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Displaying: 1-10 of 10 documents


1. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
C. D. Meyers Defending Moral Realism from Empirical Evidence of Disagreement
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Recently, empirically minded philosophers have employed evidence of widespread, fundamental moral disagreement to argue against moral realism. I argue that the empirical evidence does not refute realism because the disagreement is consistent with certain pluralistic versions of moral realism that posit a set of pro tanto normative principles. Others have appealed to pluralism in defense of moral realism but have used pluralism to attack the empirically based approach to ethical theory. Although I argue that the empirical argument against moral realism fails, I defend the approach and suggest better ways that (pluralist) moral realism could be tested empirically.
2. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Adam Kadlac Empiricism and Moral Status
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Many inquiries into the scope of moral value try to adopt an impersonal perspective on the world—that is, a perspective that abstracts away from the particularities of our personal experience and attempts to view the world from no place within it. In contrast to this approach, I argue that our investigation into the nature and scope of moral value should proceed from a more thoroughly personal standpoint by taking seriously our moral experience and the relational possibilities that obtain among various entities.
3. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Helena de Bres Disaggregating Global Justice
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If global distributive justice or injustice is to exist, there must be something that is just or unjust: something to which the moral assessments at issue attach. I argue in this paper against one popular candidate for that role: the “global basic structure.” I argue that principles of distributive justice that target the global basic structure fail to satisfy a crucial “action guidance” desideratum and that this problem points to an alternative target that philosophers of global justice have yet to widely acknowledge. We ought to exclusively direct our principles at subspheres of global politics: disaggregating global justice for a disaggregated world.
4. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Jeremy Neill Deliberative Institutions and Conversational Participation in Liberal Democracies
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Deliberative democracy is an account of legitimacy and participation whose purposes are to produce justifiable political outcomes and to involve the citizens in productive conversations with each other. This article argues for a greater reliance on the efforts of local conversational participants in the institutional construction process. Because of their epistemic advantages, local participants are usually the agents who are most optimally positioned to construct the deliberative institutions. As such, institutionalized deliberation ought not to be seen as an orderly event that is capable of being planned out beforehand by philosophers, but rather as a complex process that flourishes when the conversation is developing—as much as is practicable—on its own.
5. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Dwight Furrow, Mark Wheeler Blunting the Blind Impress: Autonomy, Self-Reflection, and Tracking the Truth
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Contrary to hierarchical/procedural (HP) models of autonomous action, according to which reflective self-appraisal is essential to autonomous action, we argue that autonomous action essentially involves the way agents take up and respond to the normative demands of objects of care. To be autonomous, an action must track the genuine needs of some object the agent cares about. Thus, autonomous action is essentially teleological, governed by both an agent’s concerns and the object of care. It is not dependent only on the will, understood as an internal efficient causal force, and is robustly relational in a constitutive sense.
6. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Katie Stockdale Collective Resentment
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Resentment, as it is currently understood in the philosophical literature, is individual. That is, it is anger about a moral injury done to oneself. But in some cases, resentment responds to systemic harms and injustices rather than direct moral injuries. The purpose of this paper is to move beyond individualistic conceptions of resentment to develop an account of collective resentment that better captures the character and effects of the emotion in these cases. I use the example of indigenous and settler Canadians’ reciprocal resentments in response to the Indian Residential Schools and continuing political disagreements as an example of a context in which understanding collective resentment is important.
review essay
7. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Steven Wall Self-Government, Market Democracy, and Economic Liberty
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book reviews
8. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Cian O'Driscoll Larry May, "After War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective"
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9. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Jessica Wolfendale Claudia Card, "Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide"
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10. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3
Anna Stilz Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship"
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