Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-10 of 97 documents


articles
1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Mark Migotti Slave Morality, Socrates, and the Bushmen: A Reading of the First Essay of On the Genealogy of Morals
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper raises three questions: (1) Can Nietzsche provide a satisfactory account of how the slave revolt could have begun to “poison the consciences” of masters? (2) Does Nietzsche’s affinity for “master values” preclude him from acknowledging claims of justice that rest upon a sense of equality among human beings? and (3) How does Nietzsche’s story fare when looked on as (at least in part) an empirical hypothesis? The first question is answered in the affirmative, the second in the negative, and the third with the verdict “quite well”. Nietzsche’s interpretation of Socrates is held to vindicate the affirmative answer to question one; his conception of nobility as spontaneously self-affirming to justify the negative answer to question two, and historical, anthropological and etymological evidence to support the favorable answer to question three.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Lawrence H. Davis Functionalism and Personal Identity
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Sydney Shoemaker has claimed that functionalism, a theory about mental states, implies a certain theory about the identity over time of persons, the entities that have mental states. He also claims that persons can survive a “Brain-State-Transfer” procedure.My examination of these claims includes description and analysis of imaginary cases, but-notably-not appeals to our “intuitions” concerning them.It turns out that Shoemaker’s basic insight is correct: there is a connection between the two theories. Specifically, functionalism implies that “non-branching functional continuity” is sufficient for personal identity. But there is no implication that it is necessary. And the “BST” procedure may not preserve functional continuity. I consider several possibilities. On what may be the most attractive, the survivor of this---or any similar---procedure is not identical with the original person, but related to him or her as are the survivors in a case of fission.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Mark Balaguer Attitudes Without Propositions
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing ‘that’-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form ‘x believes that p’ and ‘σ means that p’. Briefly, the view is that (a) platonists are right that ‘that’-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions, and hence, (c) ‘that’-clause-containing sentences of the above sort are not true---they are useful fictions. Semantic fictionalism is an extension of Hartry Field’s mathematical fictionalism, but my defense of the view is not analogous to his. One of the many virtues of my defense is its generality: it explains how we can adopt a fictionalist stance towards all abstract singular terms, e.g., mathematical singular terms and ‘that’-clauses.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Martha I. Gibson The Unity of the Sentence and the Connection of Causes
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper attempts a solution to the classical problem of predication, “the unity of the sentence”: how, instead of merely listing the several things they designate, the parts of the sentence combine to represent something as being the case. While this capacity of a sequence of terms to “say some single thing” is standardly attributed to the distinct function of ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ terms, these functional differences need explaining. Here, they are traced to the distinctive, asymmetrical causal explanation of the tokening of the expressions serving one role or another in the speech act: the unity of the sentence is explained by the interconnection and interdependence of the cause of the predicate on that of the subject. Thus the account adverts to the pragmatic character of the expressions rather than the ontology of what they denote. This causal context explains several central semantic features of predication.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Earl Conee Seeing the Truth
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can ‘just see’ that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied.
book symposium:
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Paul M. Churchland Précis of The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Alasdair Macintyre What Can Moral Philosophers Learn from the Study of the Brain?
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
W. D. Christensen, C. A. Hooker Churchland Symposium
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Dudley Shapere Churchland on Cognitive Creativity and the Understanding of Science
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Herman Philipse Shifting Position?
view |  rights & permissions | cited by