Cover of Res Philosophica
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 1-20 of 320 documents


articles
1. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 4
Tim Juvshik Artifactualization without Physical Modification
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Much recent discussion has focused on the nature of artifacts, particularly on whether they have essences. While it’s often held that artifacts are intentiondependent and necessarily have functions, it’s equally held, though far less discussed, that artifacts are the result of physical modification of some material objects. This article argues that the physical modification condition on artifacts is false. First, it formulates the physical modification condition perspicuously for the first time. Second, it offers counterexamples to this condition. Third, it considers and rejects two responses to these counterexamples, one which appeals to the distinction between being a K and being used as a K and another which argues that the counterexamples are merely of functional, not artifactual, kinds. Finally, it considers and rejects a more general objection that appropriation makes artifact creation too easy. Therefore, artifacts can be created by appropriation, and I sketch some success conditions for such appropriation.
2. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 4
Callie K. Phillips Why Future-Bias Isn't Rationally Evaluable
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Future-bias is preferring some lesser future good to a greater past good because it is in the future, or preferring some greater past pain to some lesser future pain because it is in the past. Most of us think that this bias is rational. I argue that no agents have futurebiased preferences that are rationally evaluable—that is, evaluable as rational or irrational. Given certain plausible assumptions about rational evaluability, either we must find a new conception of future-bias that avoids the difficulties I raise, or we must conclude that future-biased preferences are not subject to rational evaluation.
3. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 4
Joseph Vukov Rationality and Cognitive Enhancement
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
When is it rational to undergo cognitive enhancement? In the case of what I’ll call massive cognitive enhancement, my answer is never. The reason is that one must base one’s decision to undergo massive cognitive enhancement on what I’ll call either phenomenal or non-phenomenal outcomes. If the former, the choice is not rational because massive cognitive enhancements are transformative and, I’ll argue with Paul (2015), transformative experiences cannot be chosen rationally. If the latter, the choice is not rational because it ought to be based at least partly on phenomenal outcomes. This argument, however, leaves open the idea that it may nonetheless be rational to choose massive cognitive enhancement for others—for example, one’s children. The article explores this possibility, arguing that choosing enhancement for others can be rational or moral, but not both.
discussion
4. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 4
Stafan Rinner Recanati on 'That'-clauses
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The received view concerning belief ascriptions of the form ‘A believes that S’ says (A) that ‘believe’ denotes a relation holding between agents and truth-bearing entities (propositions), and (B) that ‘that’-clauses are referential expressions denoting propositions. In “‘That’-Clauses as Existential Quantifiers,” Recanati expresses his dissatisfaction with the received view. According to Recanati, (B) threatens semantic innocence. Therefore, following Panaccio, Recanati proposes to treat ‘that’-clauses of the form ‘that S’ as restricted existential quantifiers of the form ‘For some p such that p is true iff S.’ In this article, I will argue that together with Kripke’s disquotational principle connecting sincere assertion and belief this analysis leads to unacceptable consequences. Since, as we shall see, the solution cannot be to reject Kripke’s disquotational principle, it will follow that the Recanati-Panaccio analysis cannot be correct. Concluding, I will show that the argument against the Recanati-Panaccio analysis of ‘that’-clauses also provides a more general way of testing semantic analyses and that, unlike the Recanati-Panaccio analysis, the received view passes this test.
book symposium
5. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 4
David McPherson Précis of Virtue and Meaning
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
6. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 4
Philip J. Ivanhoe Comments on David McPherson's Virtue and Meaning: A Neo-Aristotelian Perspective
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
7. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 4
Christian B. Miller McPherson on Virtue and Meaning
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
8. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 4
David McPherson Replies to Ivanhoe and Miller
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
9. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Anders Herlitz, Karim Sadek Social Choice, Nondeterminacy, and Public Reasoning
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article presents an approach to how to make reasonable social choices when independent criteria (e.g., prioritarianism, religious freedom) fail to fully determine what to do. The article outlines different explanations of why independent criteria sometimes fail to fully determine what to do and illustrates how they can still be used to eliminate ineligible alternatives, but it is argued that the independent criteria cannot ground a reasonable social choice in these situations. To complement independent criteria when they fail to fully determine what to do, it is suggested that society must engage in public deliberation by way of generating new reasons that can determine how to rank the alternatives. It is suggested that the approach to social choice presented here reveals a way of accepting the relevance of independent criteria for social choice without letting go of the idea that the attitudes of affected parties matter.
10. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
David Holiday Moral Incapacities of Vice
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article examines the moral-theoretic implications of a species of moral incapacity which is frequently acknowledged, but nowhere fully explored, in the extant literature. This is the species ‘moral incapacity of vice,’ comprised of those strict limits to intentional action that manifest a weakness or corruption of moral character. Such incapacities demand closer attention, because they block a prominent line of skepticism about the moral incapacities (skepticism resulting partly from theorists’ heretofore exclusive concern with moral incapacities of virtue). A literary example of moral incapacity of vice is analyzed by means of a Thomistic concept of capital vice. The case blocks moral incapacity skepticism, illustrates that moral incapacities of vice share all of the major criterial (i.e., significant and collectively distinctive) features of moral incapacities of virtue, and brings out the significance of such incapacities for our understanding of character, practical reasoning, and agency.
11. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Michael Vazquez Hopeless Fools and Impossible Ideals
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this article, I vindicate the longstanding intuition that the Stoics are transitional figures in the history of ethics. I argue that the Stoics are committed to thinking that the ideal of human happiness as a life of virtue is impossible for some people, whom I dub ‘hopeless fools.’ In conjunction with the Stoic view that everyone is subject to the same rational requirements to perform ‘appropriate actions’ or ‘duties’ (kath¯ekonta/officia), and the plausible eudaimonist assumption that happiness is a source of normative reasons only if it is in principle attainable, the existence of hopeless fools demonstrates that the Stoics were pluralists about the ultimate justificatory basis of rational action. Hopeless fools are required to behave just like their non-hopeless counterparts, not because doing so is conducive to their happiness, but because doing so conforms with the dictates of Right Reason.
12. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Michael Granado Scientific Epistemology: Exploring the Primacy of Science in the Writing of Gaston Bachelard
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article will explore the ways in which early twentieth century physics informs and sustains Gaston Bachelard’s writing on epistemology and time. By investigating the scientific underpinnings of Bachelard’s philosophy of time, this article will also establish a connection between his epistemological and temporal works that are underdeveloped in the secondary literature. This discussion will seek to prove an epistemological commitment, scattered throughout Bachelard’s work on science, in which all epistemological claims are beholden to the claims of modern science. It will be demonstrated how this epistemological claim is implemented in Bachelard’s work on time—specifically, the ways in which relativity theory and microphysics influences his philosophy of time. Such an approach will bridge the gap between Bachelard’s epistemological writings and his work on time while simultaneously illustrating the ways in which physics influences his thinking.
13. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Aaron Wells The Priority of Natural Laws in Kant's Early Philosophy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
It is widely held that, in his pre-Critical works, Kant endorsed a necessitation account of laws of nature, where laws are grounded in essences or causal powers. Against this, I argue that the early Kant endorsed the priority of laws in explaining and unifying the natural world, as well as their irreducible role in grounding natural necessity. Laws are a key constituent of Kant’s explanatory naturalism, rather than undermining it. By laying out neglected distinctions Kant draws among types of natural law, grounding relations, and ontological levels, I show that his early works present a coherent and sophisticated laws-first account of the natural order. Laws are a key constituent of Kant’s explanatory naturalism with respect to the empirical domain, and do not undermine it.
discussion
14. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Nathan Robert Howard, N. G. Laskowski Phenomenal Concepts as Complex Demonstratives
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
There’s a long but relatively neglected tradition of attempting to explain why many researchers working on the nature of phenomenal consciousness think that it’s hard to explain.1 David Chalmers argues that this “meta-problem of consciousness” merits more attention than it has received. He also argues against several existing explanations of why we find consciousness hard to explain. Like Chalmers, we agree that the meta-problem is worthy of more attention. Contra Chalmers, however, we argue that there’s an existing explanation that is more promising than his objections suggest. We argue that researchers find phenomenal consciousness hard to explain because phenomenal concepts are complex demonstratives that encode the impossibility of explaining consciousness as one of their application conditions.
book symposium
15. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Mary Kate McGowan Précis for Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
16. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Luvell Anderson Reflections on McGowan's Just Words
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
17. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Claire Horisk Can McGowan Explain Hepeating?
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
18. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Lori Watson Comments on Mary Kate McGowan's Just Words
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
19. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Mary Kate McGowan New Applications, Hepeating, and Discrimination: Response to Anderson, Horisk, and Watson
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
20. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 2
Billy Dunaway, Jon McGinnis Editors' Note
view |  rights & permissions | cited by