Roczniki Filozoficzne

Artykuł jest próbą wykazania, że E.A. Milne’a filozofia nauki ma swoje źródła w filozofii Arystotelesa i mogła stanowić inspirację dla Popperowskiego hipotetyzmu. O zgodności z koncepcją Arystotelesa świadczą następujące jej cechy: 1) celem nauki jest wyjaśnianie zjawisk przez odkrywanie ogólnych zasad; 2) istotną rolę w ich odkrywaniu spełnia umysł, choć doświadczenie ukierunkowuje poszukiwania; 3) dedukowanie szczegółowych twierdzeń z ogólnych założeń jest najważniejszym elementem badań. Z drugiej strony propozycja Milne’a jest zgodna z głównymi ideami koncepcji Poppera: 1) krytyką zasady indukcji; 2) preferowaniem metody hipotetyczno-dedukcyjnej (założenia mają charakter śmiałych hipotez i są akceptowane na podstawie wyników testów empirycznych); 3) docenieniem falsyfikacji i przekonaniem o skuteczności logiki dedukcyjnej.

In the times preceding the emergence of Neo-Platonism (1st–3rd century BC), the philosophers now known as Middle Platonists elaborated an extensive reflection on the possibility of knowing God, and the ways that could lead to acquiring knowledge about the transcendent. According to Plato, “To discover the Maker and Father of this Universe were a task indeed; and having discovered Him, to declare Him unto all men were a thing impossible” (PLATO, Timaeus 28c). The Middle Platonists believed that God, whom they sometimes identified with the Platonic One and Good, is possible to know but not possible to express. Even though the knowledge of God is accompanied by all the difficulties associated with the process of intellectual and ethical improvement, and although what one comes to know in this process is ultimately impossible to express in human language, gaining knowledge of God and becoming like Him is nevertheless the goal of all Platonic philosophy. Jewish and Christian thinkers working at this time came to similar conclusions. These include Philo of Alexandria, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, who are themselves sometimes deemed Middle-Platonic philosophers. Unlike their pagan colleagues, they believed that man’s process of coming to know God would go on forever. They thought that the finite human mind would never be able to contain the infinite, and they held that the essence and power of God are indeed infinite. The goal of this article is to expose the relationship between the infinity and the unknowability of God, and at the same time to point out the differences in the theses put forward on this question by pagan Middle Platonists and those who accepted Judeo-Christian revelation.

In the article, in its first part, I present selected, the most important elements of the capabilities approach developing by contemporary American philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum. In the second part, I criticize certain elements of this concept, treating it, in accordance with the Nussbaum’s declaration, as above all a political theory, not a moral one.

In the paper, there were presented ethical arguments concerning the application of modern techniques of genetic intervention in human procreation. In particular, the rationalistic arguments in favor of genetic interventions were critically presented, namely the argument on ethical neutrality of technology, liberal argument on procreative freedom and argument on genetic enhancement. There were also analyzed the negative emotional reaction to genetic engineering. The main aim of the paper was to express the cognitive element from these emotions enabling the wider understanding of human procreation and the values of parent-child relations.

The Darwinian argument in metaethics can have its memetic counterparts based on the assumption that our moral beliefs were formed in the process of cultural evolution by means of memetic natural selection. Is there any difference with respect to the debunking force of these two kinds of genealogical critiques? In this paper I argue that there might be such difference. Therefore, it is not true that any possible naturalistically respectable causal mechanism is equally undermining for our moral beliefs. Yet, there is a more profound question to be asked: should we leave the rationality of our deepest moral beliefs at the mercy of the results of empirical investigations into their causal origin? This paper argues that we should not. However, if this approach is to be justified, the autonomy of moral beliefs must be defended in a principal manner. Only then may a different account of knowledge as well as different standards of objective propositional rationality be legitimately adopted for moral beliefs — i.e. different from those proper to non-normative beliefs. It turns out that only expressivists are in a position to claim that the property in virtue of which moral beliefs perform their distinctive practical function confers autonomy on moral discourse.

In the article, an analysis was made of what’s new in the debate on the condition of the contemporary political community brought up by the discussion about the relationship between care and justice. The author introduces the category of care in philosophy and its understanding and with particular emphasis on the views of Virginia Held. He analyzes the importance of a relationship of care as the foundation for the proper functioning of the socio-political community and criticism of the idea of a social contract undertaken by representatives of the ethics of care. Critically, he presents the consequences of the assumptions of the civic community accepted by Held.