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Displaying: 1-10 of 27 documents


1. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Memorial Notices
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articles
2. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Robert B. Talisse Why I am Not a Pluralist (Presidential Address)
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3. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Eva Dadlez Kames on Ideal Presence: Revisiting the Problem of Fiction and Emotion
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The problem of fiction and emotion is the problem of how we can be moved by the contemplation of fi ctional events and the plight of fictional characters when we know that the former have not occurred and the latter do not exist. I will give a general sketch of the philosophical treatment of the issue in the present day, and then turn to the eighteenth century for a solution as effective as the best that are presently on offer. The solution is to be found in the account of ideal presence given by Henry Home, Lord Kames.
4. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Sarah E. Worth Fact, Fiction, or Fraud; Faked Memoirs from Frey to Wilkomirski
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5. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Eric Thompson Pragmatic Invariantism and External World Skepticism
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Simply stated, Pragmatic Invariantism is the view that the practical interests of a person can influence whether that person’s true belief constitutes knowledge. My primary objective in this article is to show that Pragmatic Invariantism entails external world skepticism. Toward this end, I’ll first introduce a basic version of Pragmatic Invariantism (PI). Then I’ll introduce a sample skeptical hypothesis (SK) to the framework. From this I will show that it is extremely important that the phenomenally equivalent skeptical scenarios generated by SK are actually false. We’ll then see that by combining PI and SK, the effect will be to place extremelyhigh demands upon evidence for ~SK. It will finally be observed that, while we may have good evidence for ~SK, we do not have extremely strong evidence sufficient for establishing ~SK. This supports my conclusion that any standard version of Pragmatic Invariantism ultimately entails external world skepticism. If successful, my conclusion will critically undermine the current view that Pragmatic Invariantism is actually a skeptically resistant position.
6. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Zachary J. Goldberg Van Inwagen’s Two Failed Arguments for the Belief in Freedom
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7. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Jason Wyckoff The Inseparability Thesis: Why Political Legitimacy Entails Political Obligations
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Several noted political theorists have argued that a state can be legitimate even if it does not generate in its citizens an obligation to obey the law. I argue that this claim is false. All plausible analyses of political legitimacy either build in the concept of political obligation, or else incorporate claims that require some account of political obligation. In either case, political legitimacy is possible only when a state successfully generates in its citizens an obligation to obey the law.
8. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Kendy M. Hess The Modern Corporation as Moral Agent: The Capacity for “Thought” and a “First-Person Perspective”
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9. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Todd Lekan Friendship as an Impersonal Value
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This paper defends a broadly Aristotelean account of character friendship that maintains that the impersonal value of acquiring a virtuous character is the ultimate basis for our reasons for caring about friends. This view of friendship appears to conflict with the entrenched intuition that viewing our connections to particular friends as merely contingent occasions for the cultivation of virtue is alienating and undesirable. I argue that far from being an alienating feature of character friendships, a focused appreciation of the contingent nature of friendships represents a morally sound attitude of honest self-acceptance. On my account, honest selfacceptance is an impersonal value—an ideal that anyone has a reason to cultivate. Although the ideal is impersonal, its content specifi es that we appreciatively acknowledge the particular contributions that friends make to the development of virtue.
10. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Mark Piper Hursthouse’s Virtue Ethics, the Slide into Consequentialism, and the Problem of Instrumentally Successful Vice
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