Sententiae

The article analyzes the philosophical course of Stephan Kalynovskyi taught at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in 1729–1731. By now researchers considered this course to be one of the best monuments of Ukrainian philosophical thought of that time. However, the textual analysis has shown that the course was borrowed verbatim from François le Reés, a French author who wrote it in Paris in the 1630s. The article also analyzes all other currently known educational courses of Kalynovskyi (courses on rhetoric, history, mathematics). Neither they were written by the professor himself, but borrowed, mostly verbatim, from other authors. The article drew conclusions about the (un)originality of Kalynovskyi's courses based on a comparison of his courses with their sources, identifying authorial changes, deviations, etc. In addition, an attempt was made to find out whether the verbatim borrowing of someone else's text without indicating the author during teaching could be considered plagiarism at that time. Biographical information about Kalynovskyi, as well as an overview of the church sermons that he delivered as a bishop, allows a better understanding of his educational courses.

The purpose of the article is, firstly, to explicate and give a critical assessment of the methodological, epistemological, and philosophical foundations that led to the “rhetorical turn” in modern philosophy, and, secondly, to answer the question of how justified the grounds for such a “rhetorical turn” are. The answer proposed is based on a reconstruction of Eugene Dupréel’s critical arguments that were directed against the “classical philosophy” and their reception in Chaim Perelman’s works during his “turning point” period (1947 – 1949). The article proves that these two scholars’ critique of classical philosophy proceeds from a realistic position, therefore it does not apply to the epistemological principles of idealistic philosophy. Their criticism of the classical theory of progress and the ideal of universally valid knowledge is “axiological” in nature and boils down to a reassessment of all traditional values. As a result of this reassess-ment, the methodological principles of sophistry (subjectivism, pragmatism, pluralism, relativ-ism, conventionalism, etc.) are actually rehabilitated. The criticism of philosophy that appeals to spoken language and everyday knowledge, is not justified, since it is based on a misunderstanding of the conceptual and constructive nature of the philosophical language. Although the rhetorical analysis of philosophical texts should be recognized as fruitful and useful, rhetoric cannot be an instrument of philosophizing, since the interpretation of values depends on their understanding, which is given by “classical philosophy”.

The paper determines the status of the “Oral History of Philosophy” within the history of philosophy as a discipline. The author formulates his theses as answers to the fundamental questions Serhii Yosypenko asked in 2019. The latter subjected the first attempts to comprehend the then-new concept of “Oral History of Philosophy” to fruitful criticism. It is in response to his criticisms that the former gives now his answers which can be summarized in six points: (1) Oral History of Philosophy is fundamentally different from Oral History and is not limited to the application of the interview method; (2) it is a set of dialogical methods of producing new information in the field of the history of philosophy, that is, a new methodology that can be used in any historical-philosophical research; (3) the main difference is the orientation of the Oral History of Philosophy not to personal testimony, but to joint reflection; (4) this focus on reflection determines all the methods of Oral History of Philosophy; (5) the name “Oral History of Philosophy” is due to the specifics of the situation that gave rise to this methodology rather than a conscious conceptual reflection; (6) this methodology can be given a more exact name: “Dialogical forms of historical-philosophical reflection”, while the name “Oral history of philosophy” can be used for those dialogical forms that rely on oral speech.

Olexandr Lukovyna’s interview with doctor of sciences in philosophy Oleksiy Panych, devoted to pyrrhonism’s principles, practice and contemporary status.

An overview of publications devoted to the philosophy of India, China and Japan (articles and translations of sources) in the journal The World of the Orient from 2018 to 2021 (publications in the field of Buddhist Studies are not included here).

Інтерв’ю Олександра Луковини з професором Плініо Жункейрою Смітом, присвячене дослідженню скептицизму у бразильській філософії, зокрема початковому етапові цього вивчення, внескам Освальдо Порчата та Єзекіля де Оласо, сучасному бразильському неопірронізмові та ґлобальному дослідницькому контекстові.

Interview of Illia Davidenko, Vlada Anuchina and Daria Popil with Svitlana Ivashchenko.

Interview of Vlada Anuchina, Yana Dziuba and Yana Gorobenko with Yevhen Prychepii.

Interview of Vsevolod Khoma with Professor Tamara Yashchuk within the framework of the research program “Ukrainian Philosophy of the 60s–80s of the 20th Century” of the Student Society of Oral History of Philosophy.

The article examines the peculiarities of the relationship between phenomena of freedom and tradition in the discourse of deconstruction. In this case, the tradition stands primarily as philo-sophical tradition, a critical questioning about which underlies Derridian thought. The latter in a great measure is a philosophical reflection on just the philosophical heritage ("philosophy of philosophy"). The author carries out her own analysis of the relationship between deconstruction and philosophical tradition in connection with the problem of freedom. In this respect, she uses the Derridian concept-metaphor of translation (passage), drawing on Mark Crepon’s historico-philosophical findings. Considering the peculiarities of the thematization of concepts of freedom and tradition in deconstructive discourse, the author reveals a connection between the problems of (a) limits of philosophy (as one of the cornerstone issues of Derridian discourse) and (b) the specific corre-lation between the phenomena of freedom and tradition. It has been established that it is the ideas of other and translation (passage) that stand as links enabling such a connection. For the history of philosophy of the second half of the 20th century, it is important to understand correctly the Derridian concept of tradition. The article proves that Derrida's interpretation of this concept (1) is significantly determined by the factor of other, (2) is based on the paradoxical interaction of tradition and freedom, (3) causes and enables deconstructing of the opposition between freedom and violence. As a result, it is established that deconstruction, which is apparently guided by the goal of liberation from tradition, in essence turns out to be a freedom for tradition, if the latter is interpreted in the semantic context set by the concepts of translation (or transition), other and limit.

One of the traditional subjects of discussion among historians of philosophy is the question of the status of the history of philosophy as well as a discipline, as well as the tasks, possibilities, and limitations of some approaches and genres of the historiography of philosophy. The article focuses on the analysis of the contribution to these discussions of studies in the historiography of philosophy, which began in Francophone philosophy in the 1970s with the publication of the studies of L. Braun and M. Gueroult, in particular, the answers to the mentioned questions, pro-posed within the framework of these studies. The starting point of the article is the historical scheme of the attitude of philosophers to the past of philosophy, proposed by Y. Lafrance, which makes it possible to determine the place of the history of philosophy as a discipline in philosophical activity and to study the historiography of philosophy as an element of such activity. In this article, three research projects of the histo-riography of philosophy were analyzed – the Based on the analysis of the mentioned projects, the article support the conclusion that the history of philosophy cannot be considered either only as a historical or only as a philosophical discipline, and also that a historian of philosophy cannot investigate a subject without simulta-neously constructing it on the basis of historical data, which always remain outside the histori-ographic construction.

This article outlines the leading trends in contemporary English-language historiography of philosophy. It is shown that the anti-historicity, which was characteristic of analytic philosophy in its classical versions was only a moment in its development. A historical turn that began in English-language philosophical world as early as the 1960s, during the first decades of the 21st century has led to a true flourishing of the history of philosophy - both at the conceptual and institutional level. Contemporary English-speaking historians of philosophy pay considerable attention to the methodologically important distinction between real historical process, i.e., facts that took place in the past (history of philosophy), and reflections concerning means, goals, and epistemological foundations for the understanding of these facts (historiography of philosophy). It is also shown that one of the main results of a careful study of history of philosophy is inclusiveness – drawing attention to those pages or aspects of the past that, for some reason, were marginalized or completely forgotten. Factors that were traditionally dismissed as external and unimportant, now acquire the same significance as those that were previously considered as exclusively internal and important. Due to this fact traditional history of philosophy, focused primarily on the study of the most prominent representatives of Western thought, usually men by gender, is replaced by a much broader historically-philosophical canon, which includes a much wider circle of thinkers, representatives of different cultures and types of philosophizing.

The paper aims to disclosure of key points in the development of the German tradition of historiography of philosophy after the 90s of the 18th century. The starting point was the socalled «dispute about the method» of historiography, which erupted in the last decade of the 18th century not without the influence of Kant’s «critical philosophy». Its participants (Reinhold, Fülleborn, Goess, Grohmann, Tennemann, and others) put forward different theses, but they agreed that it is Kant’s philosophy that makes it possible to create a «philosophical history of philosophy». A type of historiography was formed, which was based on the criterion of «progress of philosophy» and Kant’s position was considered as a standard for any historiography. Subsequently, other types of historiography were formed, which followed either the opposite criterion of «regress» or «decadence», or tried to combine both of these criteria (Hegel). In the second half of the 19th century «history of problems» becomes widespread as a principle of research and presentation of the history of philosophy, its main representatives were W. Windelband, N. Hartmann, H. Heimsoeth. Instead, in the second half of the 20th century the dominant type of historiography is the «history of concepts», which finds linguistic and philosophical justification in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. In recent decades, the German tradition of historiography has been enriched by K. Flasсh’s project «historical philosophy» and by D. Henrich program «constellation research». In both of these projects, there is a noticeable attraction to microhistory, going beyond the «classic» texts, discovering hitherto unknown figures and sources that significantly expand the established practice of the historiography of philosophy.

The article carries out a critical analysis of Arthur Kiefer's methodology (described in the “Ecclesiastes and the meaning of life in the ancient world”, Cambridge University Press, 2022), namely his concept of “meaning of life” applied to the analysis of the book of Ecclesiastes. The core argument made here is that the “threefold conceptual scheme” of the meaning of life borrowed from the field of empirical psychological research (coherence – purpose – significance), cannot be effective in the analysis of theological or philosophical texts, which involve a high level of generalization. On the other hand, since the concept of “meaning of life” is absent from the language of Ecclesiastes and other ancient texts, and its own meaning is extremely vague, it is unable to play the role of a useful analytical tool.

Arina Orіekhova's interview with Professor Sergii Secundant, devoted to Leibniz's concepts of time and space, the peculiarities of Michael Fatch's interpretation of those concepts, and various historico-philosophical approaches to understanding Leibniz's philosophy as a whole.

Review of D’Angelo, D., Figal, G., Keiling, T., & Guang Yang. (2020). Paths in Heidegger's Later Thought. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.