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Displaying: 1-20 of 27 documents


1. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Memorial Notices
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articles
2. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Robert B. Talisse Why I am Not a Pluralist (Presidential Address)
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3. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Eva Dadlez Kames on Ideal Presence: Revisiting the Problem of Fiction and Emotion
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The problem of fiction and emotion is the problem of how we can be moved by the contemplation of fi ctional events and the plight of fictional characters when we know that the former have not occurred and the latter do not exist. I will give a general sketch of the philosophical treatment of the issue in the present day, and then turn to the eighteenth century for a solution as effective as the best that are presently on offer. The solution is to be found in the account of ideal presence given by Henry Home, Lord Kames.
4. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Sarah E. Worth Fact, Fiction, or Fraud; Faked Memoirs from Frey to Wilkomirski
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5. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Eric Thompson Pragmatic Invariantism and External World Skepticism
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Simply stated, Pragmatic Invariantism is the view that the practical interests of a person can influence whether that person’s true belief constitutes knowledge. My primary objective in this article is to show that Pragmatic Invariantism entails external world skepticism. Toward this end, I’ll first introduce a basic version of Pragmatic Invariantism (PI). Then I’ll introduce a sample skeptical hypothesis (SK) to the framework. From this I will show that it is extremely important that the phenomenally equivalent skeptical scenarios generated by SK are actually false. We’ll then see that by combining PI and SK, the effect will be to place extremelyhigh demands upon evidence for ~SK. It will finally be observed that, while we may have good evidence for ~SK, we do not have extremely strong evidence sufficient for establishing ~SK. This supports my conclusion that any standard version of Pragmatic Invariantism ultimately entails external world skepticism. If successful, my conclusion will critically undermine the current view that Pragmatic Invariantism is actually a skeptically resistant position.
6. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Zachary J. Goldberg Van Inwagen’s Two Failed Arguments for the Belief in Freedom
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7. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Jason Wyckoff The Inseparability Thesis: Why Political Legitimacy Entails Political Obligations
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Several noted political theorists have argued that a state can be legitimate even if it does not generate in its citizens an obligation to obey the law. I argue that this claim is false. All plausible analyses of political legitimacy either build in the concept of political obligation, or else incorporate claims that require some account of political obligation. In either case, political legitimacy is possible only when a state successfully generates in its citizens an obligation to obey the law.
8. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Kendy M. Hess The Modern Corporation as Moral Agent: The Capacity for “Thought” and a “First-Person Perspective”
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9. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Todd Lekan Friendship as an Impersonal Value
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This paper defends a broadly Aristotelean account of character friendship that maintains that the impersonal value of acquiring a virtuous character is the ultimate basis for our reasons for caring about friends. This view of friendship appears to conflict with the entrenched intuition that viewing our connections to particular friends as merely contingent occasions for the cultivation of virtue is alienating and undesirable. I argue that far from being an alienating feature of character friendships, a focused appreciation of the contingent nature of friendships represents a morally sound attitude of honest self-acceptance. On my account, honest selfacceptance is an impersonal value—an ideal that anyone has a reason to cultivate. Although the ideal is impersonal, its content specifi es that we appreciatively acknowledge the particular contributions that friends make to the development of virtue.
10. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Mark Piper Hursthouse’s Virtue Ethics, the Slide into Consequentialism, and the Problem of Instrumentally Successful Vice
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11. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Kenneth Henley Hume’s Deflationary Theory of Allegiance
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12. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Iain Morrisson Nietzsche, Economy and Morality
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13. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
C.D. Meyers Nature, Virtue, and the Nature of Virtue: An Outline for an Environmental Virtue Ethics
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Most of the philosophical work written on environmental issues focuses on notions such as rights, consequences, duties, etc. And most of the theoretical philosophy done in environmental ethics focuses on questions of whether animals, plants, or ecosystems have inherent value or moral standing independently of their usefulness to humans. A character-based approach has been largely neglected (despite a few important works). In this paper, I consider what a plausible environmental virtue ethics would look like. Specifically, I argue (pace Sandler) that it would not require any distinct eco-virtue but would involve merely widening the scope of traditional virtues to include the non-human world. I further argue that a successful environmental virtue ethics would have to be pluralistic (involving more than one virtue) and would require the formulation of prima facie (rather than absolute) v-rules. Finally, borrowing from Naess, I suggest a way that eco-friendly character could be acquired.
14. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
William Grove-Fanning Biodiversity Loss, the Motivational Gap, and the Failure of Conservation Education
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While the precipitous decline of biodiversity threatens life-sustaining processes and vast segments of the human population, concern about its loss remains extremely shallow. Nearly all motivational campaigns falsely assume that upon appreciating the relevant information, people will be sufficiently motivated to do something. But rational argumentation is doomed to fail, for there exists a motivational gap between a comprehension of the crisis and action taken based upon such knowledge. The origin of the gap lies neither in the quantity and quality of information on the crisis, nor in the putative confl ict between self-interest and morality. Instead, it lies in “remoteness conditions” which dissociate decision-makers from ecological damage and enfeeble incentive to correct it. The centralremoteness conditions are spatial, temporal, and consequential. They can be eliminated by concretizing and particularizing earth others. While direct-experience, place-based educational programs satisfy the criteria, they are uncommon. There is also little opportunity for working adultsto engage in these sorts of activities. As such, the outlook for endangered species and humans in the developing world remains dire.
15. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Hoke Robinson Kant on Empirical Concept- and Intuition-Formation: A Discussion with Hannah Ginsborg
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16. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Scott Forschler Willing Universal Law vs. Universally Lawful Willing: What Kant’s Supreme Principle of Ethics Should Have Been
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17. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Amanda Roth Ethical Progress and the Goldilocks Problem: Objectivity and the Radical Revision of Values
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I argue that a number of non-utopian accounts of ethical progress—specifically, those offered by Wiggins, Moody-Adams, and Rorty—face a trade-off between objectivity and the radical revision of values. I suggest that each of these views is unsatisfactory because they face the Goldilocks problem—none of the views is able to get the trade-off between objectivity and radical revision of values “just right.” Moody-Adams and Wiggins offer accounts which are too conservative with regard to ethical progress in not allowing radical revision of values, while Rorty’s account is too liberal in not maintaining enough objectivity. Despite thisdifficulty, however, I conclude on an optimistic note about the potential of non-utopian accounts of progress. I sketch out a Dewey-inspired view of progress which I believe can overcome the Goldilocks problem.
18. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Mary Stewart Butterfield Moral Considerations in Epistemic Conceptions of Democracy
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19. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Jenn Neilson Freedom of Expression, Obscenity and the Community Standards Test
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20. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Samuel A. Stoner Critical Philosophy as Artistic Endeavor: On the Form of Kant’s “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” and its Implications
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