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the royce lectures
1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 54 > Issue: 2
Sydney Shoemaker Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture I: The Object Perception Model
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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 54 > Issue: 2
Sydney Shoemaker Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model
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3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 54 > Issue: 2
Sydney Shoemaker Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience
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articles
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 54 > Issue: 2
Derk Pereboom Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 54 > Issue: 2
Clive Stroud-Drinkwater The Naive Theory of Colour
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6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 54 > Issue: 2
Douglas C. Long One More Foiled Defense of Skepticism
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In my essay I contend that the three main avenues by which one might plausibly account for one's self-awareness are unavailable to an individual who is restricted to the skeptic's epistemic ground rules. First, all-encompassing doubt about the world cancels our "external" epistemic access via perception to ourselves as material individuals in the world. Second, one does not have direct cpistemic access to one's substantial self through introspection, since the self as such is not a proper object of inner awareness. Third, we cannot claim, as Descartes did, that we have indirect epistemic access to the substantial self by inference from the occurrence of experiences.The summary conclusion for which I argue is that, if we are to account for our self-knowledge, we cannot adopt the purely subjective epistemological stance that is at the heart of global skepticism.
book symposium
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 54 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Rescher Précis of A System of Pragmatic Idealism
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8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 54 > Issue: 2
John Kekes The Pragmatic Idealism of Nicholas Rescher
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 54 > Issue: 2
Jack Meiland Cognitive Schemes and Truth as an Ideal
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 54 > Issue: 2
T. L. S. Sprigge Idealism contra Idealism
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