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Studia Neoaristotelica

Volume 14, Issue 3, 2017
Series Bohemoslovaca

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1. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
David Peroutka, Stručně k Novákově libertariánské polemice
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In hac ad Lucae Novák impugnationem responsione intellectiones quasdam minus bonas recti fi care studeo, necnon compatibilismum circa voluntatis libertatem vindicare. Argumentum meum principale hoc est: ponamus exemplum duorum agentium, quorum uter que eligit non occidere; unus autem eligendo perplexus est mente atque incertus, dum alter principia moralia adeo clare percipit ut necessario sic bene eligat. Quandoquidem hic bonitate morali illum sane superat, concludo in doctrina indeterministae libertatem cum bonitate morali confl igere: quo scilicet magis virtuosus est hic agens, eo minus liber (cum in doctrina indeterministarum dicta volitionis necessitas tollat libertatem). Atque e contrario: quanto deterius moraliter agit ille, tanto magis libere – immo ille esset liber, hic tamen non liber, siquidem, ut volunt indeterministae, contingentia ad libertatem necessario requireretur. Viget huiusmodi proportionalitatis inconvenientia, quam sane compatibilismus vitat.In response to Novák’s polemic attack I try to remove some misunderstandings and defend compatibilism about free will. My main argument goes thus: Let us take for example two agents who both decide not to kill. The first one makes his choice out of his dilemmatic mental state of incertitude and perplexity. Conversely the second person understands the sense of moral principles so clearly that she makes the right decision with necessity. Since the morality of the second person surpasses that of the fi rst, my point is that the libertarian thinker puts in confl ict morality and freedom: The more a person (the latter agent) is virtuous, the less she is free (for the supposed necessity of her volition is taken to be incompatible with freedom in the libertarian theory). And – on the other hand – the less an agent (the former one) is moral, the more he is free. Indeed, he would be free while the latter unfree if it were true (as the libertarian believes) that freedom entails contingency. This is a peculiar rule of proportion. Compatibilism avoids such a peculiarity.