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Displaying: 1-10 of 14 documents


1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Nicholas Silins The Agony of Defeat?
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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Samuel C. Rickless The Contrast-Insensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions
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3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner, Alex Kerr Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content
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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Stuart Brock The Phenomenological Objection to Fictionalism
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Tim Henning Normative Reasons Contextualism
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This article argues for the view that statements about normative reasons are context-sensitive. Specifically, they are sensitive to a contextual parameter specifying a relevant person's or group's body of information. The argument for normative reasons contextualism starts from the context-sensitivity of the normative "ought" and the further premise that reasons must be aligned with oughts. It is incoherent, I maintain, to suppose that someone normatively ought to φ but has most reason not to φ. So given that oughts depend on context, a parallel view about normative reasons is needed. It is shown that the resulting view solves notorious puzzles involving apparently conflicting but equally plausible claims about reasons. These puzzles arise especially in cases where agents have limited information or false beliefs. In these cases, we feel tom between reasons claims that take into account the limitations of the agent's perspective and apparently conflicting claims that are made from a more objective point of view. The contextualist account developed here accommodates both objectivist and subjectivist intuitions. It shows that all of the claims in question can be tme, provided that they are relativized to different values of the relevant information parameter. Also, contextualism yields a fmitful approach to the debate about having reasons and the alleged failure of the so-called "factoring account".
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Boyd Millar The Phenomenological Problem of Perception
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7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
A. D. Smith Spinoza, Gueroult, and Substance
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8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Walter Ott Malebranche and the Riddle of Sensation
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Timothy Williamson Précis of Modal Logic as Metaphysics
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Phillip Bricker The Methodology of Modal Logic as Metaphysics
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