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Displaying: 1-10 of 16 documents


2013 presidential address
1. Teaching Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Deborah S. Mower Reflections on . . . A Culture of Sensitivity
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The robust research within Project Implicit drives home the discomforting fact that many of us have implicit biases that we may believe lead to unethical action and which we may have attempted to eradicate from our thoughts. I examine the problem that implicit bias poses for moral education, and search for a solution by examining the alternatives of culture, character, conscience, and moral sensitivity. I argue that each fails individually, but that a potential solution to the problem comes through the creation of a limited “culture” within our classrooms; specifically, a culture that cultivates moral sensitivity as a collaborative endeavor.
special section: philosophical practices for pre-college ethics education
2. Teaching Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Maughn Gregory Introduction: Ethics Education as Philosophical Practice: The Case from Socratic, Critical, and Contemplative Pedagogies
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John Dewey wrote of moral education as growth from impulsive behavior to a “reflective morality,” involving the pursuit of ends-in-view identified through practices of critical reflection and social interaction. The essays in this section explore a variety of such practices as a philosophical approach to K–12 ethics education. The essays draw on, and contribute to three educational movements that aim for particular kinds of reflective consciousness and agency. Socratic Pedagogy engages students in problematizing the status quo, inquiry to identify truth, and self-correction. Critical Pedagogy utilizes school subjects to raise students’ political awareness and as methods of political inquiry and agency. Contemplative Pedagogy introduces practices of mindfulness to help students cultivate curiosity and attention and to bring personal insight to bear on their studies. Teaching ethics as a series of philosophical practices helps students and teachers become more sensitive to ethical meaning and skillful in ethical inquiry and agency.
3. Teaching Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Stefano Oliverio Narcissus and the Care of the Self: Promoting Ethical Life in a Foucaultian-Kierkegaardian Vein
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The paper takes its cue from the emergence in our society of a new view of the adolescent, which a branch of the psychological literature has spelled out in terms of a passage from Oedipus to Narcissus. It is argued that pre-college ethics education should engage with this passage by deploying educational strategies modelled according to the Care of the Self paradigm (as theorized by Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot) but revisiting it through Kierkegaard’s idea of repetition. The latter prevents that paradigm from fostering a sort of aestheticization of ethical life and allows us to mobilize it in ethics education. Against this backdrop two pedagogical methods—autobiographical writing and essay writing—are discussed as possible tools for a Care-of-the-Self-oriented education.
4. Teaching Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Gabriele Münnix Against Prejudice: Justice as Virtue: An Example of Teaching Ethics in German Secondary Schools
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In German schools, philosophy, ethics, or practical philosophy (the names differ) are ordinary school subjects in lower secondary education (beginning at the age of 11). The author who was member of a commission to introduce the subject and to prepare a curriculumin for North Rhine Westphalia has formed teachers of “Practical Philosophy”and “Ethics” and gives an insight into didactical principals, methods and media of a problem centered teaching of philosophical ethics by describing an example, a unit about prejudice and justice.
5. Teaching Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Beth Dixon Fables and Philosophy
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In our local school district some teachers have chosen to use fables as a way of integrating character education into their 4th and 5th grade curriculum. This paper about fables and philosophy illustrates how to employ philosophical inquiry to discuss the moral virtues. Aristotle’s remarks about the particular moral virtue of friendliness is a paradigmatic example for writing philosophy discussion plans that cultivate ethical judgment—one component of educating for moral character. However, the methodology I recommend can be generalized to stories that are not fables, and also can be made appropriate for different grade levels. Included here is a lesson plan for Arnold Lobel’s fable “The Lobster and the Crab,” used in a 4th grade classroom. Also included is a short transcript of the students’ dialogue.
6. Teaching Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
John Fantuzzo Towards a "What-If" Class: Practices of Respect as the Aim of Teaching Ethics to Court-Involved Youth
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This paper contends that the primary aim of teaching ethics to court-involved youth should be the realization of respect. I make this argument by defining what is meant by a practice of respect using Bernard Williams’s "The Idea of Equality." I then couch this understanding in my recent experience leading a moral/political philosophy workshop with court-involved youth in Harlem, New York. Raising the objection that educational opportunity, not the practice of respect, should be the primary aim of teaching court-involved youth, I respond to this objection by examining the stated aims of two prison education programs, Inside Out and Bard Prison Initiative. I argue that the educational opportunities within a broken system can hinder the practice of respect, while educational opportunities can arise from the practice of respect.
articles
7. Teaching Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Joe Mintoff Teaching to the Elenchus
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Socrates declared that the unexamined life is not worth living, but if someone opens themselves up to Socratic cross-examination, they are likely to fail, and on a matter of no small importance—how best to live. They will want to be able to pass their exams. Fortunately, philosophers’ avowed aim is (amongst other things) to teach and facilitate ethical reflection. Someone who aims to lead an examined life, then, will want these instructors to teach and to help them to pass elenctic exams on how best to live. The purpose of this paper is to describe and defend a mode of philosophy instruction with this as its sole aim, by responding to various objections leveled against other approaches within the Socratic teaching tradition.
8. Teaching Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Paul Thagard Value Maps in Applied Ethics
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This paper describes the role in applied ethics of a new method of representing values using cognitive-affective maps. Value mapping has been used in two undergraduate courses in medical ethics and in environmental ethics. Students have found the method easy to use and also informative concerning the nature of ethical conflicts, and they often change their minds in the course of developing value maps.
9. Teaching Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Susan T. Gardner Selling "The Reason Game"
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There is a clear distinction between genuine and fraudulent reasoning. Being seduced by the latter can result in horrific consequences. This paper explores how we can arm ourselves, and others (particularly our youngsters) (1) with the ability to recognize the difference between genuine and pseudo-reasoning, (2) with the motivation to maintain an unbending commitment to follow the “impersonal” “norm-driven” rules of reason even in situations in which “non-reasonable” strategies appear to support short-term bests interests, and (3) with the confidence that genuine reasoning is the best defense against the pseudo-reasoning. It also provides a simple table of “markers” whereby genuine reasoning can be distinguished from the “fake stuff.”
10. Teaching Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Michelle Ciurria The Meaning(s) of Situationism
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This paper is about the meaning(s) of situationism. Philosophers have drawn various conclusions about situationism, some more favourable than others. Moreover, there is a difference between public reception of situationism, which has been very enthusiastic, and scholarly reception, which has been more cynical. In this paper, I outline what I take to be four key implications of situationism, based on careful scrutiny of the literature. Some situationist accounts, it turns out, are inconsistent with others, or incongruous with the logic of situationist psychology. If we are to teach students about situationism, we must first strive for relative consensus amongst experts, and then disseminate the results to philosophical educators in various fields.