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1. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 16

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2. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 16
Ty Rossow

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This paper considers Chinese Communist Party policies in Tibet from Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist perspectives. I first explain how these three traditions are unified in the sanjiao heyi, but I contend that this practice has been neglected in favor of state repression. I then elucidate Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism with respect to their general principles and application in Tibet. I conclude that a fuller embrace of the sanjiao heyi where Confucian tenets are balanced by insights from Daoism and Buddhism would cultivate an anti-oppressive response to governmental control.

3. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 16
Elijah Parish

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In this paper, I summarize and object to the “deep-self” view of moral responsibility as laid out by Susan Wolf in “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility.” My objection centers on how our intuitions regarding crimes of passion conflict with the conclusions drawn by the deep-self view. I then proceed to sketch out three possible responses which can be made by an adherent to the deep-self view and make my recommendations on how such adherents should proceed in further understanding moral responsibility.

4. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 16
Madelyn Huerkamp

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In this paper I explain the utility of shapeshifting through the figure of the sage and the nepantlera according to the Zhuangzi and “the path of conocimiento. . . inner work, public acts,” respectively. These two figures could serve as guidelines to protecting subjective truth in a tumultuous and egoistic time, and aid in defense against mental assimilation into normative cultures. A distinction between the two will be made, with emphasis on how the contextual development of the figures applies to different social situations, and a synthesis of the utility of their application in present day will follow. The process of shapeshifting, of not clinging to social custom and normative identity categories as a means to protect ourselves from mental harm and assimilation, may serve to be of some use to us all.

5. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 16
Rylan Garwood

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The standard pedagogy within Philosophy for Children courses is the community of inquiry. In this paper, I argue that the current form of the community of inquiry does not properly accommodate autistic students. Using observations from Benjamin Lukey alongside my personal testimony, I illustrate how autistic students may struggle within the community of inquiry. Importantly, I argue that this need not be the case, as the community of inquiry can be made more inclusive if it were to emphasize collaboration instead of verbal dialogue.

6. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 16
Aniyah Marie Daley

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This work “Escaping Self-Sacrifice: Changing Black Women’s Relationship with Servility” is a deep dive into Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues. Addressing the idea of servility as a burdened virtue that requires self-sacrifice, I strive to reevaluate the traditional role Black women have in their families and within their communities. I argue that the demands of Black women are so excessive that they have lost touch with their self-regarding virtues, causing them to have ethical imbalances within themselves. This work is a part of an ongoing attempt to counter oppressive practices with joy as a form of resistance. I use the idea that simply existing is enough for Black women without the added burden of taking care of everyone else.

7. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 16
Raymond Peters

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In The Rule of Law in the Real World, Paul Gowder presents a new account of the rule of law based on three conditions: publicity, regularity, and generality. In this essay, I examine two closely related questions that are prompted by Gowder’s version of the rule of law. First, does the rule of law require citizens to follow the law? Second, what does Gowder’s account mean for jury nullification? I argue that the rule of law does not require citizens to follow the law, but it does prohibit jury nullification. A discussion of some moral implications and objections follow.

8. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 16
Molly Graham

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Since the Taliban resumed political power in Afghanistan in August 2021, their total application of strict Sharia Law has demanded global attention. This paper theorizes that, in pursuit of social order, the Taliban has enacted a civil religion to justify their complete reversion of women’s rights as a public good. I examine Afghanistan's social contact through the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau and suggest why the intended social order has not materialized. In conclusion, I depict the erosion of women's rights as a matter of structural injustice and incite critical reflexivity towards our responsibility for global justice.

9. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 16
Cecilia Becker

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10. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 16

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11. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 15

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12. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 15
Klayton Silverpen

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God is often portrayed as being omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Many worry that these traits make it so that God cannot possess free will. However, very little is said about why a God without freedom would be an issue. I argue that God does not need the kind of freedom we usually care about. I make a case that free will is important to us because it allows us to assign blame and praise to others. From here, I argue that being able to blame God is unimportant, and that God can still be praised even without free will.

13. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 15
Greyson Gold

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In this paper, I explore the cognitive value of fantasy literature. Using Immanuel Kant's and Jean-Paul Sartre's discussions of the imagination, and J.R.R. Tolkien's "On Fairy Stories,” I argue that fantasy literature is cognitively valuable when it confers phenomenal knowledge. I move on to demonstrate what a work of fantasy literature requires to confer this phenomenal knowledge. Fantasy literature has the potential to reveal true insights into this world when it brings the reader into a state of “secondary belief” and confers phenomenal knowledge through the union of world and story.

14. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 15
Kelsey Gaylord

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Using the interactionist approach of comparative philosophy, I evaluate the intersecting points made in Animal Liberation by Peter Singer and The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory by Carol Adams. The purpose of this paper is to examine how a combination of the utilitarian and feminist perspectives helps us adopt a new philosophy accounting for all systems of oppression involved in eating animals. I conclude that by removing unnecessary harm to animals and unlearning phrases with an absent reference to oppressed groups, society can progress toward an anti-oppressive system of liberation.

15. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 15
Nevin Chellappah

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In this paper, I examine whether John Stuart Mill’s account of free speech can survive three main challenges posed by social media. First, I consider the problem of social media failing to distinguish between emotive and factual language. Second, I look at the problem of algorithms creating moralism. I then turn to a potential objection to my first two challenges. The objection elucidates the benefits of social media’s emotional and algorithmic character, amplifying arguments and increasing public engagement. However, I take issue with this objection on consequentialist terms. I finally return to the third challenge, where I focus on how anonymity removes the consequences to our words; I contend that this final failure is the ultimate reason why Mill’s account cannot persist in the modern age. In conclusion, I argue that Mill’s account cannot withstand the problems posed by social media.

16. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 15
Shir Bloch

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Some views of holism fail to fully encapsulate the structure and independence of consciousness while others are reductionist in their insistence on a strict structure. After examining holism and mental state consciousness, I move to my own proposal for the structure of consciousness: experiential swaths. By highlighting the phenomenal interdependence of some aspects of consciousness without conceding that all aspects are so strongly intertwined, experiential swaths allow for further conceptual structurization within consciousness.

17. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 15
Kelly Oduro

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In this paper, I discuss the epistemological injustices that Black women face in academia. I review Patricia Hill Collins’s work, “Learning from the Outsider Within: Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought,” which details the unique knowledge standpoint that Black women possess. I build upon the ideas set forth by Collins and other scholars to understand how the traditional knowledge validation process is tainted with political implications and harms Black women. I then offer recommendations rooted in alternative epistemology principles to combat the injustices inherent in academia.

18. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 15
Vaibhav Gaddam

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Based on Eli Alshanetsky’s work Articulating a Thought, in this paper, I present a reconstructed puzzle involving complex thoughts and a method for how to tackle articulating them. Then, I reconstruct and provide objections to Alshanetsky’s favored view with rationality. I expound on an initially overlooked deflationary view that is arguably much more viable, while also adding a layer of nuance and granularity to the view that affirms its place in solving the puzzle. I reach the conclusion that if articulation is simply a medium for us to express our complex unfinished thoughts, then perhaps it isn’t necessary for us to clarify the thought.

19. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 15
Jacob Berk

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In this paper, I consider Hilary Putnam’s argument for the prima facie acceptance of robotic consciousness as deserving the status of mind. I argue that such an extension of consciousness renders the category fundamentally unintelligible, and we should instead understand robots as integral products of an extended human consciousness. To this end, I propose a test from conceptual object permanence, which can be applied not just to robots, but to the in­numerable artifacts of consciousness that texture our existences.

20. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 15
Mukund Maithani

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Buddhist philosophers generally hold that concepts like “I” and “me,” while useful in everyday life, are ultimately meaningless. Under this view, there would be no “agents” because it is meaningless to say “I did so and so….” How do we explain the occurrence of actions without referring to agents? I argue that Cappelen and Dever’s Action Inventory Model (AIM) is a useful resource for developing a Buddhist theory of action. In response to an objection that AIM cannot explain a buddha’s action, I show that a slightly tweaked version of AIM succeeds in explaining how a buddha acts.