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1. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Eduardo Pérez-Navarro, Víctor Fernández Castro, Javier González de Prado Salas, Manuel Heras–Escribano Not Expressivist Enough: Normative Disagreement about Belief Attribution
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The expressivist account of knowledge attributions, while claiming that these attributions are nonfactual, also typically holds that they retain a factual component. This factual component involves the attribution of a belief. The aim of this work is to show that considerations analogous to those motivating an expressivist account of knowledge attributions can be applied to belief attributions. As a consequence, we claim that expressivists should not treat the so-called factual component as such. The phenomenon we focus on to claim that belief attributions are non-factual is that of normative doxastic disagreement. We show through several examples that this kind of disagreement is analogous to that of the epistemic kind. The result will be a doxastic expressivism. Finally, we answer some objections that our doxastic expressivism could seem to face.
2. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Camil Golub Reid on Moral Sentimentalism
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In the Essays on the Active Powers of Man V. 7, Thomas Reid seeks to show “[t]hat moral approbation implies a real judgment,” contrasting this thesis with the view that moral approbation is no more than a feeling. Unfortunately, his criticism of moral sentimentalism systematically conflates two different metaethical views: non-cognitivism about moral thought and subjectivism about moral properties. However, if we properly disentangle the various parts of Reid’s discussion, we can isolate pertinent arguments against each of these views. Some of these arguments, such as the argument from disagreement and the argument from implausible counterfactuals against subjectivism, or the transparency argument against non-cognitivism, still have important roles to play in contemporary metaethics.
3. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Eric Stencil Arnauld's Silence on the Creation of the Eternal Truths
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In the latter half of the seventeenth century, Antoine Arnauld was a public and private defender of many of the central tenets of Cartesianism. Yet, one issue on which he is surprisingly silent is René Descartes’s claim that God freely created the eternal truths (the Creation Doctrine). Despite Arnauld’s evasion of the issue, whether he holds the Creation Doctrine is one of the most contested issues in Arnauld scholarship. In this article I offer an interpretation of Arnauld’s position. I argue that Arnauld does not hold what I call the metaphysical version of the Creation Doctrine according to which God in fact freely created the eternal truths. Rather, he holds what I call the epistemic version of the Creation Doctrine according to which we cannot know whether God freely created the eternal truths.
4. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Filip Grgić Good Luck, Nature, and God: Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics 8.2
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In this paper I argue that the basic form of good luck (eutuchia) that Aristotle identifies in his Eudemian Ethics 8.2 is the divine good luck, which is not also natural good luck, as is commonly assumed by interpreters. The property of being lucky is neither a primitive nor a natural property, nor such that it is based on some natural property, but a property bestowed by god. Hence, the only satisfactory explanation of good luck must be theological. Furthermore, I argue that Aristotle’s account is neutral in regard to character, intellectual, and physical dispositions of those who are subject to good luck.
5. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Philip Swenson, Bradley Rettler Bundle Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles
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A and B continue their conversation concerning the Identity of Indiscernibles. Both are aware of recent critiques of the principle that haven’t received replies; B summarizes those critiques, and A offers the replies that are due. B then raises a new worry.
book symposium
6. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Anna Alexandrova Précis for A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being
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7. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Dick Arneson Comments on Anna Alexandrova, A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being
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8. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Nicole Hassoun Thoughts on Philosophy and the Science of Well-Being
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9. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Jennifer Hawkins Diversity of Meaning and the Value of a Concept: Comments on Anna Alexandrova’s A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being
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10. Res Philosophica: Volume > 96 > Issue: 4
Anna Alexandrova Reply to Hawkins, Hassoun, and Arneson
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