In the paper the concept of ontological theory is defined according to the general principles of Aristotelian metaontology. The following question concerning the structure of ontology is formulated: What are the main methodological types of axiomatic ontological theories and what basic relationships occur between them? It is noted that there are three distinct ideas of formal ontology in both traditional and analytic philosophy: logical, explicative, and empirical ontology. The aim of the paper is twofold: 1) to indicate a homogeneous concept of formal ontology that takes into account these ideas and provides a solution to the question of the structure of ontology, and 2) to use this concept for the construction of basic examples of theories of being and time. The paper consists of the following sections: Introduction. 1.1 Three concepts of formal ontology. 1.2 On logical ontology. 1.3 On explicative formal ontology. 2.1 Monadic second order theory of identity and membership. 2.2 Explicative theory of filled time. 2.3 Towards the empirical ontology of real world. Conclusion

The article presents Kant’s and Husserl’s philosophies with reference to Hartmann’s understanding of irrationality. In Hartmann’s metaphysics of cognition, irrationality, which corresponds with partial unknowability of being, appears to be an argument against idealism that assumes a complete rationality of our knowledge and its object. In this article the author shows that it is possible to indicate similarities between Kant’s idea of the unknowability of the transcendental object, Husserl’s conception of the transcendental constitution of the world, and Hartmann’s concept of gnoseological irrationality. In Kant’s transcendentalism, irrationality implies an asymmetry between the conditions of the possibility of experience and the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, because the unknowability of a transcendental object and a thing in itself indicates that not all conditions of the objects are at the same time conditions of the possibility of experience. According to Husserl, transcendental subjectivity is not a sufficient reason for the world in its Dasein and Sosein, because the fact of the constitution of the world is an irrational one and it cannot be derived from the essence of subjectivity. The author tries to demonstrate that this analogy between Husserl and Hartmann, in the question of the irrationality, opens new interpretational possibilities for the relation between transcendental phenomenology and Hartmann’s philosophy.

This article concerns a transition of the cultural image of religious experience. This transition — shaped by Anglo-Saxon romanticism — was identified by the American literary critic Geoffrey Hartman in literature. The most important aspects of this transition are: the victory of a creative model of poetry over a mimetic model, the epitaphic sensibility to the transitoriness of the world, the naturalization of supernaturalism (according to M.H. Abrams’s formula: natural supernaturalism) and the relinquishment of answers to ultimate questions. The horizon of searching for a sense of this transition is marked by quasi-messianism in view of Adorno — i.e. a belief that you should prize the variety of incomplete answers more than the integrality of ultimate truths.

Dotychczas problematyka mądrości nie była szerzej rozważana na gruncie epistemologii analitycznej. W ostatnim czasie interesujące ujęcie tematu zaproponował Stephen Grimm, który dowodzi, że mądrość oparta jest na wiedzy oraz że tradycyjny podział na wiedzę teoretyczną i praktyczną jest nie do utrzymania. Dostrzegam pewną niespójność w tychże aspektach jego pracy. Z jednej strony chciałby utrzymywać, że tradycyjne wzorce mądrości (takie jak Jezus, Budda, Konfucjusz) mogą wciąż być określane mianem „mądrych” z punktu widzeniajego teorii. Lecz z drugiej strony, proponowany przezeń warunek bycia mądrym zdaje się zakładać, że tylko cześć tych, którzy głoszą sprzeczne ze sobą poglądy, istotnie jest mądra. Rozważam szereg możliwych rozwiązań tego problemu oraz popieram podejście kontekstualistyczne, które dopuszcza warunek wiedzy oraz pozwala tradycyjne wzorce mądrości określać mianem „mądrych”.

In the 1840’s, due to Luigi Taparelli and Antonio Rosmini, the term of “social justice” emerged. Since that time, its meaning has developed in many ways. In the literature of the subject, one can find numerous identifications of “social justice”. This paper brings up some applications of the notion. The author, in inevitably approximate analyses, tries to show the specificity of particular types of meanings assigned to the notion of “social justice”. The article focuses on the identity of this term with justice framed as a legal and distributivejustice.

In the 1840’s, due to Luigi Taparelli and Antonio Rosmini, the term of“socialjustice” emerged. Since that time, its meaning has developed in many ways. In the literature of the subject, one can find numerous identifications of the term “social justice”. The article focuses on the identity of this term with justice framed as: a commutative justice (in its varieties: retributive, restorative and justice of exchange). Some of these concepts assume the existence of some kind of social persons. The author, in inevitably approximate analyses, tries to show specificity of particular types of meanings assigned to the notion of “socialjustice”.

In the 1840’s, due to Luigi Taparelli and Antonio Rosmini, the term of “social justice” emerged. Since that time, its meaning has developed in many ways. The author, in inevitably approximate analyses, tries to show the specificity of particular types of meanings assigned to the notion of “social justice”. In the literature of the subject, one can find numerous identifications of “social justice”. The article focuses on the identity of this term with the ideas of social equality or solidarity. It also considers aspects of equality applied to opportunities and rights.

This article tries to answer the question of the concept of natural philosophy in the view of Tadeusz Stanisław Wojciechowski (1917-2000), a professor of philosophy at the Pontifical Academy of Theology in Cracow. The article consists of an introduction, a biographical section, a chapter devoted to the analysis of the method of practicing the philosophy of nature by T. Wojciechowski, and finally it attempts to summarize and evaluate his attitude.Preliminary analysis shows that the method of practicing the philosophy of nature by T. Wojciechowski was original, taking into account the historical context. This concept is located between traditional neo-scholastic answers and modern views in the theory of the philosophy of nature.

This essay is a set of Robin George Collingwood’s basic reflections on the objectives and tasks of the historical sciences. It contains the critic of history as a discipline that aims at establishing general laws, which rule the course of history, and as a discipline that aims at discovering a divine plan, which is realizing itself in history. It is an attempt to show the differences between history and the philosophy of history, art and science. It expresses the thought that there is no such thing as a pure historical fact, that absolute cognition of any historical fact is impossible, though the knowledge about it increases, and that historical thought is based on perception.The conclusion of this essay is twofold. First, it concludes that the idea that each historian looks at the past from his own point of view, therefore sources used by him, and inferences that he reaches, significantly differ from sources and inferences of other historians. Second, it concludes that the thought that any historical event is unexhausted, in the sense that, it takes another shape in the hands of every new historian.

In addition to being uncertain about what the world is like, one can also be uncertain about one’s own spatial or temporal location in the world. The aim of the paper is to pose a problem arising from the interaction between these two sorts of uncertainty, solve the problem, and draw two lessons from the solution.