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Roczniki Filozoficzne

Volume 66, Issue 3, 2018
Philosophy and Cognitive Science

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1. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Marek Hetmański Marek Hetmański
Archaeology of Cognitive Science: Michel Foucault’s Model of the Cognitive Revolution
Archeologia Kognitywistyki

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The article presents an epistemological and partially methodological analysis of cognitive science as a scientific discipline, created as a result of the transformations that took place in the philosophical and psychological concepts of the mind and cognition, which were carried out with the aid of tools and methods of modelling as well as through simulating human cognitive processes and consciousness. In order to describe this interdisciplinary (transdisciplinary) science, and its positions, as well as the stages and directions of its development, it makes use of the epistemological model formulated by Michel Foucault, in which he draws attention to social, ideological and technological conditions of scientific knowledge (episteme). The opinions of the leading creators and critics of cognitive science, such as George A. Miller, Howard Gardner, Margaret Boden and José Luis Bermúdez are referenced to and analyzed with the use of this model. The article shows the epistemologically and methodologically divergent status of cognitive science, as well as its cognitive and institutional conditions and challenges, which stand before it after half a century of intensive development.
2. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Arkadiusz Gut, Robert Mirski Arkadiusz Gut
Language as a Necessary Condition for Complex Mental Content: A Review of the Discussion on Spatial and Mathematical Thinking
Język Jako Warunek Konieczny Złożonej Treści Mentalnej

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In this article we review the discussion over the thesis that language serves as an integrator of contents coming from different cognitive modules. After presenting the theoretical considerations, we examine two strands of empirical research that tested the hypothesis — spatial cognition and mathematical cognition. The idea shared by both of them is that each is composed of two separate modules processing information of a specific kind. For spatial thinking these are geometric information about the location of the object and the information about the object’s properties such as color or size. For mathematical thinking, they are the absolute representation of small numbers and the approximate representation of numerosities. Language is said to integrate the two kinds of information within each of these domains, which the reviewed data demonstrates. In the final part of the paper, we offer some comments on the theoretical side of the discussion.
3. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Marcin Miłkowski Marcin Miłkowski
Objections to Computationalism: A Survey
Zarzuty Wobec Komputacjonizmu

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In this paper, the Author reviewed the typical objections against the claim that brains are computers, or, to be more precise, information-processing mechanisms. By showing that practically all the popular objections are based on uncharitable (or simply incorrect) interpretations of the claim, he argues that the claim is likely to be true, relevant to contemporary cognitive (neuro) science, and non-trivial.
4. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Marek Lechniak Marek Lechniak
Once More about Moore’s Paradox in Epistemic Logic and Belief Change Theory
Jeszcze Raz O Paradoksie Moore’a W Logice Epistemicznej I Teorii Zmian Przekonaniowych

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In this article, it was first presented Moore’s paradox per se and after the author focused on the logical perspective — at first he analyzed these considerations in the field of so-called standard epistemic logic and after on the formal theory of belief change.
5. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Anna Dutkowska, Zbigniew Wróblewski Anna Dutkowska
Mindreading in the Animal Kingdom: Philosophical Controversies
Czytanie Umysłu W Królestwie Zwierząt

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The central issue in the debate on animal minds is the issue of mindreading. This complicated cognitive ability belongs to the key elements of social cognition — as a form of adapting to specific circumstances connected with living in groups, it enables the reading of the mental states of other individuals, e.g. intentions, desires, and beliefs as well as the adaptation of one’s own behavior to this information. The primary purpose of the article is to present the main philosophical controversies which arise in the discussion of whether this ability can be attributed to animals; if so, then to what extent. Philosophical discussions concentrate on methodological issues: alternative interpretational models of animal behavior (mindreading vs reading behavior), anthropomorphism, experimental protocols, and gradeability of mindreading as well as the nature of the mind (thinking).
6. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Robert Poczobut Robert Poczobut
Contextual Emergence and Its Applications in Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science
Emergencja Kontekstowa I Jej Zastosowania W Filozofii Umysłu I Kognitywistyce

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The purpose of the article is to analyze the concept of contextual emergence as well as its selected applications in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In the first section the author presents the general assumptions of the emergentist model of reality. He stresses that the concept of emergence can be applied to the description of various levels of organization of nature: one of these levels is that of mental-cognitive processes, analyzed within the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In the subsequent sections, he introduces the definitions of contextual emergence and systemic causation and he points to their selected applications to mentalcognitive systems. In the concluding part, he presents the ideas of Gerald Edelman and Michael Gazzaniga on the role of contextual explanations as well as the concepts of emergence in the philosophy of biology and cognitive neuroscience. He also indicates the possibility of incorporating the concept of contextual emergence into active externalism and the extended cognition theory.
7. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Adriana Schetz Adriana Schetz
Consciousness and Perception from Biological Externalism Point of View
Świadomość I Postrzeganie Z Punktu Widzenia Biologicznego Eksternalizmu

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The aim of the analyzes carried out in this paper is to show that within the multitude of theories of perception which center their main presuppositions around the idea of action and embodiment, we can distinguish a body of approaches, which characteristically emphasize the following claims: that it is the living organism that should serve as perceiving subject; that perceptual states are not only a form of action but primarily a form of consciousness; that perceptual information is obtained by perceiving subjects from the environment by means of so-called perceptual invariants (i.e. structural indicators, which allow organisms to recognize such perceptual properties as color, shape, size, intensity of sound, type and direction of smell, tactilely given texture, etc.).
8. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3
Marcin Tkaczyk Marcin Tkaczyk
Distribution Laws in Weak Positional Logics
Prawa Dystrybucyjne W Słabych Logikach Pozycyjnych

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A formal language is positional if it involves a positional connecitve, i.e. a connective of realization to relate formulas to points of a kind, like points of realization or points of relativization. The connective in focus in this paper is the connective “R” , first introduced by Jerzy Łoś. Formulas [Rαφ] involve a singular name α and a formula φ to the effect that φ is satisfied (true) relative to the position designated by α. In weak positional calculi no nested occurences of the connective “R” are allowed. The distribution problem in weak positional logics is actually the problem of distributivity of the connective “R” over classical connectives, viz. the problem of relation between the occurences of classical connectives inside and outside the scope of the positional connective “R”.
9. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 3

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