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Displaying: 1-10 of 26 documents


articles
1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
I. L. Humberstone Two Types of Circularity
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For the claim that the satisfaction of certain conditions is sufficient for the application of some concept to serve as part of the (‘reductive’) analysis of that concept, we require the conditions to be specified without employing that very concept. An account of the application conditions of a concept not meeting this requirement, we call analytically circular. For such a claim to be usable in determining the extension of the concept, however, such circularity may not matter, since if the concept figures in a certain kind of intensional context in the specification of the conditions, the satisfaction of those conditions may not itself depend on the extension of the concept. We put this by saying that although analytically circular, the account may yet not be inferentially circular.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Bernard Reginster Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation
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The paper examines Nietzsche’s claim that valuations born out of a psychological condition he calls “ressentiment” are objectionable. It argues for a philosophically sound construal of this type of criticism, according to which the criticism is directed at the agent who holds values out of ressentiment, rather than at those values themselves. After presenting an analysis of ressentiment, the paper examines its impact on valuation and concludes with an inquiry into Nietzsche’s reasons for claiming that ressentiment valuation is “corrupt.” Specifically, the paper proposes that ressentiment valuation involves a form of self-deception, that such self-deception is objectionable because it undermines the integrity of the self, and that the lack of such integrity ensnares the agent in a peculiar kind of practical inconsistency. The paper ends with a brief review of the problems and prospects of this interpretation.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Donald L. M. Baxter Abstraction, Inseparability, and Identity
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Berkeley and Hume object to Locke’s account of abstraction. Abstraction is separating in the mind what cannot be separated in reality. Their objection is that if a is inseparable in reality from b, then the idea of a is inseparable from the idea of b. The former inseparability is the reason for the latter. In most interpretations, however, commentators leave the former unexplained in explaining the latter.This article assumes that Berkeley and Hume present a unified front against Locke. Hume supplements Berkeley’s argument just where there are gaps. In particular, Hume makes explicit something Berkeley leaves implicit: The argument against Locke depends on the principle that things are inseparable if and only if they are identical. Abstraction is thinking of one of an inseparable pair while not thinking of the other. But doing so entails thinking of something while not thinking of it. This is the fundamental objection.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Grant Gillett Husserl, Wittgenstein and the Snark: Intentionality and Social Naturalism
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The Snark is an intentional object. I examine the general philosophical characteristics of thoughts of objects from the perspective of Husserl’s, hyle, noesis, and noema and show how this meets constraints of opacity, normativity, and possible existence as generated by a sensitive theory of intentionality. Husserl introduces terms which indicate the normative features of intentional content and attempts to forge a direct relationship between the norms he generates and the actual world object which a thought intends. I then attempt to relate Husserl’s account to Fregean insights about the sense and reference of a term. Neither Husserl nor Frege suggest plausible routes to a naturalistic account of intentionality and I turn to Wittgenstein to provide a naturalistic reading of the crucial terms involved in the analysis of intentional content. His account is normative in a way required by both Husserl and Frege and yet manages a kind of Aristotelian naturalism which avoids crude biologism.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Takashi Yagisawa Salmon Trapping
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Call a sentential context semantically transparent if and only if all synonymous expressions are substitutable for one another in it salva veritate. Nathan Salmon has boldly advanced a refreshingly crisp semantic theory according to which belief contexts are semantically transparent. If he is right, belief contexts are much better behaved than widely suspected. Impressive as it is, this author does not believe that Salmon’s theory is completely satisfactory. This article tries to show that Salmon’s theory, in conjunction with a number of auxiliary but important claims he makes to buttress the theory, seems to lead to failure of semantic transparency of belief contexts.
discussions
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
W. R. Carter Dion’s Left Foot (and the Price of Burkean Economy)
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Two recent papers by Michael Burke bearing upon the persistence of people and commonplace things illustrate the fact that the quest for synchronic ontological economy is likely to encourage a disturbing diachronic proliferation of entities. This discussion argues that Burke’s promise of ontological economy is seriously compromised by the fact that his proposed metaphysic does violence to standard intuitions concerning the persistence of people and commonplace things. In effect, Burke would have us achieve synchronic economy (rejection of coincident entities) by postulating strongly counterintuitive transtemporal claims of numerical diversity. The argument is made that the price of Burkean economy is too high.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Louise M. Antony Feeling Fine About the Mind
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The article presents a critique of John Searle’s attack on computationalist theories of mind in his recent book, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Searle is guilty of caricaturing his opponents, and of ignoring their arguments. Moreover, his own positive theory of mind, which he claims “takes account of” subjectivity, turns out to offer no discernible advantages over the views he rejects.
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
William Hasker Explanatory Priority: Transitive and Unequivocal, a Reply to William Craig
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According to William Craig, the notion of explanatory priority is the Achilles’ heel of Robert Adams’ argument against Molinism. Specifically, Craig contends that (1) the notion of explanatory priority is employed equivocally in the argument; (2) Adams is guilty of conflating reasons and causes; and (3) one of the intermediate conclusions of the argument is invalidly inferred, as can be seen by a counterexample. I argue that Craig is mistaken on all counts, and that Adams’ argument emerges unscathed.
book symposia:
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Robert J. Fogelin Précis of Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Paul K. Moser The Relativity of Skepticism
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