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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 3
Theodore J. Everett Antiskeptical Conditionals
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Empirical knowledge exists in the form of antiskeptical conditionals, which are propositions like [if I am not undetectably deceived, then I am holding a pen]. Such conditionals, despite their trivial appearance, have the same essential content as the categorical propositions that we usually discuss, and can serve the same functions in science and practical reasoning. This paper sketches out two versions of a general response to skepticism that employs these conditionals. The first says that our ordinary knowledge attributions can safely be replaced by statements using antiskeptical conditionals, which provides a way around the standard sort of skeptical argument while accepting its soundness with respect to the usual targets. The second analyzes the objects of our ordinary knowledge attributions as antiskeptical conditionals, which allows us to refute, not just evade, the skeptic's argument. Both versions compare favorably to the best-knowncurrent approaches to skepticism, including semantic contextualism.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 3
Derk Pereboom Kant on Transcendental Freedom
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Transcendental freedom consists in the power of agents to produce actions without being causally determined by antecedent conditions, nor by their natures, in exercising this power. Kant contends that we cannot establish whether we are actually or even possibly free in this sense. He claims only that our conception of being transcendentally free involves no inconsistency, but that as a result the belief that we have this freedom meets a pertinent standard of minimal credibility. For the rest, its justification depends on practical reasons. I argue that this belief satisfies an appropriately revised standard of minimal credibility, but that the practical reasons Kant adduces for it are subject to scrious challenge.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 3
Robert Pasnau A Theory of Secondary Qualities
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The secondary qualities are those qualities of objects that bear a certain relation to our sensory powers: roughly, they are those qualities that we can readily detect only through a certain distinctive phenomenal experience. Contrary to what is sometimes supposed, there is nothing about the world itself (independent of our minds) that determines the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Instead, a theory of the secondary qualities must be grounded in facts about how we conceive of these qualities, and ultimately in facts about human perception.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 3
Elizabeth Fricker Second-Hand Knowledge
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 3
Roger Crisp Hedonism Reconsidered
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This paper is a plea for hedonism to be taken more seriously. It begins by charting hedonism's decline, and suggests that this is a result of two major objections: the claim that hedonism is the 'philosophy of swine', reducing all value to a single common denominator, and Nozick's 'experience machine' objection. There follows some elucidation of the nature of hedonism, and of enjoyment in particular. Two types of theory of enjoyment are outlined-intemalism, according to which enjoyment has some special 'feeling tone'. and externalism, according to which enjoyment is any kind of experience to which we take some special attitude, such as that of desire. lnternalism-the traditional view--is defended against current externalist orthodoxy. The paper ends with responses to the philosophy of swine and the experience machine objections.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 3
Jordi Fernández Schopenhauer’s Pessimism
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My purpose in this essay is to clarify and evaluate Arthur Schopenhauer's grounds for the view that happiness is impossible. I shall distinguish two of his arguments for that view and argue that both of them are unsound. Both arguments involve premises grounded on a problematic view, namely, that desires have no objects. What makes this view problematic is that, in each of the two arguments, it conflicts with Schopenhauer's grounds for other premises in the argument. I shall then propose a way of fixing both arguments. The solution involves substituting the view that desires have no objects with the view that we have a desire to have desires. The latter view, I shall argue, can do the grounding work that the former does in Schopenhauer's arguments but, unlike it, the view that we desire to desire is consistent with Schopenhauer's grounds for the rest of premises in those arguments.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 3
Daniel Nolan Selfless Desires
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David Lewis's unified theory of the contents of de se and de dicto attitudes faces a problem. Whether or not it is adequate for representing beliefs, it misrepresents the content of many of our desires, which rank possible outcomes in which the agent with the desire does not exist. These desires are shown to playa role in the rational explanation of action, and recognising them is important in our understanding of ourselves.
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 3
Richard Fumerton Direct Realism, Introspection, and Cognitive Science
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book symposium
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 3
Tim Maudlin Précis of Truth and Paradox
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 73 > Issue: 3
Nuel Belnap Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox
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