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Studia Neoaristotelica

A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism

Volume 9, Issue 2, 2012

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articles
1. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Gregory B. Sadler Aneu Orexeōs Nous: Virtue, Affectivity, and Aristotelian Rule of Law
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Passages in Aristotle’s Politics Book 3 are cited in discussions of the “rule of law”, most particularly sections in 1287a where the famous characterization of law as “mind without desire” occurs and in 1286a where Aristotle raises and explores the question whether it is better to be ruled by the best man or the best laws. My paper aims, by exegetically culling out Aristotle’s position in the Politics, Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric, to argue that his view on the rule of law and its relations to human subjects is considerably more complex and considerably more interesting. Despite Aristotle’s dictum, laws are not expressions or institutions of a pure and passionless rationality, and in order to be framed, understood and administered well, one must both have the sort of solid understanding of virtues, vices, passions, and motives of human action that Aristotle’s moral philosophy provides and have developed, at least to some degree, certain virtues. My paper focuses particularly on three themes: the role of the passions and desires in judgment, action, virtues and vices; the inescapability of passions and desires in the functioning of law; the possibility for rule of law and a certain level of virtue to be mutually supporting.
2. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Martin Ossikovski Some Medieval Readings of Aristotle’s Argument for the Collective Superiority of “the Many”: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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An essential challenge of Aristotle’s Politics arises from the juxtaposition of contrasting and competing arguments in favour of virtuous monarchy, on the one hand, and the collective superiority of “the many”, on the other. This paper examines the purely theoretical reception of this contrast in the writings of some late medieval Aristotelians by focusing on a key section in Politics Γ (1280a8–1284b34). After reviewing Aristotle’s problematic position, the paper discusses its interpretation in the commentaries of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas/Peter of Auvergne and Walter Burley, as well as its use in the works of Giles of Rome, John of Paris and Marsilius of Padua. On that basis, finally, the paper outlines some general trends with regard to how medieval scholars dealt with Aristotle’s idea of the rule of the many as opposed to that of one or few virtuous persons.
3. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Miroslav Hanke John Mair on Semantic Paradoxes: Alethic and Correspondence Paradoxes II
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John Mair (1467–1550) was an influential post-medieval scholar. This paper focuses on his Tractatus insolubilium, in which he proposed semantic analysis of self-referential phenomena, in particular on his solution to alethic and correspondence paradoxes and his treatment of their general semantic aspects as well as particular applications. His solution to paradoxes is based on the so-called “network evaluation”, i.e. on a semantics which defines the concepts of truth and correspondence with reality in contextual terms. Consequently, the relation between semantic valuation, synonymy and contradiction must be redefined.
review articles
4. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Lukáš Novák Divine Ideas, Instants of Nature, and the Spectre of “verum esse secundum quid ” A Criticism of M. Renemann’s Interpretation of Scotus: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The purpose of this review article is to offer a criticism of the interpretation of Duns Scotus’s conception of intelligible being that has been proposed by Michael Renemann in his book Gedanken als Wirkursachen. In the first place, the author shows that according to Scotus, for God “to produce a thing in intelligible being” and “to conceive a thing” amounts to altogether one and the same act. Esse intelligibile therefore does not have “priority of nature” with respect to “esse intellectum” or “esse repraesentatum”, contrary to Renemann’s interpretation. The distinction between Scotus’s second and third “instants of nature” consists in something else, then: the relation of reason, of which Scotus says that it is produced in the third instant, is not the relation of being actually conceived (first, because actual intellection comes already in the second instant, and second, because divine intellection, being the measure of the conceived objects, is not relative bud absolute) but it is a relation of comparison, viz. of an image to its exemplar. Next, the author shows how a misreading of two passages of Scotus’s Ordinatio misled both the Vatican editors and Renemann to create the chimaera of “verum esse secundum quid”. By way of a conclusion the author argues that Scotus’s doctrine of “esse intelligibile” does not make him any less a direct realist than Suárez, his position being quite plausible even from the point of view of common sense.
5. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 9 > Issue: 2
Michael Renemann Reply to Lukáš Novák’s Article: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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