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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 1
John Greco A (Different) Virtue Epistemology
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Section 1 articulates a genus-species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S's success in believing the truth is attributable to S's ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus-species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That question is raised in the context of an important line of objection against even the genus-species claim; namely, that there is no way to understand the attribution relation so that it does all the work that it is supposed to do. Section 3 reviews several extant proposals for understanding the attribution relation, and argues that none of them are adequate for answering the objection. Section 4 proposes a different way of understanding the relation, and shows how the resulting view does resolve the objection. Section 5 completes the new account by proposing a way to understand intellectual abilities. Section 6 briefly addresses Barn Fafade cases and lottery propositions. Section 7 briefly addresses a question about the scope of knowledge; in particular, it shows how the new view allows a neo-Moorean response to skepticism.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 1
Guy Kahane The Value Question in Metaphysics
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Much seems to be at stake in metaphysical questions about, for example, God, free will or morality. One thing that could be at stake is the value of the universewe inhabit—how good or bad it is. We can think of competing philosophical positions as describing possibilities, ways the world might turn out to be, and to whichvalue can be assigned. When, for example, people hope that God exists, or fear that we do not possess free will, they express attitudes towards these ossibilities,attitudes that presuppose answers to questions about their comparative value. My aim in this paper is to distinguish these evaluative questions from related questions with which they can be confused, to identify structural constraints on their proper pursuit, and to address objections to their very coherence. Answers to such evaluative questions offer one measure of the importance of philosophical disputes.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 1
Jonathan Ichikawa, Ishani Maitra, Brian Weatherson In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 1
Michael Jacovides Locke and the Visual Array
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 1
Simon Prosser Why Does Time Seem to Pass?
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According to the B-theory, the passage of time is an illusion. The B-theory therefore requires an explanation of this illusion before it can be regarded as fullysatisfactory; yet very few B-theorists have taken up the challenge of trying to provide one. In this paper I take some first steps toward such an explanation by first making a methodological proposal, then a hypothesis about a key element in the phenomenology of temporal passage. The methodological proposal focuses onthe representational content of the element of experience by virtue of which time seems to pass. The hypothesis involves the claim that the experience of changeinvolves the representation of something enduring, rather than perduring, through any change.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 1
Stephen Barker, Mark Jago Being Positive About Negative Facts
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Negative facts get a bad press. One reason for this is that it is not clear what negative facts are. We provide a theory of negative facts on which they are no stranger than positive atomic facts. We show that none of the usual arguments hold water against this account. Negative facts exist in the usual sense of existence and conform to an acceptable Eleatic principle. Furthermore, there are good reasons to want them around, including their roles in causation, chance-making and truth-making, and in constituting holes and edges.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 1
Colin Marshall Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason
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review essay
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 1
Richard Joyce Review of Kalderon, M.E., Moral Fictionalism
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book symposium
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 1
John Skorupski Précis of The Domain of Reasons
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 1
Quassim Cassam Epistemic Self-Audit and Warranted Reasons
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