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Displaying: 1-14 of 14 documents


articles
1. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
John Barker Disquotation, Conditionals, and the Liar
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In this paper I respond to Jacquette’s criticisms, in (Jacquette, 2008), of my (Barker, 2008). In so doing, I argue that the Liar paradox is in fact a problem about the disquotational schema, and that nothing in Jacquette’s paper undermines this diagnosis.
2. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Paul Horwich Kripke’s Paradox of Meaning
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This paper argues that deflationism about truth enables us to resolve the notorious problem of intentionality—the problem (forcibly articulated by Kripke) of explaining how intrinsically dead signs, whether material or mental, are able to reach into the world and pick out specific collections of things.
3. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Mark McLeod-Harrison God and (Nearly) Universal Pluralistic Antirealism
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This essay takes on two challenges to universal pluralistic antirealism (UPA). One of those challenges is successful, so the universality of UPA is not entirely plausible. However, I propose that the best way to remain as close to the spirit of UPA is to be a theist. God is the only thing that needs to be outside the universal claim of UPA. However, even God is what God is partially within human noetic schemes. Since God is “in the mix” with humans in terms of being a concept-user, God’s presence can solve the other challenge to UPA. UPA is thus replaced by nearly universal pluralistic antirealism (NUPA). The difference between UPA and NUPA, in the end, is not very great.
4. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Christopher Norris Badiou on Set Theory, Ontology and Truth: mathematics as a guide to metaphysics (Part One)
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Alain Badiou is a highly original, indeed decidedly iconoclastic thinker whose work has ranged widely over areas of equal concern to philosophers in the ‘continental’ and mainstream analytic traditions. These areas include ontology, epistemology, ethics, politics, and – above all – philosophy of mathematics. It is unfortunate, and symptomatic of prevailing attitudes, that his work has so far receivedminimal attention from commentators in the analytic line of descent. Here I try to help the process of reception along by describing Badiou’s remarkably ambitious approach to issues of mathematical (more specifically: of set-theoretical) ontology, and by explaining just where his project stands in relation to some major issues within current analytic debate. Chief among them are: the issue between realists and anti-realists – along with various avowed middle-ground or compromise solutions – and those oddly tenacious problems-from-Wittgenstein (e.g., concerning what it means to follow a rule) that have so preoccupied philosophers over the past decade. In particular I stress the unusual, indeed unique combination in his thought of high formal rigour and conceptual clarity allied to a speculative scope and inventiveness which tend to make those other discussions appear somewhat self-absorbed and parochial. Most importantly, Badiou engages these issues at a level of creative as well as of technical or analytic grasp, which puts his thinking closely in touch with the way that set theory has itself evolved through a constant process of – in Badiou’s phrase – ‘turning paradoxes into concepts.’ I also discuss his strong and principled rejection of the ‘linguistic turn’ in its manifold (analytic and continental) variants, and his idea of the ‘event’ as that which inherently eludes or surpasses the conceptual resources of any received ontology, whether in mathematics and the natural sciences or in the history of genuinely epochal changes in politics and ethics. All in all, I put the case for Badiou as a thinker of the first importance not only for the impressive range, depth and originality of his work, but also because it points to an escape-route from some of the more cramped or windowless quarters of present-day philosophic thought.
5. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Włodek Rabinowicz Values Compared
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Gert (2004) has suggested that several different types of value relations, including parity, can be clearly distinguished from each other if one interprets value comparisons as normative assessments of preference, while allowing for two levels of normativity - requirement and permission. While this basic idea is attractive, the particular modeling Gert makes use of is flawed. This paper presents an alternative modeling, developed in Rabinowicz (2008), and a general taxonomy of binary value relations. Another version of value analysis is then brought in, which appeals to appropriate emotions rather than preferences. It is also shown what the modeling of value relations would look like from such an emotion-centered perspective. The preference-based and the emotion-based approaches differ importantly from each other, but they give rise to isomorphic taxonomies.
6. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
John Skorupski Back to Kant?
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Can we develop a Critical Philosophy without resorting either to transcendental idealism or to linguistic conventionalism; that is, without resorting to either of these accounts of the a priori? I argue that we can, by focusing on the notion of a reason: the basic normative concept, which provides the ‘interface’ between self and thought about an objective world.
7. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Nicole A. Vincent Responsibility: distinguishing virtue from capacity
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Garrath Williams claims that truly responsible people must possess a “capacity … to respond [appropriately] to normative demands” (2008, p. 462). However, there are people whom we would normally praise for their responsibility despite the fact that they do not yet possess such a capacity (e.g. consistently well-behaved young children), and others who have such capacity but who are still patentlyirresponsible (e.g. some badly-behaved adults). Thus, I argue that to qualify for the accolade “a responsible person” one need not possess such a capacity, but only to be earnestly willing to do the right thing and to have a history that testifies to this willingness. Although we may have good reasons to prefer to have such a capacity ourselves, and to associate ourselves with others who have it, at a conceptual level I do not think that such considerations support the claim that having this capacity is a necessary condition of being a responsible person in the virtue sense.
book reviews
8. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Christopher M. Caldwell Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics
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9. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Adam Feltz Experimental Philosophy
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10. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Stefan Konstańczak Ekofilozofia: Ecophilosophy
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11. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Jakub Gomułka Gramatyka w dobie sporu o podstawy matematyki. Esej o drugiej filozofii Wittgensteina: [Grammar in the Age of the Dispute over the Foundations of Mathematics: an Essay on Wittgenstein’s Second Philosophy]
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12. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Roman Murawski Philosophy of Mathematics: A Contemporary Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures
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13. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Scott Wilson Ethics and Qualities of Life
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14. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Jan Woleński Notes on Books
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