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Displaying: 1-10 of 10 documents


1. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Catriona McKinnon Vertical Toleration as a Liberal Idea
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This paper argues that the direct, vertical toleration of certain types of citizen by the Rawlsian liberal state is appropriate and required in circumstances in which these types of citizen pose a threat to the stability of the state. By countering the claim that vertical toleration is redundant given a commitment to the Rawlsian version of the liberal democratic ideal, and by articulating a version of that ideal that shows this claim to be false, the paper reaffirms the centrality of vertical toleration in the Rawlsian liberal account of state-citizen relations.
2. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Eva Erman, Niklas Möller Three Failed Charges against Ideal Theory
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An intensified discussion on the role of normative ideals has re-emerged in several debates in political philosophy. What is often referred to as “ideal theory,” represented by liberal egalitarians such as John Rawls, is under attack from those that stress that political philosophy at large should take much more seriously the nonideal circumstances consisting of relations of domination and power under which normative ideals, principles, and ideas are supposed to be applied. While the debate so far has mainly been preoccupied with defending or rejecting ideal theory through a defense or rejection of a specific ideal theory, this paper instead focuses on a number of general philosophical concerns on which the critique relies. More specifically, it brings up for scrutiny, and ultimately rejects, three charges against ideal theory: the charge that ideal theory is not action-guiding, that ideal theory is impossible, and that ideal theory is distorting. By investigatingthese charges in tandem, the paper shows that the criticism against ideal theory is premised on assumptions about the relationships between thought and action and between concepts and the world for which there is little or no support.
3. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Ayelet Banai Political Self-Determination and Global Egalitarianism: Towards an Intermediate Position
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Proponents of global egalitarian justice often argue that their positions are compatible with the principle of self-determination. At the same time, prominent arguments in favor of global egalitarianism object to one central component of the principle: namely, that the borders of states (or other political units) are normatively significant for the allocation of rights and duties; that duties of justice and democratic rights should stop or change at borders. In this article, I propose an argument in defense of the normative significance of territorial boundaries that draws on a political interpretation of the principle of self-determination. The political interpretation is distinct from the two major approaches to self-determination: the national and the democratic. It makes a twofold contribution to the debates about global justice and democracy; while it (a) challenges the position that political memberships and political borders are morally arbitrary; it (b) helpsdefine the realm of permissible autonomy for self-governing political units, which does not ignore duties to nonmembers and outsiders.
4. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Andrew Lister Reciprocity, Relationships, and Distributive Justice
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This paper argues that the concern for distributive justice might be universal rather than contingent on a morally optional relationship, but limited in the demands it places upon us where a reasonable assurance of reciprocity is lacking. Principles of distributive justice apply wherever people are interacting, even if they have no choice but to interact, but are grounded in the goal of constituting relationships of mutual recognition as equals, and so partly conditional on compliance by others. On this view, there is no unilateral duty to share the benefits of cooperation fairly, only a unilateral duty to help establish institutions that will permit fair sharing with a reasonable assurance of reciprocity.
5. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Suzy Killmister Autonomy and the Problem of Socialization
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One of the more intractable problems in the debate over autonomy is how we should distinguish autonomy-enhancing from autonomy-compromising forms of socialization. In this paper I first survey a range of theories of autonomy, from the procedural through to the substantive, and argue that none offers sufficient resources to resolve the problem of socialization. In the second half of the paper I develop an alternative theory that can both differentiate benign from pernicious socialization and, more importantly, provide an explanation for the means by which pernicious socialization compromises autonomy.
6. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Frej Klem Thomsen But Some Groups Are More Equal Than Others: A Critical Review of the Group-Criterion in the Concept of Discrimination
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In this article I critically examine a standard feature in conceptions of discrimination: the group-criterion, specifically the idea that there is a limited and definablegroup of traits that can form the basis of discrimination. I review two types of argument for the criterion. One focuses on inherently relevant groups and relies ultimately on luck-egalitarian principles; the other focuses on contextually relevant groups and relies ultimately on the badness of outcomes. I conclude that as neither type of argument is convincing, the criterion is morally arbitrary, and as such untenable. Finally, I suggest both some of the conceptual and some of the practical implications of abandoning the criterion.
7. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Cassie Striblen Collective Responsibility and the Narrative Self
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This essay advocates applying a “narrative” conception of the individual self to the problem of “collective responsibility.” Participants in the debate agree that groups are composed of individuals and that group responsibility must somehow mimic individual responsibility. However, participants do not begin from a neutral and unproblematic conception of the individual. So far, most participants have assumed standard models of the individual that may unduly bias their conclusions about different forms of group responsibility. I argue that switching to a “narrative” conception may provide a more comprehensive and therefore preferable starting point for considering questions of group responsibility.
book reviews
8. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Mark Alfano Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Personal Value
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9. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Jeffrey A. Gauthier Peter de Marneffe, Liberalism and Prostitution
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10. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Thanks to Reviewers
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