>> Go to Current Issue

Studia Neoaristotelica

A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism

Volume 10

Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 1-10 of 19 documents


studie
1. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Jan Petříček Princip individuace podle Jana Dunse Scota
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article deals with Duns Scotus’s solution of the problem of individuation, as it is presented in his Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle and, in particular, in the Ordinatio. In the first part of the article, an exposition of the way Scotus understood this problem is given. In the second section, Scotus’s arguments against alternative theories of individuation are summed up. The third part of the paper focuses on the characteristics and ontological status of the entity identified as the principle of individuation by Scotus himself, the “individual difference”; it is argued here in favour of the traditional view that the individual difference is a formal principle. Finally, in the conclusion of the article, two important features of Scotus’s approach to the problem of individuation are emphasized: namely, his insistence on the intelligibility and on the ontological dignity of the individual.
2. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Miroslav Hanke Sémantika vět Martina Le Maistra Rekonstrukce scholastické sémantiky a ontologie komplexů
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Martin Le Maistre (1432–1482), also known as Martinus Magistri, was one of the nominalists at the university of Paris from the watershed between medieval and postmedieval scholasticism. This influential logician, moral philosopher and theologian wrote a repeatedly edited treatise on logical consequence Tractatus consequentiarum. The present paper focuses on this treatise where Le Maistre, influenced by late-medieval logicians, develops a theory of validity based upon postulating abstract compound entities as sentential meanings (complexe significabile).
3. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
David Peroutka OCD Inhabitace Boha v duši
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The New Testament testifies the fact of divine inhabitation in the soul. This raises the question of what philosophical means may be employed in order to explicate such a theological supposition. Irenaeus and Basil the Great seem to suggest that God is present in the soul as a form in a matter. Thomas Aquinas speaks of God in-existing in us as an efficient cause of our existence and of the grace. In accordance with the modern Thomists we may understand the God’s sanctifying inhabitation as an exemplar-efficient causality (the “form” of Basil has to be interpreted in the sense of “exemplar”). This causality does not constitute any new substantial divine presence in the soul. Rather we may conclude that the “old” substantial presence of God as the cause of our existence becomes also cause of our spiritual transformation operated according the “exemplar” of God.
4. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Ondřej Sikora K pozitivnímu významu Kantovy kritiky metafyziky
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The paper focuses on the positive aspects of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason with respect to the question of metaphysics. Metaphysical value of Kant’s first Critique is not exhausted in its negative, refuting function, based on the conviction that all human knowledge requires empirical intuition. Neither is this value identical with the transcendental theory of conditions of empirical knowledge. The critique, as a specific kind of philosophical investigation, has metaphysical purpose in the traditional scholarly-Wolffian meaning of the word, dealing with the triad freedom, God and immoratality of the soul. The Critique of Pure Reason not only prepares room for this kind of metaphysics by eliminating the claims of pure speculative knowledge, it also shows the direction for its elaboration, which takes the form of rational faith. In this specific epistemic attitude, both theoretical and practical function of reason is employed.
statě & diskuse
5. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Stanislav Sousedík K pozitivnímu významu Kantovy kritiky metafyziky Poznámka ke stejnojmennému příspěvku Ondřeje Sikory
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
6. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Ondřej Sikora Kant a metafyzika K reakci Stanislava Sousedíka na článek „K pozitivnímu významu Kantovy kritiky metafyziky“
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
7. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Prokop Sousedík Úvahy o filosofii a vědě
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The author divides his reflections on the nature of philosophy or science into three parts. In the first part, he strives to determine the issues in question systematically. By dividing the concept of human activity he uncovers the features common to philosophy and science as well as the features by which these two disciplines are distinguished. The inspiration is found especially in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In the second part, the same problem is dealt from the historical perspective. By way of a reconstruction of the origins of philosophy and science, the author shows the features by which these disciplines got mutually separated and secluded from the previous trends. In the third part, the author contrasts the presented approaches and highlights why it is reasonable to investigate the nature of philosophy and science from both, systematical and historical point of view.
articles
8. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Rescher Aristotle’s Precept on Precision
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
As Aristotle saw it, the modus operandi of nature is frequently irregular and unruly. And this accords with the structure of the universe, with regularity predominant in the trans-lunar realm and regularity prominent in the cis-lunar. This circumstance opens the way to the different sorts of natural laws: those which are strictly universal and those which function only normally and “for the most part.” And knowing to what extent exactness, regularity, and universality can be expected in different areas of inquiry was, for Aristotle, the very touchstone of scientific wisdom and sophistication.
9. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter Scientific Knowledge and the Metaphysics of Experience The Debate in Early Modern Aristotelianism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Early modern commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics contain a lively debate on whether experience is ‘rational’, so that it may count as ‘proto-knowledge’, or whether experience is ‘non-rational’, so that experience must be regarded as a primarily perceptual process. If experience is just a repetitive apprehension of sensory contents, the connection of terms in a scientific proposition can be known without any experiential input, as the ‘non-rational’ Scotists state. ‘Rational’ Thomists believe that all principles of scientific knowledge must rely on experiential data, because experience consists in an apprehension of facts rather than objects. And it is only apprehension of facts that can justify knowledge of principles. In this context, the role of mathematical knowledge is special, because it is self-evident. So Thomists must either show that mathematical principles do rely on experience, or that they do not express knowledge claims.
10. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Mark K. Spencer Transcendental Order in Suárez
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Francisco Suárez’s account of the transcendentals in Disputationes Metaphysicae 3 has been noted by Aertsen, Courtine, Darge, and Sanz for its reductionism; Suárez argues that all proposed transcendentals reduce to unum, verum, and bonum. This scholarship overlooks a key feature of Suárez’s account. In addition to providing his own theory, Suárez also works out a meta-metaphysical framework with which it can be shown how any proposed metaphysical item, including those that do not fit into Suárez’s own theory, relates to Being; he also works out rules for ordering these items. The way in which Suárez orders and reduces items related to Being involves several different kinds of reduction, and is more complex than current interpretations allow. Suárez’s framework and rules providea neutral standard for assessing the truth of any theory of transcendentals; this is shown through examining four accounts of the proposed transcendental aliquid using Suárez’s framework and rules.