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Displaying: 1-10 of 24 documents


articles
1. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
J. M. Fritzman Hegel’s Philosophy—in Putnam’s Vat?
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Using Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, this article argues that interpretations which assert that Hegel’s philosophy, or some portion of it, develops inan entirely a priori manner are incoherent. An alternative reading is then articulated.
2. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Jerzy Gołosz Science, Metaphysics, and Scientific Realism
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The paper can be logically divided into two parts. In the first part I distinguish two kinds of metaphysics: basic metaphysics, which affects scientific theories, and a second kind, which is an effect of interpretations of these theories. I try to show the strong mutual relations between metaphysics and science and to point out that the basic metaphysics of science is based on realistic assumptions. In the second part of my paper I suggest that we should consider the basic metaphysics of science and its realistic foundations in order to better understand scientific realism and to properly resolve the debate around it. The methodology of Imre Lakatos is applied in the paper.
3. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Elżbieta Łukasiewicz Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction: Locke’s, Reid’s, or None?
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In the present paper we shall first focus on Locke’s and Reid’s understanding of primary and secondary qualities, as these two approaches mark the main dividing line in interpreting this distinction. Next, we will consider some modern approaches to the distinction and try to answer the question of whether, from theperspective of what we know about perception of sensory qualities, Locke’s ontological interpretation or Reid’s epistemological approach to the distinction are tenable ideas. Finally, we will concentrate on the relation between language and qualities of objects and, on the basis of some adjectival systems in the world’s languages, see how languages render, or code, certain distinctions and qualities apparently obvious to our cognition.
4. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Niklas Möller Thick Concepts and Practice
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Thick concepts provide a focal point for several important issues in ethical theory. Separatists argue that the descriptive and evaluative elements of a thick concept can be separated out. Non-separatists deny this and claim that there are no descriptive boundaries delimiting a thick concept. A common strategy for both camps in the debate has been an appeal to armchair intuitions of various everyday thick concepts. My alternative strategy consists in a closer study of the professional practice of risk analysis. As a well-developed practice, it provides substantial material for analysis. Moreover, its central concepts of risk and safety are typically seen as scientific concepts fitting the separatist analysis. Still, I argue that there are several evaluative aspects in risk and safety ascription that are hard to account for on a separatist analysis. I consider three separatist strategies, and conclude that they all fail. The result is a corroboration of the general non-separatist thesis put forward by theorists such as John McDowell and Bernard Williams.
5. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Jörgen Sjögren Indispensability, the Testing of Mathematical Theories, and Provisional Realism
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Mathematical concepts are explications, in Carnap’s sense, of vague or otherwise unclear concepts; mathematical theories have an empirical and a deductivecomponent. From this perspective, I argue that the empirical component of a mathematical theory may be tested together with the fruitfulness of its explications.Using these ideas, I furthermore give an argument for mathematical realism, based on the indispensability argument combined with a weakened version of confirmational holism
critical notices
6. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Justyna Miklaszewska Contemporary Theories of Justice: Between Utopia and Political Practice
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book reviews
7. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Paweł Armada Historia filozofii politycznej od Tukidydesa do Locke’a: tradycja klasyczna i jej krytycy, [A History of Political Philosophy from Thucidydes to Locke]
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8. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Jakub Gomułka Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Tractatus
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9. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Marek Przychodzeń Natura Cnoty. Problematyka emocji w neoarystotelesowskiej etyce cnót, [The Nature of Virtue. Questions of Emotions in Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics]
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articles
10. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Marie Duží St. Anselm’s Ontological Arguments
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In the paper I analyse Anselm’s ontological arguments in favour of God’s existence. The analysis is an explication and formalization of Pavel Tichý’s study‘Existence and God’, Journal of Philosophy, 1979. It is based on Transparent Intensional Logic with its bi-dimensional ontology of entities organized in the ramified hierarchy of types. The analysis goes as follows. First, necessary notions and principles are introduced. They are: (a) existence is not a (non-trivial) property of individuals, but of individual offices to be occupied by an individual; (b) the notion of requisite is defined, which is a necessary relation between an office O and a property R: necessarily, if a happens to occupy O then a has the property R. (c) I demonstrate that an argument of the form “R is a requisite of O, hence the holder of O has the property R” is invalid. In order to be valid, it must be of the form “R is a requisite of O, the office O is occupied, hence the holder of O has the property R.” Finally, (d) higher-order offices that can be occupied by individual offices are defined. Their requisites are properties of individual offices. Then the analysis of Anselm’s arguments is presented. The expression ‘God’ denotes an individual office, a ‘thing to be’, rather than a particular individual. Thus the question whether God exists is a legitimate one. I analyze the expression ‘that, than which nothing greater can be conceived’. Since ‘greater than’ is a relation-in-intension between individual offices here, the expression denotes a second-order office, and its requisites are properties of first-order offices suchas necessary existence. The second of Anselm’s assumptions is that individual office that has the property of necessary existence is greater than any other office lacking this property. From these it follows that the first-order holder of the office denoted by ‘that, than which nothing greater can be conceived’ (that is God) enjoys the property of necessary existence. Thus God exists necessarily, hence also actually. Anselm’s argument is logically valid. If it were also sound, then an atheist would differ from a believer only by the former not believing whereas the latter believing in a tautology, which is absurd. Yet we may doubt the validity of Anselm’s assumption that a necessary existence makes an office greater than any other office lacking this property.