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Res Philosophica

Volume 90, Issue 1, January 2013
Philosophy of Religion

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Displaying: 1-7 of 7 documents


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1. Res Philosophica: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Alexander R. Pruss, Omnirationality
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God is omnirational: whenever he does anything, he does it for all and only the unexcluded reasons that favor the action, and he always acts for reasons. Thisdoctrine has two unexpected consequences: (a) it gives an account of why it is that unification is a genuine form of scientific explanation, and (b) it answers the question of when the occurrence of E after a petitionary prayer for E is an answer to the prayer.
2. Res Philosophica: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Lynne Rudder Baker, Updating Anselm Again
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I set out four general facts about things that we can refer to and talk about, whether they exist or not. Then, I set out an argument for the existence of God. Myargument, like Anselm’s original (11th c.) argument, is a reductio ad absurdum: It shows that the assumption that God does not exist leads to a contradiction. Theargument is short and in (almost-)ordinary language. Each line of the argument, other than the reductio premise, is justified by one of the general facts. Finally, I consider some traditional objections to Anselm’s argument, and show how my updated version avoids them.
3. Res Philosophica: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Nicholas Wolterstorff, C. S. Lewis on the Problem of Suffering
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C. S. Lewis’s small book, The Problem of Pain, first published in 1940, is essentially a theodicy, specifically, a version of soul-making theodicy. In this essay I present Lewis’s theodicy and I offer some critical comments. I conclude by asking whether his theodicy remains intact and helpful upon the death of Lewis wife, as he reflects on that in A Grief Observed. I conclude that it does.
4. Res Philosophica: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Theories of Providence and Creation
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Einstein was notoriously confident that God doesn’t play dice with the universe. Perhaps it is a confidence born of a deeper modal presumption: that Godcouldn’t play dice with the universe. If so, such confidence almost certainly disappoints. Even if God doesn’t play dice with the universe, he might. Thus arises the issue here addressed: what implications does this datum have for a proper understanding of divine providence? My interest is in theories that aim to present complete theories of providence, ones that refuse to relegate anything that happens to a domain falling outside the scope of providence. What we can learn about the parts of it that are most promising for a fully satisfying theory of providence, in light of the dice-playing possibility?
5. Res Philosophica: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Brian Leftow, God’s Deontic Perfection
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I offer part of an account of divine moral perfection. I defend the claim that moral perfection is possible, then argue that God has obligations, so that one part of his moral perfection must be perfection in meeting these. I take up objections to divine obligations, then finally offer a definition of divine deontic perfection.
6. Res Philosophica: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Paul Draper, The Limitations of Pure Skeptical Theism
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Michael Bergmann argues directly from our ignorance about actual and merely possible goods and evils and the broadly logical relations that hold betweenthem to the conclusion that “noseeum” arguments from evil against theism like William L. Rowe’s are unsuccessful. I critically discuss Bergmann’s argument in the first part of this paper. Bergmann also suggests that our ignorance about value and modality undermines the Humean argument from evil against theism that I defended in a 1989 paper. I explain in the second part of this paper why this suggestion is false.
7. Res Philosophica: Volume > 90 > Issue: 1
Peter van Inwagen, C. S. Lewis’s Argument Against Naturalism
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