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Displaying: 1-10 of 20 documents

1. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
James L. Muyskens Life After Death: An Idle Wish or a Reasonable Hope?
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I argue that life after death (understood as personal survival of one's death) is an appropriate object of one's hope, despite the fact that it may not be an appropriate object of one's belief. That is, the hope for life after death is a reasonable hope. Whereas the belief that there is a life after death may not be a justified belief.I begin by discussing and clarifying the phenomenon of hoping and developing a logical analysis of the concept of hope. Hoping is then distinguished from both wishing and believing. Next I discuss what must obtain before we consider a hope to be a reasonable one or to be justified. Finally I demonstrate that at least one form of life after death meets the conditions for justified hope.
2. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Hugh T. Wilder Quine's Arguments for the Interdeterminacy of Translation
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The purpose of the article is to evaluate Quine's arguments for the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. After formulation of the thesis, Quine's four main arguments are described and evaluated. The arguments are: (1) the argument from the underdeterminacy of physical theory, (2) the argument from the inscrutability of terms, (3) the argument from the conjunction of the Peircean notion of meaning and the Duhemian thesis about the interanimation of sentences, and (4-) the argument from the linguist's reliance on sets of analytical hypothesis. It is contended that none of these arguments is successful in supporting the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, and that Quine has offered no reason to believe that the degree of determinacy of translation is different from that of physical theory.
3. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
William H. Brenner Prime Matter and Barrington Jones
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In Philosophical Review, October 1974, Professor Jones argues that Aristotle's concept of matter is that of any individual item, such as a piece of bronze or a seed, with which a process of coming into existence begins, and which is prior (in a purely temporal sense) to the product which comes to exist. Aristotle does not try to prove the existence of some sort of "super-stuff" called "prime matter."I argue that Jones' account does not do full justice to Aristotle's analysis of change, or to the traditional notion of prime matter based on it. I criticize Jones' arguments and draw attention to a passage in which Aristotle says that matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, while in another it does not. "Matter" in the first sense refers to the determinate individual, the first term of a change; in the second sense it is the "stuff" which remains after a substantial change, the "prime matter."
4. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
L. Duane Willard Intrinsic Value in Dewey
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It is widely believed that John Dewey completely rejected intrinsic value. The objective of the paper is to show this belief mistaken. Several different concepts of intrinsic value have been offered by philosophers. I argue that while Dewey rejected much in these various concepts, a careful examination of his writings reveals that he still retained the view that at least some things may be worth having, doing, enjoying for their own sakes. Perhaps the major point established is that Dewey's doctrine of the means-ends continuum does not deny the possibility of intrinsic value as he conceives it. This is shown by calling attention to his discussions of ends incorporating means and of conmummatory experiences.
5. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Louis F. Kort What is an Apology?
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In this essay I attempt to elucidate the concept of an apology. I begin by considering the way in which apologizing is characterized by Erving Goffman; and I argue that his characterization does not suffice to distinguish the apology from many other speech acts. I then offer my own analysis, according to which (roughly) a speaker is apologizing to his hearer for something if and only if in saying what he does he is 1) expressing regret about it, 2) accepting responsibility for it, 3) acknowledging it to constitute an offense to his hearer, 4) expressing regret about it as such, and 5) making a gesture of respect to his hearer as a person with a right to be spared such mistreatment.
6. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
John B. Fisher The Concept of Structure in Freud, Levi Strauss, and Chomsky
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In this paper I attempt to help clarify the nature of structuralism as a philosophical approach by examining the way in which Freud, Lévi-Strauss and Chomsky use the concept of structure. I argue that in each of these thinkers there is an important tension between their attempts to develop, on the one hand, a theory within the framework of determinism and, on the other, to emphasize the meaningfulness of certain aspects of human behavior. I suggest that the ability of the term "structure" to refer either to a universal or a particular helps the two sides of their thinking from coming into conflict with one another, and that this is a magor reason why these figures were attracted to a structural approach.
7. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Richard E. Olson On Truth by Convention
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In his early essay, "Truth by Convention," W.V.O. Quine scraps a programme for a conventionalistic account of logic on finding that the very logic which he wishes to stipulate by conventional truth assignments is presupposed in the stipulation of his conventions. Recently, however, Carlo Giannoni has offered us a variant of the Quine programme which, he maintains, avoids Quine's initial pitfall by shifting the emphasis from truth assignment to the conventional stipulation of inference rules. In the following essay I argue that Quine and, hence, also Giannoni have misconceived the problem of conventionalism in their accounts and that the Giannoni reconstruction is consequently to no avail. The alternative account of Quine's initial difficulties which I offer is both incompatible with a classical conventionalism and Quine's own Duhemian conventionalism, while explaining these difficulties far more adequately than his account of them does.
8. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
James W. Felt On Burying Induction
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Contrary to a popular view that induction constitutes solely a methodological problem, this essay argues that a metaphysical problem underlies the methodological in such a way that any solution of the latter implicitly assumes the solvability in principle of the former. Thus the metaphysical problem deserves to be faced rather than dismissed. It is further suggested that the general features of a solution to the metaphysical problem are exemplified in the philosophical approach of A. N. Whitehead, inasmuch as it couples both the recognition of causal derivation within the fabric of immediate sense experience and a speculative account of just how the present can thus derive from the past and the future from the present.
9. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
James L. Hudson Frege's Way Out
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I show that Frege's statement (In the Epilogue to his Grundgesetze der Arithmetic v. II) of a way to avoid Russell's paradox is defective, in that he presents two different methods as if they were one. One of these "ways out" is notably more plausible than the other, and is almost surely what Frege really intended. The well-known arguments of Lesniewski, Geach, and Quine that Frege's revision of his system is inadequate to avoid paradox are not affected by the ambiguity of Frede's statement. But a rectnt argument by Linsky and Schumm (Analysis 82 (1971-72), 5-7), intended as a very simple derivation of a contradiction within Frege's revised system, is valid only for the less plausible of the two versions of Frege's way out, and thus is not an effective attack on the revision that Frege intended to make.
10. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Michael R. Neville Kant on Beauty as the Symbol of Morality
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The paper attempts to show what Kant means by his claim that "the beautiful Is the symbol of the morally good" In Section 59 of the Critique of Judgment. Part I explicates his notion of symbolism in general and includes a subsidiary explication of his notion of analogy. Part II deals with some special problems which arise when he seeks to apply that general notion of symbolism to the particular province of the beautiful. The conclusions drawn are that Kant means the following: that in the very act of appreciating a beautiful object and making judgments of taste thereon, we have some awareness of ourselves as free, supersensible beings, which awareness is analogous to our awareness of ourselves as free moral agents; that any beautiful object can, in this sense, serve as a symbolic presentation of the morally good; but that the symbolic relationship between beauty and moral goodness does not constitute an argument for morality or for the actuality of human freedom, for it rather presupposes our awareness of such, nor should it sinply be conflated with the beauty of nature bridging the noumenal and the phenomenal aspects of our selves, which is a further issue.