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articles
1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 72 > Issue: 3
Jessica Moss Pleasure and Illusion in Plato
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Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion: the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but ignores reasoning about what is really good. Hence the new moral psychology of the Republic: not all desires are rational, and thus virtue depends on bringing one's non-rational desires under the control of reason.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 72 > Issue: 3
David B. Wong Moral Reasons: Internal and External
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The view defended is one sense externalist on the relation between moral reasons and motivation: A's having a moral reason to do X does not necessarily imply that A has a motivation that would support A's doing X via some appropriate deliberative route. However, it is in another sense externalist in holding that there are the kind of moral reasons there are only if the relevant motivational capacities are generally present in human beings, if not in all individuals. The process of socialization is an attempt to embed the recognition of what we have moral reason to do in the intentional content of one's feelings. E.g., learning that about others' suffering embeds their suffering as a reason to help in the intentional content of incipient compassionate feelings. This endows the reason with motivational efficacy while conferring further direction to the feelings in ways that shape us for social cooperation.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 72 > Issue: 3
Gilbert Harman, Sanjeev R. Kulkarni The Problem of Induction
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 72 > Issue: 3
Brian Jonathan Garrett What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the “Hard Problem”
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Daniel Dennett has claimed that if Chalmers' argument for the irreducibility of consciousness were to succeed, an analogous argument would establish the truth of Vitalism. Chalmers denies that there is such an analogy. I argue that the analogy does have merit and that skepticism is called for.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 72 > Issue: 3
Eric Schwitzgebel Do Things Look Flat?
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Does a penny viewed at an angle in some sense look elliptical, as though projected on a two-dimensional surface? Many philosophers have said such things, from Malebranche (1674/1997) and Hume (1739/1978), through early 20th-century sense-data theorists, to Tye (2000) and Noe (2004). I confess that it doesn't seem this way to me, though I'm somewhat baffled by the phenomenology and pessimistic about our ability to resolve the dispute. I raise geometrical complaints against the view and conjecture that views of this sort draw some of their appeal from over-analogizing visual experience to painting or photography. Theorists writing in contexts where vision is typically analogized to less-projective media-wax signet impressions in ancient Greece, stereoscopy in introspective psychology circa 1900-are substantiailly less likely to attribute such projective distortions to visual appearances.
symposium
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 72 > Issue: 3
Sanford Goldberg, David Henderson Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony
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One of the central points of contention in the epistemology of testimony concerns the uniqueness (or not) of the justification of beliefs formed through testimony-whether such justification can be accounted for in terms of, or 'reduced to,' other familiar sort of justification, e.g. without relying on any epistemic principles unique to testimony. One influential argument for the reductionist position, found in the work of Elizabeth Fricker, argues by appeal to the need for the hearer to monitor the testimony for credibility. Fricker (1994) argues, first, that some monitoring for trustworthiness is required if the hearer is to avoid being gullible, and second, that reductionism but not anti-reductionism is compatible with ascribing an important role to the process of monitoring in the course of justifiably accepting observed testimony. In this paper we argue that such an argument fails.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 72 > Issue: 3
Elizabeth Fricker Varieties of Anti-Reductionism About Testimony—A Reply to Goldberg and Henderson
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8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 72 > Issue: 3
Adam Sennet Water and Ice
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 72 > Issue: 3
Scott Soames Is H2O a Liquid, or Water a Gas?
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book symposium
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 72 > Issue: 3
Alan Berger Précis of Terms and Truth: Reference Direct and Anaphoric
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