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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Nicholas Silins

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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Samuel C. Rickless

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3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner, Alex Kerr

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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Stuart Brock

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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Tim Henning

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This article argues for the view that statements about normative reasons are context-sensitive. Specifically, they are sensitive to a contextual parameter specifying a relevant person's or group's body of information. The argument for normative reasons contextualism starts from the context-sensitivity of the normative "ought" and the further premise that reasons must be aligned with oughts. It is incoherent, I maintain, to suppose that someone normatively ought to φ but has most reason not to φ. So given that oughts depend on context, a parallel view about normative reasons is needed. It is shown that the resulting view solves notorious puzzles involving apparently conflicting but equally plausible claims about reasons. These puzzles arise especially in cases where agents have limited information or false beliefs. In these cases, we feel tom between reasons claims that take into account the limitations of the agent's perspective and apparently conflicting claims that are made from a more objective point of view. The contextualist account developed here accommodates both objectivist and subjectivist intuitions. It shows that all of the claims in question can be tme, provided that they are relativized to different values of the relevant information parameter. Also, contextualism yields a fmitful approach to the debate about having reasons and the alleged failure of the so-called "factoring account".

6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Boyd Millar

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7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
A. D. Smith

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8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Walter Ott

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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Timothy Williamson

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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Phillip Bricker

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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
John Divers

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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Meghan Sullivan

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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Timothy Williamson

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The thoughtful and probing comments by Phillip Bricker, John Divers, and Meghan Sullivan on Modal Logic as Metaphysics raise a number of interlocking issues, both detailed ones about the reladon of my arguments to David Lewis's modal reahsm and more general ones about methodology in metaphysics. I will respond to each author separately, mentioning interconnections as they arise, and expanding some points made very briefly in the book.

14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3

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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Jacob Ross, Mark Schroeder

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This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is for her credence in this proposition to be above a certain threshold, a threshold that varies depending on pragmatic factors. We show that while this account of belief can provide an elegant explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, it is not alone in doing so, for an alternative account of belief, which we call the reasoning disposition account, can do so as well. And the latter account, we argue, is far more plausible than pragmatic credal reductivism, since it accords far better with a number of claims about belief that are very hard to deny.

16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Tomas Bogardus

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Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S's true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S's belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesana, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at epistemic risk just before forming her belief to the conclusion that S's belief was formed unsafely. In light of lessons from their failure, I provide a new and successful counterexample to the safety condition on knowledge. It follows, then, that knowledge need not be safe. Safety at a time depends counterfactually on what would likely happen at that time or soon after in a way that knowledge does not. I close by considering one objection concerning higher-order safety.

17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio

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Recent authors have drawn attention to a kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as higher-order evidence. Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one's doxastic state is the result of a flawed process —for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug. I argue that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle. The puzzle is that at least in some situations involving higher-order defeaters the correct epistemic rules issue conflicting recommendations. For instance, a subject ought to believe p, but she ought also to suspend judgment in p. l discuss three responses. The first resists the puzzle by arguing that there is only one correct epistemic rule, an Uber-rule. The second accepts that there are genuine epistemic dilemmas. The third appeals to a hierarchy or ordering of correct epistemic rules. I spell out problems for all of these responses. I conclude that the right lesson to draw firom the puzzle is that a state can be epistemically rational or justified even if one has what looks to be strong evidence to think that it is not. As such, the considerations put forth constitute a non-question-begging argument for a kind of extemalism.

18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
John Martin Fischer, Neal A. Tognazzini

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19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Nathan Ballantyne

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20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Peter A. Graham

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In this paper I sketch an account of moral blame and blameworthiness. I begin by clarifying what I take blame to be and explaining how blameworthiness is to be analyzed in terms of it. I then consider different accounts of the conditions of blameworthiness and, in the end, settle on one according to which a person is blameworthy for φ-ing just in case, in φ-ing, she violates one of a particular class of moral requirements governing the atdtudes we bear, and our mental orientation, toward people and other objects of significant moral worth. These requirements embody the moral stricture that we accord to these others a sufficient level of respect, one that their moral worth demands. This is a familiar theme which has its roots in P. F. Strawson's pioneering views on moral responsibihty. My development of it leads me to the conclusion that acting wrongly is not a condition of blameworthiness: violating a moral requirement to perform, or refrain from performing, an acdon is neither necessary nor sufficient for being blameworthy. All we are ever blameworthy for, I will argue, are certain aspects of our mental bearing toward others. We can be said to be blameworthy for our actions only derivatively, in the sense that those actions are the natural manifestations of the things for which we are strictly speaking blameworthy.