Fictionalism and Meinongianism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Fictionalism about a kind of disputed object is often motivated by the fact that the view interprets discourse about those objects literally without an ontological commitment to them. This paper argues that this motivation is inadequate because some viable alternatives to fictionalism have similar attractions. Meinongianism—the view that there are true statements about non-existent objects—is one such view. Meinongianism bears significant similarity to fictionalism, so intuitive doubts about its viability are difficult to sustain for fictionalists. Moreover, Meinongianism avoids some of fictionalism’s weaknesses, thus it is even preferable to fictionalism in some respects.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Antonio Blanco Salgueiro Uptake: ¿entender o aceptar?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Austin introduces the idea of securing the uptake in the context of dealing with the illocution-perlocution distinction. In recent times, the notion is employed by some neoaustinian scholars to argue that the uptake is what triggers the deontic effects (rights, duties, obligations, permissions, etc.) associated to an illocution. Here, a distinction is made between two kinds of uptake: uptake-as-understanding and uptake-asaccepting, and the stance that the second is the one needed for a plausible theory of speech action inspired by Austin’s original ideas is defended. When that notion is adopted, some old problems about speech action can be clarified.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Javier Suárez El holobionte/hologenoma como nivel de seleccion: una aproximacion a la evolucion de los consorcios de multiples especies
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The units or levels of selection debate concerns the question of what kind of biological systems are stable enough that part of their evolution is a result of the process of natural selection acting at their level. Traditionally, the debate has concerned at least two different, though related, questions: the question of the level at which interaction with the environment occurs (which entity acts as an interactor), and the question of the level at which reproduction occurs (which entity acts as a replicator or reproducer). In recent years, biologists and philosophers have discussed a new aspect of this debate, namely the possibility that certain multi-species consortia formed by a host and its microbiome (holobionts/ hologenomes) may act as a unit of selection. This thesis, however, has not been without criticism, as it is doubtful that such consortia could meet the conditions required to achieve the degree of stability that would allow them to experience natural selection. The purpose of this paper is to systematically examine such criticisms and to defend the thesis that the holobiont/hologenome can act as a genuine level of selection both in the form of an interactor and in the form of a reproducer. To do so, it will be argued that the microbiome should be characterized in functional rather than taxonomic terms.
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart, Vítor Medeiros Costa Quasi-truth and incomplete information in historical sciences
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Quasi-truth is a formal approach to a pragmatically-oriented view of truth. The basic plan motivating the framework consists in providing for a more realistic account of truth, accommodating situations where there is incomplete information, as typically happens in the practice of science. The historical sciences are a case in hand, where incomplete information is the rule. It would seem, then, that the quasi-truth approach would be the most appropriate one to deal with historical sciences, then. In this paper, we explore this possibility and use the historical sciences as a test case for the approach of quasi-truth. Our claim is that, on what concerns historical sciences, the quasi-truth approach fails in two basic senses; first, by misrepresenting some cases concerning incomplete information, and second, by falling short of accounting for many features of incomplete information peculiar to historical sciences. We conclude that, despite its stated goals, quasi-truth must be either amended or substituted if the goal of a more faithful representation of scientific practice is to be achieved.
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Fausto Corvino, Alberto Pirni Discharging the moral responsibility for collective unjust enrichment in the global economy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this article we wonder how a person can discharge the political responsibility for supporting and benefiting from unjust social structures. Firstly, we introduce the concept of structural injustice and defend it against three possible objections: ‘explanatory nationalism’, a diachronic interpretation of the benefits of industry-led growth, being part of a social structure does not automatically mean being responsible for its negative consequences. Then, we hold that both Iris Marion Young’s ‘social connection model’ and Robin Zheng’s ‘role-ideal model’ provide clear indications on how to unload responsibility for supporting/participating in unjust social structures, but fail to explain how to get rid of responsibility for unjust enrichment. We maintain that both models should be complemented with a global redistributive scheme that allows to disgorge the benefits that are unfairly obtained in the global economic system, besides undertaking collective transformative actions and assuming ideal-role responsibilities.
errata
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Nancy Cartwright Errata in Middle-range theory: Without it what could anyone do?
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Summary
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Referees for THEORIA (2019-2020)/Informantes de THEORIA (2019-2020)
view |  rights & permissions | cited by