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Philosophical Inquiry

Volume 41, Issue 4, Fall 2017

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1. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Samuel Kahn, Positive Duties, Maxim Realism and the Deliberative Field
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2. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Luca Forgione, Kant on the Reflecting Power of Judgment and Nonconceptual Content
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3. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Joby Varghese, Misguided Explanation by the Application of Screening Off Via the Principle of Common Cause
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The Principle of common cause (PCC) has its significance in providing explanations of phenomena in terms of causal theories. Though the principle has its own epistemological advantages, there can be certain situations where the principle might fail. In the first part of the paper, I offer a preliminary assessment of the PCC and then I turn to make an attempt to illustrate those scenarios where the PCC might misguide us in providing explanation of phenomena in terms of common cause.
4. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Petros Damianos, Non Conceptual Content And Observable, In Realism Debate
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In this article, I try to present some effects of the acceptance of nonconceptual content of perception in the realism problem. After having enhancement as main the problem of discrimination observable - unobservable into the conflict of realism with the constructive empiricism, I criticize a particular aspect, that nonconceptual content of perception strengthens the realistic position. Arguing that, while the starting point of the realist position is the existence of entities of common sense, there is nothing that assures us that the world of our daily life consists of objective, specific, unambiguous entities, that is made up the deep structure of the world - as realists believes - and entities are not just "relevant" objects, which are meant only for our own biological species. These “subjective for species” entities we are obliged, as a particular species, to percept with particular perceptual organs in order to satisfy specific needs, and manage to survive ourselves in a particular environment.
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5. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Nikolaos Garipidis, Democracy as Popular Sovereignty
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