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articles
1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Sarah Moss Updating as Communication
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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Nathan L. King Disagreement: What's the Problem? or A Good Peer is Hard to Find
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3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Declan Smithies Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Eric Swanson Conditional Excluded Middle without the Limit Assumption
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Stephen Kearns, Ofra Magidor Semantic Sovereignty
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6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Andrew M. Bailey Incompatibilism and the Past
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There is a new objecton to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide-ranging than originally thought. In particular:if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompahbilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I then present an argument for incompatibilism that is immune to the objection and that enjoys other advantages.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Bradford Skow "One Second Per Second"
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8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Ben Bradley Doing Away with Harm
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Ben Blumson Mental Maps
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It's often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis—the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the same kind of compositional and recursive structure.
review essay
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 85 > Issue: 2
Richard Gale Review of Robert B. Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy
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